

**Institute of Distance and Open Learning
Gauhati University**

**M.A. in Sanskrit
1st Semester**

**Paper IV
NYÂYA And VEDÂNTA**



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Block Introduction

The Paper-IV named as Nyâya and Vedânta, consists of two books, viz. Tarkabhâṣâ and Vedântasâra. Tarkabhâṣâ is related with the Indian philosophy written by Kesava Misra. Here, we are going to give you an overview of the different aspects of Indian philosophy, so that you will be familiar with the origin and development of different schools of Indian philosophy. The first three units of this paper will introduce you in detail the various philosophical doctrines of Tarkabhâṣâ, the text prescribed for your study. You will be expected to acquaint yourself with the definition of philosophy, its divisions, characteristics of Indian philosophy, place of Tarkabhâṣâ in Indian philosophy, its authorship, metaphysical and epistemological doctrines of Tarkabhâṣâ as described in these units.

The other three units deal with the Vedântasâra, a book on philosophy written by Sadānanda Yogendra. This book helps you to realise the fundamental concepts of Advaita Vedānta System. From this book you will be able to gather a fair idea of the Advaita Vedānta philosophy propounded by Śaṅkarācārya. In these three units, we shall try to give you an introduction to Vedānta specially to the Advaita Vedānta philosophy; a brief introduction to the book Vedântasâra and its author; relevant texts, its translation and exposition; topics like Maṅgalācarāṇa, Anubandhacatuṣṭaya, Adhyāropa, Apavāda, Ajñāna and origin of the world; Jīvatman, the meaning of Mahāvākyas, liberation, Jīvanmukti and means of liberation.

There will be six units of this paper, which will be run as follows :

- Unit 1 : A General Note on Indian Philosophy
- Unit 2 : A General Note on Tarkabhâṣâ and its Epistemological Aspects
- Unit 3 : Metaphysical Aspects of Tarkabhâṣâ
- Unit 4 : Introduction to the Vedānta Philosophy and Vedântasâra
- Unit 5 : Vedântasâra: Maṅgalācarāṇa, Anubandhacatuṣṭaya, Adhyāropa etc.
- Unit 6 : Vedântasâra: Jīvatman, Mahāvākyas, Liberation etc.

Unit - I

A General note on Indian philosophy

Contents :

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Objectives
- 1.3 Classification of the schools of Indian philosophy
- 1.4 Development of the systems of Indian philosophy
- 1.5 Common characteristics of Indian Philosophy
- 1.6 A brief sketch of *Nāstika* schools of Indian philosophy
- 1.7 A brief sketch of *Āstika* schools of Indian philosophy
- 1.8 Summing up
- 1.9 Sample questions
- 1.10 References

1.1 Introduction

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India inherits from her past a very great treasure of philosophical wisdom. Ancient India is known all over the world for her rich philosophical speculations. For over a period of four thousand years, Indian ascetics developed their systems of philosophy. Indian philosophy is intensely spiritual and has always emphasized the need of practical realisation of truth. It signifies a natural and a necessary urge in human beings to know themselves and the world in which they live and move and have their being. The philosophical thinking in India began with the *R̥gveda* itself, prominently revealed in the hymns like the *Devīs̄ kta*, *Puruṣas̄ kta*, and the *s̄ ktas* ascribed to Dīrghatamas. The *Puruṣas̄ kta* and the *Devīs̄ kta* show the germs of the monistic idealism and the *s̄ ktas* of Dīrghatamas contain the germs of dualistic realism. Thus as a result of this nucleus, there arose six philosophical systems in India based on either monistic idealism or dualistic realism.

Philosophy is an attempt at comprehending the problem of the universe. As philosophy aims at knowledge of truth, it has been termed in Indian literature as *darśana* or the vision of truth. The term *darśana* is derived from the root *dṛś* which means vision and also the instrument of vision. It stands for the direct, immediate and intuitive vision of reality, the actual perception of truth and also includes the means which lead to this realisation.

SAQ :

Give the meaning of *darśana*.

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1.2 Objectives

After reading this unit you will be able to:

- Define philosophy
- Discuss the development of the system of Indian philosophy
- Analyse the characteristic features of Indian philosophy
- Describe the different schools of Indian philosophy

1.3 Classification of the schools of Indian philosophy

The schools of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad classes – *stika* (orthodox) and *n stika* (heterodox). In Indian philosophy the terms *stika* and *n stika* are used in different senses by different thinkers. In common usage *stika* means one who believes in the existence of God or the Absolute and *n stika* means one who does not believe in the existence of God or the Absolute. In the view of the philosophers, the *stika* is one who believes in the validity of the Vedas and the *n stika* is one who does not believe in the validity of the Vedas. According to the grammarians one who believes in the existence of the other world is called *stika* and one who denies the existence of the other world is called *n stika*.

Thus *stika* means orthodox school and *n stika* means heterodox school. Ny ya, Vai eṣika, S khya, Yoga, M m s and Ved nta are the six orthodox schools whereas Caarvaaka, Bauddha and Jaina are the three heterodox schools. The six orthodox schools are also known as *saḍdarśana* (six philosophies).

Stop to Consider :

Different opinions regaing the number of philosophical systems :

The earliest reference to the number of systems is found in the *Śivamahimnastotra* of Puṣpadanta where it is said that there are only four schools of philosophy namely S khya, Yoga, P upata and Vaiṣṇava.

According to the author of the *Arthashastra*, Sākhya, Yoga and Lokaayata are the three philosophical systems. The *Sarvadarśanaśāstra* attributed to Maadhavacaarya classifies Lokaayata, Aārḥata, Bauddha, Raamaanuja, Madhva, Nakulīśa Paaszupata, Szaiva, Pratyabhijā, Raseszvara, Vaiszeṣika, Nyaaya, Mīmāṃsā, Paaṇini, Saamrkhya-Yoga and Szamrkara Vedaanta. Madh sudana Sarasvatī in his *Prasthānabheda* divides darsana into *astika* and *naastika*. Under the former he includes Nyaaya, Vaiszeṣika, Karmamīmāṃsā, Szankaramīmāṃsā, Paañcaraatra and Paaszupata while under the latter the four schools of Buddhism, Digambara school of Jaina and the school of Caarvaaka are included.

1.4 Development of the systems of Indian philosophy

In the west we find one school of philosophy goes on reigning supreme until a new school of thought comes and replaces it. So in the west, we find different schools of philosophy coming successively. But in India we find several schools of philosophy existing side by side. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that these systems originated at the same time. They are found to flourish simultaneously for centuries and pursue parallel courses of growth. The reason for this peculiar fact is that in India philosophy was accepted as a way of life. As each system came into existence, it was adopted as a philosophy of life by a band of followers who formed a school of that particular philosophy. They nurtured the philosophy and handed it down to succeeding generations of followers who are attracted to that school. The different schools of thought thus continued to exist through their followers.

It should however, be borne in mind that each school influenced the other and was in turn influenced by the other systems of thought. Each philosophy regarded it as its duty to patiently learn and consider the view of other schools and to satisfy all possible objections that might be advanced against its own views. It is by such constant mutual criticism that the huge philosophical literature has come into existence.

It is a patent fact that the Vedas are directly or indirectly responsible for most of the philosophical speculations in India. In the orthodox schools, we find the *śāstra* literature, which makes the beginning of systematic philosophical thinking. In philosophical literature *śāstra* means aphorism. It should be remembered that in those ancient times discussions between the preceptor and his disciples took place orally and as there was no printing machinery the discussions were handed down orally to the students of the next generation. Hence a need was felt for linking up the main thoughts in the mind of students by brief statements of problems, answers, possible objections and replies to them.

Sūtra-sūtra is used as a device in respect of the formation of the words in grammar and it is also a device for explaining some topics on issues in short form. A *sūtra* is defined as—

‘अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।

अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥’

In this verse five features of *sūtra* are mentioned. First of all a *sūtra* should consist of minimum number of letters, a *sūtra* should be doubtless, it should be very wide having a significance, it must be clear and expressive in respect of conveying the meaning and it should be free from any defects.

The *sūtra* were very brief and their real imports were not always clear. It was therefore necessary to explain and interpret the *sūtras*. There are cases where different authors have written different commentaries on the same *sūtra* work to justify their respective stand points. As for example the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa contains the aphorism that systematise the different philosophical teachings of the Upaniṣads. Different commentaries on *Brahmasūtra* were written by Śaṅkara, Rāmaṇuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbārka and others. The followers of each of these commentaries formed a school of the Vedaānta and thus there arose many Vedaāntic schools.

And as time went on commentaries on the major commentaries arose. The philosophical literature of the orthodox schools developed in this way. Though the heterodox schools developed in more or less the same way, they did not start from any *sūtra* work.

Brahmasūtra— The work *Brahmasūtra* is ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa. It is also known as Śāṅkarākasūtra, Vedaāntasūtra, Śāṅkarāka-mīmāṃsā or Uttaramīmāṃsā. The *Brahmasūtra* describes the philosophical views of Upaniṣads. The work is in 555 cryptic sūtras which are not intelligible without commentaries. Of the commentators the chief are Śaṅkara, Bhaṣkara, Rāmaṇiya, Nimbārka, Madhva, Baladeva, Vallabha, Śrīpati, Śrīkantha, Vijānabhikṣu and others.

1.5 Common characters of Indian philosophical systems

There are mainly six orthodox and three heterodox schools of Indian philosophy. Though these schools are sometimes widely divergent in their views on the Reality and the world, they are found to agree on certain points. These points of agreement are called the common characters of Indian philosophy. The philosophy of a country is the cream of its culture and civilisation. It springs from the ideas that prevail in its atmosphere and bears its unconscious stamp. Though the different schools of Indian philosophy present a diversity of views, we can discern even in

them the common stamp of an Indian culture. We shall now describe in brief, the common characters of the schools of Indian philosophy.

(a) The practical motive present in all systems : The most fundamental point of agreement is that all the schools regard philosophy as a practical necessity. In India, philosophy is cultivated in order to understand how life is to be led. The aim of philosophical schools in India is not merely the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity, but mainly the acquisition of an enlightened and chastened life. The main aim of philosophy in our country is to enquire into the rules and ways of life which would lead the followers to the realisation of the highest end or ideal of life.

SAQ :

Why all the schools of Indian philosophy regard philosophy as a practical necessity?

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(b) Philosophy springs from spiritual disquiet at the existing order of things:

Every system of Indian philosophy excepting the C r̄v kas, is moved to philosophical speculation by a spiritual disquiet at the sight of sorrows and evils in the world and in life. Every system wants to understand the sources of these evils and incidentally the nature of the universe and the meaning of life so that a way may be found out by which the sufferings and evils can be completely overcome. Philosophy springs from spiritual disquiet at the existing order of things.

(c) Belief in the authority of the Vedas :

All the orthodox schools of India philosophy recognise the authority of the Vedas. The Vedas have been accepted by them as a source of valid knowledge. The heterodox schools, viz the C r̄v ka, Bauddha and Jaina though not subscribing to the intuitive knowledge incorporated in the Vedas, contain a discussion of the Vedas which they have tried to refute. Hence, confirming or refuting as the case may be, of the Vedas, is a common feature of the Indian systems.

(d) Acceptance of pram ṇas as a means of valid knowledge :

All schools of Indian philosophy accept some means of valid knowledge (praamaṇas). Their ontology or the theory of reality is based on epistemology.

There is, however, difference of opinion with regard to the number of the sources of valid knowledge.

(e) The belief in an eternal moral order in the universe :

All the systems of Indian philosophy, barring the Cārvākas, believe in the existence of a universal moral order. This belief has prevented the Indian mind from ending in despair and guaranteed its final optimism. The faith in an eternal moral order sustains human beings in their struggle against sorrows and sufferings in their onward march towards the ideal of future happiness. This inviolable moral order has been called *ṛta* by the seers of the *Ṛgveda*. This moral law not only holds away over the moral phenomena, but also over the physical things of the universe. It makes for the regularity and righteousness, and works in the gods, the heavenly bodies and all creatures. This idea of *ṛta* has shaped itself into *ap rva* in Mīmāṃsā system. *Ap rva* is the law that guarantees the future enjoyment of fruits of rituals performed now in this world. The same moral law has taken the name of *adr̥ṣṭa* on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. *Adr̥ṣṭa* is the unseen principle which sways even over the material atoms, and brings about objects and events in accordance with moral principles. The eternal and moral order which has been termed *ṛta* in the Vedas, *ap rva* in the Mīmāṃsā and *adr̥ṣṭa* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣik philosophies has gradually shaped itself into the general principle of *karma* accepted by all Indian systems. The law of *karma* may be regarded as the law of the conservation of moral values, merits and demerits of actions. The Indian philosophers believe that the law of *karma*, which is a moral law, guarantees reward in the form of virtue for good deeds and punishment in the form of vice for the bad deeds.

(f) Transmigration of soul : Transmigration of the soul also is a common feature of the systems of Indian philosophy barring the Cārvākas. It is, however, a corollary of the law of *karma* which demands that good actions must have good consequences. But it is found that fruits of all actions can not be reaped in this life. So it is necessary to presume the existence of a next life. Transmigration means the assumption of another body by the soul after death or dissolution of the present body. The soul is eternal and can not be extinct. The soul survives the death of the body and assumes another body which is fit for enjoying the consequences of actions done in this life. The same soul continues through different births.

(g) The universe as the moral stage : Intimately connected with the faith in an eternal moral order is the general tendency of the Indian thinkers to regard the world as a moral stage in which the individual selves are actors with different dresses in the form of physical bodies, sense organs etc. Putting on these dresses the individual selves play their respective roles well so that they may deserve well in future. The body, the senses, the motor organs that an individual gets, and the environment in which he is placed are the endowments of God or nature in accordance with the law of *karma*.

(h) Ignorance as the cause of bondage and right knowledge is necessary for liberation :

Another view held in common by all Indian philosophers, except the C̣rṿkas, is that ignorance of reality is the root cause of our bondage and sufferings. In order to attain liberation from these sufferings, a true knowledge of the real nature of the world and the self is essential. By bondage is meant the process of birth and rebirth and consequent sufferings which as individual is subjected to. Liberation (*mukti* or *mokṣa*) means a complete cessation of the process of birth and rebirth. It is because of ignorance about the real nature of the world and self that an individual becomes subject to sufferings. The soul, by nature, is essentially free. When this soul, encased in a physical body, undergoes the process of birth and rebirth, it is in bondage, and a complete stoppage of this process is known as liberation. All Indian thinkers are unanimous in their opinion that liberation can not be attained without dispelling ignorance. Thus ignorance is the cause of bondage and right knowledge is necessary for liberation.

(i) Continued meditation and self control as the pre-requisites to right knowledge :

Indian thinkers have felt the necessity of continued meditation and self control as the pre-requisites to right knowledge. The philosophic truths that are momentarily established and understood through arguments are not enough to dispel ignorance. Prolonged meditation on these truths is necessary to instill them into our life. Self control is necessary for concentration of mind on these truths and for making them effective in life. With distracted and unbridled mind it is not possible to concentrate mind on truth.

(j) Belief in liberation :

All the systems of Indian philosophy except the C̣rṿkas, accept the idea of liberation or *mokṣa* as the highest end of life (*puruṣārtha*). The idea of liberation is common to all systems of Indian philosophy barring the C̣rṿkas. Indian philosophy is a philosophy of liberation from worldly bondage. Indian philosophers believe that it is possible for the individual souls to attain freedom from miseries and death by the disinterested performance of their prescribed duties.

Stop to Consider :

Place of liberation in Indian philosophy :

The concept of liberation occupies an important position in Indian philosophy. Of all the conceptions as dealt with in Indian philosophy the conception of *mukti* or liberation is the most important one. Liberation in Indian philosophy is considered as the 'paramount ideal and end' of life. The conception of liberation attains such prominence in India that the Indian philosophical systems are called *mokṣāśāstra*. In Indian philosophy different philosophers use various terms to denote the word 'liberation' namely— *kaivalya*, *nirvāṇa*, *śreyah*, *nihśreyasam*, *amṛtam*, *mokṣa*, *apavarga* etc. All these terms have been used to indicate the same meaning.

1.6.1 A Brief sketch of the *nāstika* schools of Indian philosophy : Cārvāka system

The origin of the word 'Caarvaaka' is not definitely known, some derive the word from *c ruv k* or sweet tongued, because the Caarvaakas propounded a doctrine which was attractive to the common people. Others think that Cārvāka was the name of a sage who first expounded this philosophy. In some treatise Brhaspati is said to be the author of Caarvaaka philosophy. Hence the philosophy is known as *Baṛhaspatya darśana*. Who ever be the founder of this philosophy the word Caarvaaka has become synonymous with materialist. This philosophy is also known as *Lok yatamata* or the doctrine of the common people since the philosophy is very attractive to the common people. The Caarvaaka or a materialist is accordingly called *Lok yatika*.

A consistent and complete account of the Caarvaaka system is not found in any work written by a Caarvaaka thinker. It is therefore impossible to trace the original author of this philosophy. But it can not be denied that the Caarvaaka philosophy is a very ancient philosophy. The original writings of the Caarvaaka philosophy has not been found. The philosophy of the Caarvaaka has been reconstructed from the exposition of the doctrine by Buddhists, Jaina and Hindu critics. There is a chapter on Caarvaaka philosophy in Maadhavaacaarya's *Sarvadars'anasa graha* but the chapter contains so scanty materials that it is difficult to make a clear idea of the real views of the Caarvaaka.

The philosophy of the Cārvāka is based on their theory of knowledge or epistemology. The Cārvākas hold that perception is the only *pramāṇa* or dependable source of knowledge. Perception reveals only the material world composed of the four *bhūtas* or elements of matter viz air, fire, water and earth, the existence of which we can directly know through senses. All objects of this perceptible world are composed of these elements. The existence of soul as distinct from the body is not given in our sense-perception and hence Caarvaaka rejects the reality of the soul. The soul to them is the body endowed with consciousness. The Caarvaaka preaches hedonism as the ideal of human life. The Caarvaaka rejects the reality of God and considers the king as the God. According to Caarvaakas Vedic oblations and rituals are meaningless. In their view there is no heaven nor any hell.

1.6.2 The Bauddha system

The Bauddha system of philosophy arose out of the teachings of Gautam Bauddha the well known founder of Buddhism. Gautama was awakened to an appreciation of sorrow by the sight of disease, old age, death and other miseries to which man is subject. He spent years in study, penance and meditation to discover the origin of human sufferings and the means to overcome them. At last he received enlightenment, the result of which was set forth by him in the form of what has come to be known as the four noble truth. These are the truths that there is misery, the truth that there is a cause of misery, the truth that there is cessation of

misery and the truth that there is a path leading to the cessation of misery.

The teachings of the Buddha are to be found in the three *piṭakas* or baskets of the law which constitute the Pali canonical literature. They are *suttapiṭaka* containing the sermons with parables, *Vinaya piṭaka* dealing with rules of conduct and *Abhidhamma piṭaka* which deals with problems of philosophical interest.

According to Buddha everything is impermanent in this world. There is no permanent soul. There is no *Brahman*, God or the Absolute as creator of the world. The world is self-existent. It is without beginning or end. There are no permanent substances. They are only impermanent qualities or phenomena. They are subject to the inexorable law of becoming or dependent origination. They are produced by their causes and conditions. Change is the stuff of reality. According to Gautama Buddha ignorance is the root cause of all sufferings. His teachings aim at the total extinction of suffering and attainment of *Nirvāṇa* here in this life.

The later followers of Buddha in India and outside developed the germs of philosophical theories contained in Buddha's teachings and many schools thus came into existence. Of these the four schools that became most well known in Indian philosophy are the Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda, the Yogaśāstra or Vijñānavāda, the Sautrāntika and the Vaiśāṅhika.

Buddhism is divided on religious matters into two well known schools namely Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna schools. The first two of the four philosophical schools mentioned above come under Mahāyāna school. On the other hand the other two schools come under Hīnayāna school.

SAQ :

What are the four noble truths of Buddha Philosophy?

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1.6.3 Jaina system

The word 'Jainism' is derived from *Jina* which means conqueror-one who has conquered his passions and desires. It is applied to the liberated souls who have conquered passions and desires and karmas and obtained emancipation. The Jainas believe in twenty four *tīrtha karas* or founders of the faith through whom their faith has come down from fabulous antiquity. Of these, the first was Ṛṣabhadeva and the last, Mahāvīra, the great spiritual hero, whose name was Vardhamāna. Mahāvīra, the last of the prophets, can not be regarded as the founder of Jainism, because even before him, Jaina teachings were existent. But Mahāvīra gave a new orientation to that faith and for all practical purposes,

modern Jainism may be rightly regarded as a result of his teachings. He flourished in the sixth century B.C and was a contemporary of the Buddha. His predecessors, the twenty third *tirtha kara*, Paarszvanaatha is also a historical personage who lived in the eighth or ninth century B.C.

The Jainas are divided into two sects—*Sveta maa bara* and *Digambara*. These two sects do not disagree in the fundamental tenets of Jainism. They differ only in essential points. A council met at Pataliputra near the end of the fourth century B.C for fixing the canon of Jaina scriptures. Eighty four works are recognised as belonging to the canonical literature. All these literature were in *Ardhama agadhi*. When Jainism had to defend itself against the criticism of other schools, it adopted the technical philosophical terminology of Sanskrit and developed its literature in Sanskrit. The *Tattv rthaa dhigamasuutra* of Umaasvaami or Umasvaati is a sacred epitome of Jainism. Though it is a Svetaambara extra canonical work, it is revered by both the sects. It contains all the fundamental principles of Jainism.

The Jaina metaphysics is a realistic and relativistic pluralism. The objects perceived by us are real and they are many. The world consists of two kinds of reality—living and non-living. Every living being has a soul or spirit, however, imperfect its body may be. Therefore avoidance of all injury (*ahimsaa*) to life plays an important role in Jaina ethics. There is another great and commendable element in Jainism, namely respect for the opinion of others. This is due to the Jainas' metaphysical theory of reality as *anekaa ntavaa da* and the logical doctrine that every judgement is subject to some condition and limitation (*syaa dva da*) ।

The Jainas do not believe in God. The *tirtha karas* to whom all the godly powers like omniscience and omnipotence belong, take the place of God. They are adored as ideal of life.

The teachings and lives of the liberated saints (*tirtha karas*) prove the possibility of liberation and show also the path to be followed for the purpose. Three things are necessary for the removal of bondage viz, perfect faith in the teachings of the Jaina teachers, correct knowledge of the teachings and right conduct.

The most important contribution of the Jainas to Indian thought is their ethics. It is a philosophy of self-help. The Jainas excel others in emphasising the fact that the soul in man is the repository of infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss. According to Jainism man is greater than gods.

1.7.1 Aastika schools of Indian philosophy : Nyaya system :

The sage Gotama is the founder of Nyaya school. He is also known as Gautama and as Akṣapaada. The Nyaya system of Indian philosophy is also known as *Tarkas z stra* or the science of reasoning, *Pram ṇas z stra* or the science of logic and epistemology, *Hetuvidy* or the science of causes, *v davidy* or the science of debate and *AAnvikṣik* or the science of critical study.

Gotama's *Nyaya yasuutra* was commented upon by Vatsyaayana in his *Nyaya bha aṣya*.

On this Uddyotakara wrote his *vaartika* which was commented upon by Vaacaspati in his *Taatpariyatīka*. Udayana's *Nyāyākusumāñjalī* and Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* are the other important works of this school. The Navya-Nyāya or the modern school of Indian logic begins with the epoch-making *Tattvacintamani* of Gaṅgeśa.

The Nyāya philosophy is a realistic philosophy based mainly on logical grounds. It admits four separate sources of true knowledge, viz perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. The objects of knowledge according to the Nyāya are the self, the body, the senses and their object, cognition, mind activity, mental defects, rebirth, the feelings of pleasure and pain, suffering and freedom from suffering. According to Nyāya philosophy the self is distinct from the body and the mind. The body is only a composite substance made of matter. The mind is subtle, indivisible and eternal substance. It serves the soul as an instrument for the perception of psychic qualities like pleasure, pain etc. It is ignorance of the truth (*mithya-jāna*) and the consequent faults of desire, aversion and infatuation that impel the self to act for good and bad ends and plunge it into the world of sin and suffering, birth and death. Liberation means the absolute cessation of all pain and suffering due to the right knowledge of reality. The existence of God is proved by the Naiyāyikas by several arguments. God is the ultimate cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. He did not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms, space, time, ether, minds and souls. This world has been created in order that individual souls might enjoy pleasure or suffer pain according to the merit or demerit of their actions in other lives and in other worlds.

1.7.2 Vaiszeṣika system :

The Vaiszeṣika takes its name from *viszeṣa* or particularity of eternal substances. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal. Each atom has a particularity which distinguishes it from other atoms of the same kind. Soul and mind are eternal and many. Each of them has a particularity or *viszeṣa*. The distinction of the Vaiszeṣika consists in its discussion of *viszeṣa* from which it has taken its name. Kaṇāda was the founder of the *Vaiszeṣika* system. Kaṇāda or Kaṇabhakṣa etymologically signifies atom-eater and this name might have been suggested by the atomic theory which is the central feature of the Vaiszeṣika system. Kaṇāda's real name was Uluuka. For which his philosophy is also known as Auluukya Darsana. The first systematic exposition of the *Vaiszeṣika* philosophy is found in the *Vaiszeṣika sūtra* of Kaṇāda. The notable commentators, to mention only some of them, are Prasastapada, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Śrīvāditya.

The Nyāya and Vaiszeṣika are allied systems or *samānāntara*. They both recognise the reality of God, individual souls, mind, physical things, atoms of earth, water, fire air, ether, space and time. They both advocate a similar view of the nature of individual souls and their liberation. They both advocate realism and pluralism. They differ in two main points. The Nyāya recognises four means of valid knowledge, viz, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, recognises only two, viz, perception and inference. Secondly, the Nyāya recognises sixteen categories while the Vaiśeṣikas recognises only seven categories.

SAQ :

What are the different names used for Nyāya philosophy ? Mention a few works of Nyāya philosophy.

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1.7.3 Sāṃkhya system

Sāṃkhya philosophy is undoubtedly one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy. Tradition regards Kapila as the founder of this system. This philosophy is also known as *Kāpiladarsana*, by the name of its author. But *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra* which is attributed to him is generally regarded by scholars as a work of the fourteenth century A.D. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* seems to be the earliest available and most popular work of this system. Besides this the other *Sāṃkhya* works are Gauḍapāda's *Sāṃkhyakārikā bhāṣya*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, Vijñānabhikṣu's *Sāṃkhya Pravacanasūtra*, Nṛyaṇātha's *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, Mādhvacārya's *Mādhvavivṛtti*, Śaṅkarācārya's *Jayamaṅgalā*, Aniruddha's *Aniruddhavivṛtti*, Yukidipika, *Tattvasamāsa* etc.

The Sāṃkhya as a philosophy of dualistic realism admits two ultimate realities namely, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, which are independent of each other in respect of their existence. The *puruṣa* is an intelligent principle, of which consciousness is not an attribute but the very essence. It is the self which is quite distinct from the body, the senses and the mind. *Prakṛti* is the ultimate cause of the world. It is an eternal unconscious principle which is always changing and has no other end than the satisfaction of the selves. *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are three constituents of *prakṛti* which holds them together in state of rest or equilibrium (*śānti*). Though *puruṣa* or self is eternally liberated yet due to non-discrimination between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* the self has a false sense of bondage. However when the discriminative knowledge arises i.e., when the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is realised *prakṛti* attains salvation.

With regard to the problem of God it is found that the main tendency of the Sāṃkhya is to do away with the theistic belief. According to it, the existence of God can not be proved in any way. Some Sāṃkhya commentators however, try to show that the system admits the existence of God as the supreme person who is the witness but not the creator of the world.

SAQ :

Mention the different literature of Sāṅkhya philosophy.

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1.7.4 Yoga system

Patañjali is the traditional founder of the Yoga system. The word *yoga* literally means union i.e. spiritual union of the individual soul with the universal soul and is used in this sense in the Vedānta. The *Gītā* defines *yoga* as that state in which there is nothing higher or worth realising and firmly rooted in which a person is never shaken even by the greatest pain; that state free from all pain and misery is *yoga*. According to Patañjali *yoga* does not mean union but spiritual effort to attain perfection through the control of the body, senses and mind, and through right discrimination between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Yoga philosophy is intimately allied to Sāṅkhya. *Yoga* philosophy mostly accepts the metaphysics and epistemology of Sāṅkhya. It shows the practical path by following which one may attain *viveka-jīvanā* which alone leads to liberation. *Yoga* accepts the three *pramāṇas* of Sāṅkhya and also the twenty five metaphysical principles. *Yoga* believes in God as the highest self distinct from other selves. Hence it is sometimes called *Sesvara Sāṅkhya* or theistic Sāṅkhya as distinct from classical Sāṅkhya which is *Nirīśvara* or atheistic.

The *Yogasūtra* is divided into four parts. The first is called *Samādhi-pāda* which deals with the nature and aim of concentration. The second, *sādhana-pāda* explains the means to realise this end. The third *vibhūti-pāda* deals with the supranormal powers which can be acquired through *yoga*. The fourth, *kaivalya-pāda* describes the nature of liberation and the reality of the transcendental self. Vyāsa's commentary on the *Yogasūtra* gives the standard exposition of the *Yoga* principles. Vācaspati wrote a glossary on *Vyāsa-sabhasya* called *Tattvavaiśāradya*. Bhoja's *Rajamārtanda*, Vijñānabhikṣu's *Yogavṛttika*, *Yogasāra-graha* are useful manuals of *Yoga* philosophy.

1.7.5 Mīmāṃsā system :

The Mīmāṃsā school was founded by Jaimini. The word *Mīmāṃsā* literally means revered thought and was originally applied to the interpretation of the Vedic rituals which commanded highest reverence. Just as Sāṅkhya and Yoga, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya are regarded as allied systems, similarly Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are also treated as allied systems of thought. Mīmāṃsā deals with the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda and is therefore called *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and also *Karmamīmāṃsā* while Vedānta deals with *Jñānakāṇḍa* of the Veda and is

therefore called *Uttaramīmāṃsā* and also *Jñānamīmāṃsā*. The former deals with *dharma* and the latter with *Brahma* and therefore the former is also called *Dharmamīmāṃsā* while the latter is also called *Brahmamīmāṃsā*.

The chief aim of Mīmāṃsā is to help and support Vedic ritualism by supplying a philosophical justification of the beliefs on which ritualism depends. The faith underlying the Vedic ritualism consists of belief in the existence of soul which survives death and enjoys the fruits of rituals in heaven, of belief in some power which preserves the fruits of rituals performed here in this world and of the belief in the reality of the world and the actions performed. Mīmāṃsā justifies these beliefs. But it does not believe that there is a supreme soul or God who has created the world. The importance of Mīmāṃsā philosophy for the Hindu religion is great. Modern Hindu law is considerably influenced by the Mīmāṃsā system.

The earliest work of this system is the *Mīmāṃsāśāstra* of Jaimini which begins with an enquiry into the nature of *dharma*. It is the biggest of all the philosophical *śāstras* and discusses about one thousand topics. Śābaraśvamin has written his great commentary on this work and his commentary has been explained by Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who differ from each other in certain important respects and form the two principal schools of Mīmāṃsā named after them. Prabhākara's commentary *Bṛhati* has been commented upon by Śālikānātha who has also written another treatise *Prakaraṇapāṭikā*. Kumārila's huge work is divided into three parts—*Ślokaśruti*, *Tantravṛtti* and *Tuṭīka*, the first of which has been commented upon by Pārthasaarathi Miśra who has also written his *Śāstraśikṣā*. Tradition makes Prabhākara a pupil of Kumārila who nicknamed him as 'Guru' on account of his great intellectual powers. But some scholars believe that the Prabhākara school is older and seems to be nearer the spirit of the original Mīmāṃsā.

1.7.6 Vedānta system

Vedānta literally means 'the end of the Vedas' or the doctrines set forth in the closing chapter of the Vedas, which are the Upaniṣads. Subsequently, however, Vedānta came to mean all the thoughts that developed out of the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads are many in number. The problems discussed in these Upaniṣads and the solutions offered there to present differences in spite of a unity of general outlook. So there arose a need for systematising the different teachings of the Upaniṣads in order to bring out the harmony underlying them. Bādarāyaṇa fulfilled this task in his *Brahmasūtra* which was variously known as *Vedāntasūtra*, *Śārirākasūtra*, *Śārirākamīmāṃsā* and *Uttaramīmāṃsā*.

The *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa are very brief and naturally the real import of the *sūtras* are not easily intelligible and are liable to different interpretations. Various commentators have written their commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra* to elaborate the doctrine of the Vedānta in their own light. Of these commentators mention may be made of Śāṅkara, Rāmaānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Nimbārka. Each if

these authors became the founder of a particular school of Vedānta. These are Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta of Rāmaṇuja, Dvaitavedānta of Madhva, Suddhādvaitavedānta of Vallabha and Dvaitadvaitavedānta of Nimbarka. In this connection it can be mentioned that there are two other independent schools of Vedānta system viz. bheda-bheda of Bhāskara and Acintya-bheda-bheda of Baladeva Vidyabhāṣaṇa, which also interpreted the central concept of Vedānta system in their own way.

The common question on which the schools of Vedānta differ is regarding the nature of the relation between the self and Brahman. Some hold that these two are totally different in nature. Some are of opinion that the two are absolutely identical. Again some scholars point out that these two are related as part and whole and thus different schools of Vedānta sprang up.

1.8 Summing up :

Now we may conclude that philosophy is necessary to lead a good life. It provides wisdom to inculcate values like ethical, moral and spiritual for rational human existence and prepares the background for leading an enlightened way of life. So philosophy can help man in formulating all possible ways for achieving the highest end of life.

1.9 Sample questions :



1. What is philosophy? Write a note on the classification of the different schools of Indian philosophy.
2. Give an idea on the development of the systems of Indian philosophy.
3. Discuss in brief the salient features of Indian philosophical systems.
4. Write a brief note on the *nāstika* schools of Indian philosophy.
5. Discuss briefly the *āstika* schools of Indian philosophy.

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Unit 2

A General Note on *Tarkabhāṣā* and Its Epistemological Aspects (*Pūrvabhāga*)

Contents:

- 2.1 Introduction.
- 2.2 Objectives.
- 2.3 Contents of the *Tarkabhāṣā* .
- 2.4 About the author.
- 2.5 Commentaries and commentators of *Tarkabhāṣā* .
- 2.6 Theory of causation.
- 2.7 Valid knowledge and the sources of valid knowledge.
 - 2.7.1 Perception.
 - 2.7.2 Inference.
 - 2.7.3 Comparison.
 - 2.7.4 Verbal Testimony.
- 2.8 Summing up.
- 2.9 Sample questions. ❏
- 2.10 References.

2.1 Introduction

The *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keszava Miszra occupies an important place in the field of syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought. The fountain source of this book is the *sūtras* ascribed to Gotama which is one of the most approved elementary treatises. The *Tarkabhāṣā* is a *Nyāyaprakaraṇa* which elaborately explains the sixteen categories of Gotama and briefly the Vaiśeṣika categories of Kaṇāda. The literature on Vaiśeṣika philosophy and Nyāya philosophy had become so vast by about 10th century that it was particularly impossible for an ordinary student to have enough knowledge of logic within a short time for the pursuit of his studies. To avoid such difficulties Keszava Miszra summarized the principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy in a simpler language and wrote a *prakaraṇa*, the introductory manual which is quite useful for the learners. The book is mainly divided into two parts, viz *pūrvabhāga* and *uttarabhāga*. At the very beginning of the book the author discusses the first *sūtra* of Gotama enumerating the categories viz *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *śaśaya*, *prayojana*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *nirṇaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and

nigrahasthāna.

The exposition of the four *pramāṇas* are discussed in the *Pūrvabhāga* and *Uttarabhāga* discusses the various categories or *prameya*. The other fourteen categories are just mentioned very briefly. In order to include Vaiśeṣika categories into Nyāya, Keśava Mīśra explains *artha* as indicating *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānyā*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*. The book is very popular and is used as beginners' text book in different parts of India.

In this unit contents of *Tarkabhāṣā*, its author, different commentaries of *Tarkabhāṣā* are discussed. Besides these a detailed discussion on the theory of causation, valid knowledge and expositions of four *pramāṇas* are narrated.

2.2 Objectives

After reading this chapter you will be able to

Explain the importance of *Tarkabhāṣā* in the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought.

Discuss the position of Keśava Mīśra amongst the Indian philosophers.

List out the various commentaries of *Tarkabhāṣā*

Define the meaning and concept of *pramāṇa*

Describe the theory of causation as dealt in *Tarkabhāṣā*.

Analyse the need and importance of *pramāṇas* in Indian epistemology.

Examine the various types of *pramāṇas* discussed in the *Tarkabhāṣā*.

2.3 Contents of the *Tarkabhāṣā* :

The *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Mīśra belongs to the syncretic school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought. At the very beginning the author Keśava Mīśra mentions the sixteen categories accepted by Gotama in his *Nyāyasūtra*. He explains that by knowing the real nature of the sixteen categories liberation can be obtained. He discusses that the real nature of these categories can not be explained unless the three aspects of their discussion viz, enumeration (*uddeśā*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and analysis or examination (*parikṣā*) are not studied. Then he gives the definition of *pramāṇa*, *kāraṇa* and *kāraṇa* accordingly. Keśava Mīśra defines *pramāṇa* as an instrumental cause which produces true cognition (*pramāṇa*). Then he explains the three varieties of cause, viz, inherent (*samavāya*), non-inherent (*asamavāya*) and causes in general (*nimittakāraṇa*), while explaining the inherent cause he discusses the relation, which is of two kinds,

conjunction or contact (*sa yoga*) and inherence (*samavaya*).

He also discusses the definition and characteristics of a sentence. He said that a sentence is a collection of words which have three characteristics namely– (a) *kaṅkṣa* (verbal expectancy) (b) *yogyatā* (congruity) and (c) *sannidhi* (proximity). Here he mentions that without these characteristics a meaningful sentence can not be formed. After the discussion of four valid sources of knowledge, Keśava Miśra rejects the validity of presumption (*arthapatti*) and negation (*abhava*) as a source of knowledge. According to the author other sources of valid knowledge can be included within the four *pramāṇas* namely perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. At the end of the *pravāhiga* the author explains the objection of Mīmāṃsakas about the validity of knowledge and establishes the Naiyāyika's view.

In the *Uttarabhāṣya* of *Tarkabhāṣya* Keśava Miśra discusses *prameya* which are twelve in number as enumerated in the *Nyāyastotra*. These are self (आत्मन्), body (शरीर), sense organ (इन्द्रिय), objects (अर्थ), knowledge (बुद्धि), mind (मनः), action (प्रवृत्ति), defect (दोष), rebirth (प्रेत्यभाव), result (फल), misery (दुःख) and salvation (अपवर्ग). While mentioning objects he said that objects are divided into six categories. These are substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण), action (कर्म), generality (सामान्यम्), speciality (विशेषः) and inherence (समवाय). All these six are positive categories. He also describes negation which is cognised in the form of nonexistence, Keśava Miśra explains nine divisions of substance. These nine substances are earth (पृथिवी), water (आपः), light (तेजः), air (वायुः), ether (आकाशम्), time (काल), space (दिक्), soul (आत्मन्) and mind (मनः). Then he describes the process of production and destruction of the four producible substances beginning with earth. After that he explains the evidence for accepting atoms. According to Keśava Miśra dyad is made up of two atoms when they come in contact with each other. A triad is composed of three dyads. In this way gradually gross earth, water, fire and air are created. Then Keśava Miśra explains the rest five substances i.e., ether, time, space, soul and mind.

In the *Uttarabhāṣya* of *Tarkabhāṣya*, Keśava Miśra discusses twenty four numbers of qualities, five types of action, generality, particularity and inherence. After describing the six categories he explains the term negation (अभावः) and its various types. He discusses in detail the topics like soul, knowledge, body, mind, sense-organs, fallacies etc. There are some other categories which are also discussed briefly in *Tarkabhāṣya*.

Keśava Miśra discusses four different sources of valid knowledge viz, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. *Pratyakṣa* or perception is the direct knowledge of object which is of two types, viz. indeterminate and determinate. Keśava Miśra defines indeterminate perception as the knowledge of something without any determination. The instrumental cause is the indeterminate perception.

Determinate perception functions as an additional factor which has operation of the instrumental cause. After perception Keśava Miśra explains the second source of valid knowledge i.e., *anumāna* or inference. He discusses in detail the various divisions of inference and also the fallacies. Keśava Miśra explains different types of *vyapti* along with the definition of *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. *Upamāna* is another independent source of valid knowledge discussed by Keśava Miśra in his book *Tarkabhāṣā*. He discusses comparison in the light of *Naiyāyikas*. The fourth source of knowledge is explained as *śabda* or verbal testimony by Keśava Miśra.

2.4 About the author

The author of the book *Tarkabhāṣā* is Keśava Miśra. In the body of the book he calls himself only as Keśava. However, at the end of the concluding verse it is mentioned as इति केशवमिश्रप्रणीता तर्कभाषा समाप्ता . The word Miśra suggest that he might be a native of Mithila. Keśava Miśra never mentions about himself but we know a little about him from his disciple Govardhana's commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā*. Govardhana mentions Keśava Miśra as his preceptor. He also introduces Keśava Miśra as the son of Balabhadra who had two elder brothers namely Visvanātha and Padmanābha. According to scholars, Keśava Miśra is a *pracināyika* since he did not follow the *Navya-niyāya* system of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. According to Karl Potter, Keśava Miśra flourished about a century before Gaṅgeśa and hence considered him as a *pracināyika*. Pandit Gaurinath Sastri is also of the view that Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā* is based on old *Nyāya* tradition and takes into consideration the sixteen categories of the *Nyāyastotra* of Gotama. This proves that Keśava Miśra is a *pracināyika*. Keśava Miśra is supposed to have lived in the later half of the 13th Century. No other work of the author has come to light so far and it can be assumed that perhaps he has not written any other work.

2.5 Commentaries and commentators of *Tarkabhāṣā*

A large number of commentaries have been written on the book *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. The oldest commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā* is *Tarkabhāṣā prakāśa* by Sri Govardhana Miśra. We found another commentator Vardhamana by name. According to Dr. Peterson, Vardhamana is the first author to comment on *Tarkabhāṣā*. The most popular commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā* is *Tarkabhāṣā prakāśikā* by Cennubhaṭṭa. Another commentary is known as *Ujjalatkā* by Gopinātha which is also known by the name *Tarkabhāṣā tīkā*. Other commentaries are *Nyāyasamgrahatīkā* by Sri Ramalinga, *Tarkabhāṣā - śrīrama jar* by Sri Madhavadeva, *Paribhāṣā-darpaṇa* by Sri Bhaskarabhaṭṭa, *Tarkabhāṣā prakāśikā* by Sri Balacandra, *Tattvaprabodhinī* by Gaṅgeśa Dikṣita, *Tarkabhāṣā prakāśikā* by Sri Kaundinya Dikṣit, *Tarkadīpikā* by Kesavabhaṭṭa, *Tarkabhāṣā prakāśikā* or

Tarkabhaaṣaabhavaarṥhadīpikaa by Sri Gaurikanta Sarvabhauma, *Yuktimukt val* by Sri Nagesa Bhatta, *Ny yaprad p* by Visvakarman, *Tarkakaumud* by Sri Dinakarabhatta, *Tarkabh ṣ praṣ dini* by Vagisabhatta, *Tarkabh ṣ prakāṣa* by Akhandanananda. Beside these some commentaries unknown authors are found. Those are *B labodhin* , *Ny yaprak śik* , *Tarkbh ṣ v rttika*, *Tarkabh ṣ padakṛtya* etc. Again a few commentors are mentioned whose commentaries are not found. They are Murari Bhatta, Gundu Bhatta, Narayana Bhatta, Gangadhara and others.

SAQ :

Write a brief note on various commentaries of *Tarkabh ṣ* .

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2.6 Theory of causation in *Tarkabh ṣ*

A cause is that which invariably precedes the effect, and is not merely accessory to, but is necessary for the production of the effect. According to Keśava Miśra that which invariably precedes an effect and is unconditionally necessary for it, is the cause of that effect, e.g. the threads, loom etc, are the cause of the cloth. When a cloth is being made, a donkey may be present there accidentally and so it exists before the effect (cloth). Therefore the donkey also may be considered a cause for the cloth. But its presence is not invariable (नियत) and so it is not cause. Again the colour of the thread is invariably precedent to the cloth but it is not an unconditional necessity (अनन्यथासिद्ध). It is conditioned by the fact that the colour of the threads is a cause for the colour of the cloth, and if it is said to be a cause for the cloth as well, this will lead to unnecessary assumptions. Thus causality is defined as invariable and unconditional antecedence to the effect and effectness as invariable and unconditional consequence of the cause. From the above discussion it is clear that a cause should have three conditions (a) it must precede the effect (पूर्ववृत्ति) (b) its precedence should be invariable and not accidental (नियत) (c) it should be unconditioned (अनन्यथासिद्ध).

The *Tarkabh ṣ* distinguishes three kinds of causes : समवायि कारण (inherent cause), असमवायिकारण (non-inherent cause) and निमित्त कारण (cause in general or an occasioning cause). Of these the inherent cause is that in which the effect inheres when produced or it can be said that the inherent cause is the substance or stuff out of which the effect is produced e.g., the threads are the material

cause of the cloth or the clay of the jar. A non-inherent cause is that which inheres in the material cause and whose efficiency is well known. The conjunction of the threads is the non-inherent cause of the cloth. The threads will remain a bundle and will not make a cloth unless they are conjoined. The colour of the thread is a non-inherent cause since its efficiency in producing the colour of the cloth is well known. The non-inherent cause is always a quality or an action. That which is neither an inherent nor a non-inherent cause but is still a cause is called a cause in general or an occasioning cause just as the loom, shuttle etc. are for the cloth.

SAQ :

What is कारण ? What are the different types of कारण– Explain fully.

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1.7 Valid knowledge (*pramā*) and the sources of valid knowledge (*pramāna*)

In Indian epistemology, two words are used to mean knowledge. They are *Jñāna* and *pramāṇa*. *Jñāna* means all kinds of knowledge, true or false. When reality reveals true knowledge it is called *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge and when this revelation is false it is called *apramāṇa*. The word *pramāṇa* is used only in the sense of true knowledge or *yathārthajñāna* which is distinct from false knowledge. Keśava Miśra defines *pramāṇa* as *yathārthānubhavaḥ pramāṇaḥ*. Here the word *pramāṇa* means valid experience, i.e., an apprehension which accords with the true character of the object or thing apprehended. By the use of the word *yathārtha* (valid), cognitions such as doubt (*saśaya*), misapprehension (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical apprehensions (*tarka*) are avoided as all these are erroneous or faulty experiences. By using the word *anubhava*, remembrance (*smṛti*) is excluded. The special source of *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge is called *pramāṇa* or it can be said that *pramāṇa* is the means or source of right knowledge. According to Keśava Miśra *pramāṇa* is the instrument or means of valid knowledge or right cognition. There are four *pramāṇas* mentioned in the *Tarkabhāṣya*. These are perception (*pratyakṣa*), Inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Stop to Consider

The schools of ancient Indian philosophy are not unanimous in their choice of the *pramāṇas*. In the matter of recognizing different *pramāṇas*, different schools of Indian philosophy adopted divergent schemes. The number of *pramāṇas* accepted by them vary from one to eight. The Caarvaakas accept *pratyakṣa* (perception) only as a single means of knowledge. The Vaiszeṣika and the Buddhists recognise two-*pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference). Saammkhya, Yoga, Viśiṣṭvaīta, Dvaita, Suddhadvaita and Dvaitadvaita schools of Uttarammaasā recognise *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference) and *śabda* or *āgama* (verbal testimony) as the three means of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas recognise the above three with an addition *upāna* (comparison) as fourth. The Praabhaakara school of Pṛvamaasā adds *arthapatti* (presumption) to it. The Bhaṭṭa school of Pṛvamaasā and the Advaita school of Uttarammaasā recognise the above with the addition of *abhava* (negation or non-apprehension). The Paurāṇikas admit the above six with the addition of *sambhava* (probability) and *aitihya* (tradition).

2.7.1 Perception (*pratyakṣa*)

According to Keśava Miśra the instrument which gives rise to direct valid cognition is called perception. Direct valid perception is that which arises through the sense organs. According to Keśava Miśra the relation of the senses with objects is the cause of valid direct perceptual cognition. He also explains six kinds of relation in connection with perception. Among them the first is contact. When the cognition of a jar comes through the help of the eyes then the relation between the eye and the jar is mere contact. The second is the inherence with the contacted object. When the colour etc of a jar is perceived by the eye etc. e.g., the jar is black in colour, then the eye is the sense organ, the colour of the jar is the object and the relation between the two is inherence in the object contacted, third is the inherence with the inherent in the contacted object. When the generality of colourness which is inherent in the colour of the jar is perceived by the eye, then also the eye is the sense organ, the generality of colourness is the object and the relation between this two is inherence in that which is inherent in the contacted object.

The fourth is inherence. When the sense of hearing receives sound then ear is the sense organ, sound is the object and their relation is inherence. The fifth is inherence with the inherent. When soundness, the generality inherent in sound is grasped by the auditory sense, then the ear is the sense, the generality soundness is the object and their relation becomes inherence in the inherent for soundness inheres in sound which itself is inherent in ether represented by ear. The last is the relation between substantive and adjunct. When the eye in contact with the ground

perceives the nonexistence of jar etc. then the non existence of jar is the adjunct or qualification of the ground which is in contact with the eye, the ground is the substantive and the relation between these two is the relation of being substantive and adjunct.

Keśava Miśra accepts two types of perception i.e., *savikalpa* or the determinate and *nirvikalpa* or the indeterminate. *Savikalpa* is the cognition that has a determinant. *Nirvikalpa* is the cognition which is devoid of determinant. Keśava Miśra says that when indeterminate knowledge is the result of perception then the sense-organ is the instrument. According to him, in perception, first the soul prompts the mind, the mind gets into touch with the particular sense-organ which in turn goes forward to contact with the objects. Then through the sense organ which has contacted the object the indeterminate knowledge arises at first which visualizes the object alone as this is something without any idea of its name or generality. After indeterminate knowledge determinate knowledge arises which visualizes the object as something as a definite name or belonging to a particular class or a quality i.e., definite knowledge wherein the attributes or qualities and the qualified are clearly brought out. Thus the indeterminate knowledge is the necessary antecedent to the determinate knowledge

SAQ:

Define and explain perception. What are the different divisions of perception?

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2.7.2. Inference (*Anumāna*)

Anumāna literally means the knowledge (*māna*) which we get after (*anu*) other knowledge. From the knowledge of the sign (*linga*) we get a knowledge of the object possessing it. According to Keśava Miśra *anumāna* is the knowledge of an object through the medium of the knowledge of some mark by virtue of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two. *Anumāna* requires three propositions and three terms. The propositions constituting the body of the *anumāna* are called its *avayavas* or constituents. The hill has fire, because the hill has smoke and whatever has smoke has fire. In this inference there are three terms, hill, fire and smoke. The subject in which the inferable object is sought to be proved is the *pakṣa* or the minor term (e.g. hill). The object that is inferred about the minor term is called *sādhyā* or the major term (e.g. fire). The mark or sign which indicates the presence of the inferable object is called *hetu* or *linga*

or *s dhana* or the middle term (e.g. smoke) . In a syllogism the subject of the conclusion is the *pakṣa* and the predicate, *s dhya*. The relation of invariable concomitance between the *hetu* and the *s dhya* is known as *vyāpti* and the presence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa* is called *pakṣadharmat* . For a syllogism (inference) to be correct *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmat* are essential. It is, therefore, evident that inference does not depend on *hetu* or the middle term alone. The knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the *hetu* and *linga* and the *s dhya*, and the presence of the *linga* in the *pakṣa* taken together is known as *lingapar marśa*.

According to Keśava Miśra inference is of two kinds namely स्वार्थानुमान and परार्थानुमान । स्वार्थानुमान is that process by which one gets convinced in his own mind. For example, after ascertaining व्याप्ति between smoke and fire in the kitchen etc, if one happens to go near a mountain and sees an unbroken line of smoke issuing from the mountain, he doubts the existence of fire there and immediately recollects the *vyāpti* ‘where there is smoke there is fire’. Then he makes sure that such a (concomitant) smoke exists in the subject (पक्ष) before him and thereby concludes (in his mind) that there is fire in the mountain. This is called स्वार्थानुमान ।

Regarding परार्थानुमान Keśava Miśra says that when someone, after inferring fire from smoke for himself as already stated in the स्वार्थानुमान puts forth a five membered syllogism to carry conviction to another, that inference is called परार्थ(inference for another). The five members of syllogism are: (1) *pratij* or the proposition, (2) *hetu* or the reason, (3) *ud haraṇa* or the explanatory example, (4) *upanaya* or the application and (5) *nigamana* or the statement of the conclusion. The following example illustrate the five members of the inference.

1. The hill has fire (*pratij*)
2. Because the hill has smoke (*hetu*).
3. Wherever there is smoke there is fire e.g., a kitchen (*ud haraṇa*)
4. The hill has smoke (*upanaya*)
5. Therefore the hill has fire (*nigamana*)

While discussing *anum na* Keśava Miśra explains fallacies (*hetv bh sa*). According to the author inference based on invalid reason is called *hetv bh sa*. They are of five kinds:

1. *Asiddha* (the unfounded or unknown reason)
2. *Viruddha* (the contradictory reason)
3. *Anaikantika* (the counterbalanced or opposing reason)
4. *Prakaraṇasama* (the counterbalanced or opposing reason and *k l tyay paḍiṣṭa* (The stultified or belated reason)

Stop to Consider

There are, however, other classifications of *anumāna* found in the Nyāya philosophy. Gotama divides अनुमान into three kinds पूर्ववत्, शेषवत् and सामान्यतोदृष्ट। A पूर्ववत् inference is the inference of the effect from the cause. A शेषवत् inference is the inference of a cause from an effect. A सामान्यतोदृष्ट inference is the inference of an unknown property from its invariable accompaniment on the ground of uniformity of experience. The Navyāya school recognizes three other kinds of inference. These are केवलान्वयी, केवलव्यतिरेकि and अन्वयव्यतिरेकि। An inference is called केवलान्वयि when it is based on a middle term (हेतु) which is only positively related to the major term (साध्य). An inference is called केवलव्यतिरेकि when it is based on a middle term (हेतु) which is only negative related to the major term (साध्य) An inference is called अन्वयव्यतिरेकि when it is based on a middle term which is both positively and negatively related to the major term.

2.7.3. Comparison (*Upamaana*)

Upamaana or comparison is the means by which we get the knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously known. According to Keśava Miśra knowledge through comparison is that which is gained by the similarity of one thing to a known thing like a cow, when this similarity is aided by the recollection of an assertion made by some knowing person to that effect. Hearing from a forester that a wild ox (*gavaya*) is like a cow, we go to the forest and find an animal resembling the cow. We can remember the forester's statement that a wild ox is like a cow and know that the animal which we find like the cow is *stat gavaya*. This knowledge is *upamaana* and it is the instrument of the cognition *upamiti*. After knowing that the animal in front is similar to the cow, the cognition that this animal is to be called *gavaya* is *upamiti*, which is the grasp of the relation between the word *gavaya* and the thing denoted by it (or in other words the denotative significance of the word *gavayasamj samj sambandhaj na*).

2.7.4. Verbal testimony (*śabda*)

The fourth kind of valid knowledge is *śabda* or verbal testimony. According to Keśava Miśra, *śabda* is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person and consists in understanding its meaning. A sentence is defined as a collection of words and a word is defined as that which is potent to convey its meaning comes, according to ancient Nyāya, from God and according to later Nyāya from long established convention. Testimony is based on the words of a trustworthy person, human or divine. It is of two kinds- *vaidika* and *laukika* or secular. The *vaidika* testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God. Secular testimony being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible,

only the words of trustworthy persons who always speak the truth are valid, others are not. A word is a potent symbol which signifies an object and a sentence is a collection of words. But a sentence in order to be intelligible must conform to certain conditions. These conditions are *aakaan Akṣaa*, *yogyataa* and *sannidhi*. The first is mutual implication or expectancy. The words of a sentence are interrelated and stand in need of one another in order to express a complete sense. A mere aggregate of unrelated words will not make a logical sentence. For example, cow, horse, man etc. The second condition is that the words should possess fitness to convey the sense and should not contradict the meaning. 'Water the plants with fire' is a contradictory sentence. The third condition is the close proximity of the words to one another. The words must be spoken in quick succession without long intervals. If the words 'bring' 'a' and 'cow' are uttered at long intervals they would not make a logical sentence. Some scholars add a fourth requisite, *t tparyaj na* or knowledge of the intention of the speaker in order to make a logical sentence.

Thus Keśava Miśra admits only four *pram ñas*. *Arth patti* or implication is not considered as an independent *pram ña* by the author of *Tarkabh ṣ*. According to the author *arth patti* or implication is reduced to inference. *Abhaava* or non-existence which is regarded as a separate *pram ña* by Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Vedaantins is reduced to perception or to inference in the book *Tarkabh ṣ*. *Abh va* or non-existence of a thing and the same sense-organ which perceives a thing, perceives its non-existence also. If the thing is imperceptible and can only be inferred, then, its non existence too may be equally inferred.

2.8 Summing up

Here in this unit we have discussed about the importance of *Tarkabh ṣ*, about its author, different commentators along with their commentaries. We have also discussed about the concept of valid knowledge and the different sources of valid knowledge. After discussing all the above aspects it can be said that though the epistemological aspects of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a wide subject it has been thoroughly discussed in a very simple and lucid language in the book *Tarkabh ṣ*.

2.9 Sample Questions :

1. Write briefly the contents of *Tarkabh ṣ*.
2. Write in detail the names of different commentaries of *Tarkabh ṣ* along with its commentators.
3. Define कारण according to *Tarkabh ṣ*. Explain with example the different types of कारण।

4. What is valid knowledge (प्रमा) ? What are the sources of valid knowledge (प्रमाण) ? Discuss.
5. Discuss briefly the different *pramāṇas* dealt in the *Tarkabhāṣya* .

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Unit 3

Metaphysical Aspects of Tarkabhâṣa

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- 3.21 निर्णयः (decisive knowledge)
- 3.22 वादः (discussion)
- 3.23 हेत्वाभासः (fallacies)
- 3.24 जल्प (disputation)
- 3.25 वितण्डा (wrangling)
- 3.26 छलम् (quibbling)
- 3.27 जातिः (futile objection)
- 3.28 निग्रहस्थानम् (vulnerable point)
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- 3.30 Sample questions
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3.1 Introduction

Keśava Miśra the author of the *Tarkabhāṣā* at the very beginning of the book discusses the first *śāstra* of Gotama enumerating the following categories viz. प्रमाण (Means or instrument of valid knowledge), प्रमेय (object of valid knowledge), संशय (doubt), प्रयोजन (purpose) दृष्टान्त (example), सिद्धान्त (Established conclusion) अवयव (Members of syllogism), तर्क (reductio ad absurdum), निर्णय (Decisive knowledge), वाद (discussion), जल्प (argument), वितण्डा (mere destructive argument), हेत्वाभास (fallacies in reasoning), छल (Quibbling), जाति (unavailing) and निग्रहस्थान (vulnerable point).

The instrument of valid knowledge or *pramāṇa* has been already discussed in the preceding unit. In this unit various objects of valid knowledge or *prameya* will be discussed. The objects of valid knowledge enumerated in the *Nyāyāśāstra* are twelve in number. These are आत्मन् (self), शरीर (body), इन्द्रिय (sense-organ), अर्थ (objects), बुद्धि (knowledge). मनः (mind), प्रवृत्ति (action), दोष (defect), प्रेत्यभाव (rebirth), फल (result), दुःख (misery) and अपवर्ग (salvation). All these twelve categories are discussed in this unit. The other fourteen categories which are very briefly narrated in the *Tarkabhāṣā* are also discussed in this unit.

3.2 Objectives

After reading this chapter you will be able to

Explain the need and importance of *prameya* in the *Tarkabhāṣā*

Discuss the various types of *prameyas* in the *Tarkabhāṣā*

Define the fourteen categories enumerated in the *Nyāyasūtra* other than *pramāṇa* and *prameya*

प्रमेयाणि Now the objects of valid knowledge are being explained—

3.3 आत्मन् (self) :

Keśava Miśra defines आत्मन् as तत्रात्मत्वसामान्यवानात्मा। Soul is that which possesses the generality soulness. It is distinct from the body, sense organs etc. It is different in each body since the experience of pleasure and pain varies with each soul. It is omnipresent because its effect is seen everywhere. Being omnipresent it is eternal like ether. It is the object of perception by the mind. Again the soul is the substratum of knowledge. According to Annambhatta soul is of two fold—*jīvatman* and *paramatman* i.e, individual soul and Supreme soul. Supreme soul is all powerful, omniscient God, devoid of pleasure and pain. The individual soul is different in each body and is all pervading and eternal.

SAQ :

Write a brief note on आत्मन्

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3.4 शरीरम् (Body)

In the *Tarkabhāṣā* the word ‘शरीरम्’ is defined as तस्यभोगायतनं शरीरम्। Body is defined as the vehicle of actions, sense organs and objects. The soul exerts itself to gain objects by means of the body, which is the seat of the senses, mind and sentiments. We can not identify the body with either consciousness or the self which possesses it. Annambhatta defines body as *yātana* or abode of *bhoga* of the soul. *Bhoga* is the experience of either happiness or of misery. Keśava Miśra’s definition is similar to Annambhatta. He says that the receptacle situated within which the soul enjoys its experience is body. Here enjoyment means the experience of pleasure and pain. The soul enjoys experience only when it is limited by some receptacle and that is the body. In accordance with the definition of Gotama, Keśava Miśra again says that body is the substratum of action.

SAQ :

Name the twelve प्रेमयऽ enumerated in the book Tarkabh ष

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3.5 इन्द्रियम् (Sense-organ) :

Keśava Miśra defines इन्द्रियम् as शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणमतीन्द्रियम् i.e, that which forms part of the body, which is the instrument of cognition and which is not perceptible by the sense-organs, constitutes इन्द्रिय or sense-organ. If it is defined as that which is not perceptible by the sense-organs the definition would be so wide as to include time etc. and therefore the qualification 'which is the instrument of cognition' is added. Even then the definition overlaps 'sense-object contact' and so the qualification 'which forms part of the body' is added. If it is defined as that which forms part of the body and which is an instrument of cognition (i.e without the word अतीन्द्रिय) the definition would apply to light etc. and so the qualification अतीन्द्रिय is necessary. These sense organs are six in number, viz. nose, tongue, eye, skin, ear and mind. Of these that which is the instrument for the cognition of smell is the olfactory sense organ and it is situated at the tip of the nose. It belong to the substance earth as it has smell like a jar, that sense-organ which apprehends taste is the gustatory one and it abides at the tip of the tongue. It belongs to the substance water as it has taste. That one which apprehends colour is the visual organ and it is located in the eye. It belongs to the substance light because it has colour. That sense organ which apprehends touch is the tactile one. It exists all over the body. It belongs to the substance air as it has touch. That which apprehends sound is the auditory organ. It is nothing else but ether limited by tympanum. That sense-organ which causes the apprehension of pleasure, pain etc. is the mind.

3.6 अर्थ (Objects of cognition) :

According to Keśava Miśra there are six objects of cognitions. These are द्रव्य (substance), गुण (quality), कर्म (action), सामान्य (generality), विशेष (speciality) and समवाय (inherence).

3.6.1 द्रव्य (substance) :

Substance or *dravya* is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the material cause of the composite things produced from it. Substance signifies the self subsistence, the absolute and independent Nature of

things. The substances are nine in number. These are earth (*kṣiti*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kālā*), space (*dik*), spirit (*ātman*) and mind (*manas*). Keshava Misra gives two different definitions of substance. The first definition is that it is an inherent cause. The second definition is that it is the substratum of attributes. Keshava Misra also accepts nine substances. The following are the nine substances—

3.6.1.1 पृथिवी (Earth) :

Out of the nine substances earth is that which possesses the generality earthness. It consists of a peculiar aggregate of parts, sometimes hard, soft etc. Keśava Miśra defines पृथिवी as तत्र पृथिवीत्वसामान्यवती पृथिवी । It exists in the forms of sense-organ, body and such things as clay, stone, trees etc. It possesses the fourteen qualities which are namely colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity and tendency. It is of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal. The eternal variety consists of atoms and the non-eternal is of the form of various products.

3.6.1.2 आपः (Water) :

Keśava Miśra defines आपः as अप्त्वसामान्ययुक्ता आपः । Water is that which has the generality waterness. It consists of the sense of taste, water-body, rivers, oceans, snow, hail etc. It also has the fourteen qualities like that of earth but the quality of smell of earth is not found in water and instead an additional quality of viscosity is recorded. It is also of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal. Colour etc. abiding in eternal water atoms are eternal and those in other waters are non-eternal.

SAQ :

Define द्रव्य ? How many द्रव्यs are accepted in *Tarkabhāṣā* ?

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3.6.1.3 तेजः (Light) :

According to Keśava Miśra तेजः is defined as तेजस्त्वसामान्यवत्तेजः । Light is that which has the generality lightness. It consists of the visual sense organs, light body, the sun, gold, fire, lightning and similar things. It has eleven qualities : colour, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness,

proximity, liquidity and tendency. It is divided into eternal and non-eternal. It is of four kinds— (1) light in which both colour and touch are manifested (2) that in which both are unmanifested (3) that in which colour is unmanifested and touch is manifested and (4) that in which colour is manifested while touch is unmanifested.

3.6.1.4 वायुः (Air) :

In the *Tarkabhāṣā* वायु is defined as वायुत्वाभिसम्बन्धवान् वायुः । Air is that substance which is connected with airness. It consists of the tactile sense-organ, airbody, wind, breath of animals, etc. It has the nine qualities, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity. Air is to be inferred from its touch. It is of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal. The former consists of air atoms and the latter the products. It is again classified into three namely body (शरीर), organ (इन्द्रिय) and mass (विषय). Body is the aerial world, organ is the sense of touch, mass is the cause of the shaking of trees etc. Air circulating within the body is *prāṇa*. Though one it acquires different names such as *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, etc. owing to different situations. Keszava Miszra, however, has not stated about the division of शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषय but has hinted it when he mentions about each substance consists of.

6.1.5 आकाशः (Ether) :

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According to Keszava Miszra aakaasa or ether is शब्दगुणमाकाशम् i.e, the substance which has sound as its distinctive quality is ether. It is one, all pervading and eternal. This definition of ether differs from the preceding four on the ground that the word गुण is inserted in it. Here the author could have used the term शब्दवत् आकाशम् or शब्दसमवायि आकाशम् । But the author intentionally used the term गुण only to indicate that the word गुण is used for विशेषगुण and implies that sound is the special quality of ether and ether alone as distinguished from all other substances. Colour and other qualities are found in several substances and even odour, the special quality of earth is often associated with water and air, but sound is always confined to ether. Hence the author defined earth as simply गन्धवती while he defines ether as शब्दगुणम् ।

3.6.1.6 कालः (Time)

Keszava Miszra defines काल as कालोऽपि दिग्विपरीतपरत्वाऽपरत्वानुमेयः i.e, time is to be inferred from remoteness and proximity which are contrary to those created by space. It has the qualities of number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction (besides remoteness and proximity). It is one, eternal and all-pervading. Though time is one it is spoken of as present, past and future due to the limitations (or circumstances) caused by the actions in these three stages of time, just as the

same person is called a cook when he cooks, a reader when he reads and some other when he is engaged in other actions.

Stop to Consider :

Annambhaṭṭa in his book *Tarkasa graha* defines काल as अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः । सचैको विभुर्नित्यश्च i.e, time is the special and instrumental cause of the use of past etc. It is one and all pervading. व्यवहार is defined as वाक्यप्रयोगरूप i.e, statements such as past time and future time. The word हेतु here applied to व्यवहार, is to be understood in the restricted sense of असाधारण निमित्तकारण, special and instrumental cause. Another and apparently more accurate definition of time is that given by Vi van tha—

जन्यानां जनकः कालो जगतामाश्रयो मतः

परापरत्वधीहेतुः क्षणादिः स्यादुपाधितः ॥

Time is the cause of things that are produced and is considered to be the substratum of the universe. It is the cause of the notion of priority and posteriority. It is converted into a moment etc. owing to its limiting adjuncts.

3.6.1.7 दिक् (Space)

In the *Tarkabh ṣ* दिक् has been defined as कालविपरीतपरत्वाऽपरत्वानुमेया दिक् i.e, space is to be inferred from the notions of remoteness and proximity contrary to those caused by time. It is one, eternal and all-pervading. It has the qualities of number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction (besides remoteness and proximity). It is inferred from the notions of the directions, east, west etc., because such notions can not be caused by any other substance. Though only one it is spoken of as east, west etc. due to the limitations caused by the contact of the sun with those spaces.

3.6.1.8 आत्मन् (self)

आत्मन् has already been explained as the first प्रमेय ।

3.6.1.9 मनः (mind)

In the *Tarkabh ṣ* मनः has been defined as मनस्त्वाभिसंबन्धवन्मनः i.e, mind is that substance which has the generality mindness. It is atomic in size and is always connected with the soul. It is an internal sense organ and is the instrument for the cognition of pleasure, pain etc. It is eternal and has the eight qualities beginning with number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity. Through contact with it the external sense organs produce

the cognition of objects and therefore mind is a cause for all cognitions. It is not perceptible but only inferrable. The cognitions of pleasure, pain etc. are caused by an instrument other than the external sense-organs, eye etc. just like the act of cooking takes place without an axe but with other causes like fire etc.

3.6.2 गुणः (Quality)

Keśava Miśra defines गुण as सामान्यवानसमवायिकारणमस्पन्दात्मा गुणः i.e. quality is that which has generality, which serves as non inherent cause and which has no motion. It always abides in a substance. This quality is twentyfour in number such as colour (रूप), taste (रस), smell (गंध), touch (स्पर्श), number (संख्या), size or dimension (परिमाण), separateness (पृथक्), conjunction (संयोग), disjunction (विभाग), remoteness (परत्व), proximity (अपरत्व), intellect (बुद्धि), pleasure (सुख), pain (दुःख), desire (इच्छा), aversion (द्वेष), effort (प्रयत्न), weight (गुरुत्व), fluidity (द्रवत्व), viscosity (स्नेह), tendency (संस्कार), merit (धर्म), demerit (अधर्म), sound (शब्द).

3.6.3 कर्मन् (Action)

Keśava Miśra defines कर्म as चलनात्मकं कर्म। It is of the form of motion and like qualities subsists only in substances. It inheres along with dimensions that do not subsist in all pervading substances. It is of five kinds (1) moving upwards (उत्क्षेपण), (2) moving downwards (अपक्षेपण), (3) contracting (आकुञ्चन) expanding (प्रसारण) and going (गमन)। Whirling and other kinds of activity come under going.

Stop to Consider :

The definition of *karma* given in Kaṇḍa's *śāstra* is more elaborate though essentially the same. एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारणमिति कर्मलक्षणम् means that action inheres in one substance, but is not a quality, and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction.

3.6.4 सामान्यम् (Generality) :

In the *Tarkabhāṣā* सामान्य is defined as अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुस्सामान्यम्। Generality is the cause for comprehensive class notions. It abides in substances, qualities and activities. It is eternal, only one and inheres in many things. It is of two kinds—the highest and the lower. The highest form is 'existence' (or being) i.e. सत्ता as it inheres in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्। This constitutes pure generality as it causes the notion of comprehensiveness only. The lower generality consists of substanceness, qualityness etc. and inheres in less number of things (as compared with the former). It is exclusive generality in as much as it causes both comprehensive and exclusive notions.

Stop to Consider

Annambhaṭṭa defines सामान्य as नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यम् and adds this सामान्य resides in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म। In the *mukt valī* सामान्य is defined as नित्यत्वे सति अनेकसमवेतत्वम्। Annambhaṭṭa following the commentators on Kaṇḍa's aphorisms divides सामान्य in पर (higher) and अपर (lower). Some other writers make a three-fold division of सामान्य। These are पर, अपर and परापर।

3.6.5 विशेषः (Particularity)

विशेष is defined in the *Tarkabhāṣā* as विशेषो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिः i.e., particularity subsists in eternal substances and is the sole cause of their exclusive notions. The eternal substances are the five beginning with ether together with the atoms of the other four namely earth, water, light and air.

3.6.6 समवायः (Inherence)

समवाय is defined as अयुतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्ध समवायः . Inherence is the relation between two inseparable things. Here it can be said that when two things are so intimately connected that one subsists on the other so long as the latter is not destroyed are called inseparables. Such inseparables are (i) the parts and the whole (ii) quality and substance (iii) motion and that which moves (iv) generality and the individual things and (v) speciality and eternal substance. The whole etc. subsists in the parts etc. only till they are not destroyed. When the parts begin to perish the whole etc. does not subsist on the other, e.g., when the threads perish the cloth is destroyed. Similarly when the substratum is destroyed its quality also is lost.

Thus the six categories beginning with substance have been explained. All these six are positive categories as they are presented in our cognitions as positive entities.

3.6.7 अभावः (Negation) :

Now a seventh category which is in the form of non-existence is being described.

In the *Tarkabhāṣā* अभाव is described in the form of negation and is cognised in the form of nonexistence. It is of two kinds—relational negation (संसर्गाभावः) and mutual negation (अन्योन्याभावः). The former again is of three types—antecedent negation (प्रागभावः), subsequent negation (प्रध्वंसाभावः) and absolute negation (अत्यन्ताभावः). (i) Antecedent negation is that which exists in the cause before the product comes into existence, e.g., the negation of cloth in the threads. It has no beginning as it has no origin, but it has an end as the coming out of the effect itself constitutes its end. (ii) The absence of a thing in its cause after the thing itself is destroyed is subsequent negation and hence

called destruction, e.g., the absence of the jar in its two halves after it is broken. It has an origin but no end as a thing destroyed has no second origin. (iii) When the non-existence of a thing can be predicted in respect of all times, past, present and future it is called absolute negation, e.g., the non-existence of colour in air.

Mutual negation is that which denies the identity of two things, e.g., jar is not a cloth.

SAQ :

Explain with examples the various division of अभाव

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3.7 बुद्धि (cognition) :

Cognition is that which is denoted by such synonymous words as उपलब्धि, ज्ञान, प्रत्यय etc. Or it can be defined as that which manifests objects (to the mind). It is, in brief, of two kinds— experience (अनुभवः) and recollection (स्मरणम्). Experience is also of two kinds— valid (यथार्थ) and invalid (अयथार्थ). Valid experience is that which conforms to the real nature of the object apprehended and it is caused by valid instruments of cognition such as perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Invalid experience is that which does not conform to the real nature of the object apprehended and it is caused by invalid instruments of cognition. It is of three kinds— doubt (संशयः) , ratiocination (तर्क) and misapprehension (विपर्ययः). Recollection is of two kinds valid (यथार्थम्) and invalid (अयथार्थम्). Both these kinds occur during wakeful stage. All cognitions arising in dreams are invalid recollections as all that is apprehended as that (in the cognition) appears as this (in the dream) due to certain defects.

3.8 मनस् (Mind) :

Mind is the sixth प्रमेय which has already been explained.

3.9 प्रवृत्तिः (Activity) :

Activity consists in performing such acts (acts like sacrifices etc.) which ultimately lead to merit and demerit. This constitutes the basis for all things going on in the world.

3.10 दोषः (Defect)

Defects are attachment (रागः), aversion (द्वेषः) and ignorance (मोहः). Attachment constitutes desire, aversion constitutes anger and ignorance constitutes false knowledge or misapprehension.

3.11 प्रेत्यभावः (Rebirth)

Rebirth is having a fresh origin and consists in the soul getting into another body after leaving the present one.

3.12 फलम् (Result)

Result is enjoyment i.e. experience of pleasure or pain.

3.13 दुःखम् (Pain)

Pain is suffering and is undesirable for all.

3.14 अपवर्गः (Salvation)

Salvation is release from birth. This consists in complete cessation of all the twentyone forms of suffering. These twentyone are those arising from (i) the body (ii) the six sense organs (iii) the six objects (iv) the six kinds of cognition (v) pleasure and pain. Regarding the attainment of salvation it is said that when a man has understood the real nature of all things from the *sastras* and has cognised the defects in the objects of enjoyment, he loses attachment to these and becomes desirous of release and to gain that he takes meditation. On attaining perfection in meditation he realises the true nature of the soul and thus gets rid of defects and sufferings. Then by performing actions without any attachment to results he ceases acquiring further merit or demerit. By his yogic powers he comes to know his past merits and demerits. He collects them together and ends them by enjoying their effects. By this he exhausts all his previous *karma* and when the present body dies off, his soul has no new body to enter into and thus loses all contact with the twentyone forms of suffering for want of their cause (the body). This release from these twentyone forms of suffering is salvation.

3.15 संशयः (doubt)

When in one and the same object there arises the apprehension of two or more conflicting notions, that becomes doubt. It is of three kinds. The first variety is that caused by the observation of certain common attributes of two things while not noticing any differentiating features between the two, e.g., whether the object ahead is a tree, stump or a person. The second variety of doubt is that arising

from the difference of opinion about one and the same thing when there is no special reason to ignore or accept either; e.g., whether sound is eternal or not. The third variety of doubt is that caused by observing some peculiar attitude or characteristic without noticing anything special, in an object. For example when one apprehends smell which is the special quality of earth but which does not indicate whether it subsists in eternal or non-eternal things and when he does not see any special reason to decide either way, the doubt arises whether earth is eternal or not.

3.16 प्रयोजनम् (Purpose)

That by which one is urged to act is purpose (or motive). It consists in gaining pleasure and avoiding pain, for actions of all men in sound health are directed to the attainment of these two.

3.17 दृष्टान्तः (Example)

Example is that thing about which there is good agreement between the two parties in a debate. It is of two kinds. The first is example through similarity and the second one is example through dissimilarity.

3.18 सिद्धान्तः (Conclusion)

An established conclusion is that which is accepted as authoritative. It is of four kinds—(1) that which is accepted by all *saastras* (2) that which is accepted as proved in another *saastra* (3) that which follows as a corollary to an established conclusion and (4) that which is acceptable as such only on the basis of another thesis.

3.19 अवयवाः (Members of syllogism)

The several steps used in stating an inference for others are called members of syllogism. These are five in number namely प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु, उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन . Here प्रतिज्ञा can be explained as the statement of the proposition to be inferred or proved as पर्वतो वह्निमान् हेतु is the statement of the probans by means of which the साध्य is inferred as धूमात् । उदाहरण is the statement of the व्याप्ति between the साध्य and the हेतु followed by an example where the coexistence has been observed यथा महानसः । उपनय is the statement of the परामर्श i.e., combination of the व्याप्तिज्ञान and पक्षधर्मताज्ञान as तथा-चायम् । निगमन is the conclusion as तस्मात्तथा, the word तथा stands for साध्यवान् ।

3.20 तर्क (Hypothetical reasoning)

तर्कः is a kind of hypothetical reasoning leading to an undesirable result. It consists in arguing that if, out of two concomitant things, the concomitant (व्याप्य) one is present, the presence of the other, its correlate व्यापक should also be present, e.g., if a jar were to exist here it should be perceivable like the spot (where it stands). This kind of hypothetical reasoning helps the instruments of valid cognition.

3.21 निर्णयः (Decisive knowledge) :

Decisive knowledge or निर्णय is firm conviction and it comes as the result of the instruments of valid cognition.

3.22 वाद (Discussion) :

Discussion is argument between two persons or parties desirous of arriving at the truth of the topic under discussion. It is in this that the eight points of defeat are employed to win over the opponent. These eight are (i) deficiency in the reasoning (ii) superfluity (by bringing in extraneous or irrelevant points) (iii) stating something contrary to established conclusions and (iv) five fallacious reasons.

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3.23 हेत्वाभास (Fallacies) :

The fallacies of inference are called *hetv bh sa* since they are based on reason (*hetu*) which appear to be reason without really being so. Inference is based on *hetu* or reason. If the reason is invalid the inference is also invalid. There are five kinds of fallacies. These are *savyabhic ra*, *viruddha*, *satpratipakṣa*, *asiddha* and *baadhita*.

SAQ :

Write notes on संशयः, तर्क, अवयवाः, वाद and हेत्वाभास.

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3.24 जल्प (Disputation)

Disputation is also argument like वाद but with the desire of winning over the opponent and it accomplishes two things. It usually ends in establishing one's view point by demolishing the view point of opponent.

3.25 वितण्डा (Wrangling)

Wrangling is destructive argument which does not establish one's own position but which is directed only to find fault with the opponent's position. In fact the wrangler has no position of his own to establish.

Stop to Consider :

According to Gotama वाद, जल्प, and वितण्डा falls under the broad head of कथा or discussion under which broad head come all these three constitutes the arrangement put forth by a number of persons assembled together. Some raising objections and others trying to answer them regarding any topic proposed for decision.

3.26 छलम् (quibbling)

When some one uses a certain word (or words) in one sense and if the hearer were to find fault with it by construing it in a different sense this practice is called छल or quibbling.

3.27 जाति: (Futile objection)

An incorrect rejoinder constitutes जाति or futile objection. It is of many kinds such as उत्कर्षसमा, अपकर्ष etc. In the *Ny yas tra v rttika*, twenty four जाति have been enumerated.

3.28 निग्रहस्थानम् (Vulnerable point) :

A vulnerable point is that by which the opponent is defeated. It is of many kinds such as न्यून (deficiency), अधिक (superfluity), अपसिद्धान्त (deviation from established conclusions), अर्थान्तर (irrelevancy), अप्रतिभा (inability to find the correct answer), मतानुज्ञा (accepting the opponent's view), विरोध (contradiction) etc. In the *Ny yas tra* twenty two varieties of निग्रहस्थान are enumerated.

Summing up :

Ontology or metaphysics occupies an important place in all the schools of Indian philosophy. In the book *Tarkabhāṣā* also metaphysical aspects are very thoroughly discussed which are described in this unit. Epistemological concepts are already dealt in the preceding unit. The other fourteen categories enumerated by Gotama are also dealt by Keśava Miśra aptly considering its importance. It is evident that by acquiring proper knowledge of the *pramāṇa* and *prameya* man can attain salvation and hence discussion on the fourteen categories are of no use. But Gotama with the *śāstra* 'तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे वीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कण्टकाशारवावरणवत्' has established the importance of fourteen categories and hence the study of fourteen categories are necessary. Thus in conclusion it can be said that covering all the aspects of Indian philosophy the book *Tarkabhāṣā* occupies an important place in the philosophical arena.

3.30 Sample Questions

1. What is प्रमेय ? Name the different types of प्रमेय and explain any one of them.
2. Define द्रव्य and write a note on different types of द्रव्य ।
3. What is अभाव ? What are its divisions? Explain अभाव in the light of *Tarkabhāṣā* .
4. Discuss अपवर्ग as depicted in the *Tarkabhāṣā* .
5. Write a note on संशय ।

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Unit 4

Introduction to the Vedānta Philosophy and Vedāntasāra

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4.1 Introduction :

Vedānta literally means ‘the end of the Vedas (*vedasya antah*)’. It primarily stands for Upaniṣads which are considered as the end of the Vedas – both chronologically and philosophically. Each of the four Vedas consists of four types of literature, namely, the Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads. Generally these four came successively and the Upaniṣads form the last part. Hence, the Upaniṣads are regarded as Vedānta. Philosophically also the Upaniṣads are regarded as the end of the Vedas as they mark the culmination of the Vedic speculation and contain the essence of the Vedic teachings. Later on the denotation of the term ‘Vedānta’ has been expanded so as to include the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Brahmasūtra* etc. all of which have the Upaniṣads as their foundation. Hence, Vedānta philosophy means the philosophy which is based on the Upaniṣads.

Traditionally the literature forming the foundation of Vedānta is divided into three *Prasthānas*. The term *prasthāna* is derived from the root *sthā* with the suffix

lyut and prefix *pra* (*pra- sthā + lyut*). Among its different meanings, the term here stands for ‘the place of origin’ or ‘the starting point’. Accordingly, the *prasthānas* of Vedānta mean the different types of works on which the whole of Vedānta philosophy stands. The three *prasthānas* of Vedānta are : (1) the *Śruti-prasthāna*, (2) the *Smṛti-prasthāna* and (3) the *Nyāya-prasthāna*. *Śruti* means the Vedas and as such the *Śruti-prasthāna* of Vedānta denotes the Upaniṣads which are the parts of the Vedas. *Smṛti* generally means the Dharmasūtras which are the re-statements of the truth contained in the *Śruti*. Here *Smṛti-prasthāna* means *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* which summarises the teachings of the Upaniṣads and is helpful in understanding the truth contained in the Upaniṣads. The term *nyāya* literally means ‘that by which man is guided (*nīyate anena iti*), and as man is generally guided by reasoning or logical argument. Accordingly, *Nyāya-prasthāna* of Vedānta means that fundamental work in which the truth contained in the Upaniṣads has been established by means of logical arguments. And the work which has undertaken this task of presenting the Upaniṣadic ideas in a logical way is the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa. Hence, the *Nyāya-prasthāna* of Vedānta is the *Brahmasūtra*.

SAQ :

What is meant by *Prasthānatraya* of Vedānta?

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(You can try and write a paragraph of about 70 words as answer).

4.2 Objectives :

The Advaita Vedaanta system is one of the most important schools of Indian philosophy. It is propounded by Śaṅkaraācārya through his numerous works including the commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. Among the different systems of Vedaanta, Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedaanta is the most popular and its impact on the life and culture of Indian people is immense. The followers of Śaṅkara have written thousands of books the main theme of which is *brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva naā parah* (Brahman is real, the world is false and the individual self is not different from brahman). *Vedaāntasāra* of Sadaananda Yogīndra is but an introduction to the works of those stalwarts of Advaita Vedaanta system. Study of this work is essential for the beginners. It is also helpful for the advance students of this school. In this unit we are going to consider some primary aspects of Vedaanta philosophy. We will also discuss here about the salient features of Advaita Vedaanta system. Thus from this unit you will be able to know about :

- (a) Vedaanta and its three *prasthaanas*
- (b) Śāṅkaraaarya's life and works
- (c) Main features of Advaita Vedaanta system
- (d) *Vedaantasāra* and its author.

4.3 The *Brahmasūtra*

The *Brahmasūtra*, also called the *Vedaantasūtra* or *Śāṅkarasūtra* is the systematic exposition of the philosophy contained in the Upaniads. The Upaniads are the records of the mystical experiences of the sages with philosophy hidden in them. The problems discussed and solutions offered in the Upaniads present a variety of thoughts. Hence, it is not easy to determine what the central teaching of the Upaniads is. That is why Bādarāyaṇa composed the *Brahmasūtra* or *Vedaantasūtra* in order to expose the philosophy hidden in the Upaniads. It is also called *Sāṅkarīrasūtra*. Traditionally it is believed that Bādarāyaṇa is none other than Vyāsa who compiled the Vedas and composed the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*. However, the modern scholars do not accept this view. It is difficult to ascertain the date of the *Brahmasūtra*. Some scholars are of the opinion that it was written during the period from 500 B.C. to 200 B.C.

In the *Brahmasūtra*, Bādarāyaṇa strings together the main concepts of Vedānta in an ordered manner. These *sūtras* are as if a garland made out of the blossoms of Upaniadic sayings. There are 555 (five hundred fiftyfive) *sūtras* in the *Brahmasūtra*. These are divided into four chapters (*Adhyāyas*). Each chapter is again subdivided into four parts (*Pādas*). Each part has a number of sections (*Adhikaraṇas*) and each *adhikaraṇa* has one or more *sūtras*. The four chapters of this work are named as *Samanvaya Adhyāya*, *Avirodha Adhyāya*, *Sādhana Adhyāya* and *Phala Adhyāya* respectively.

In the first chapter which is called *Samanvaya* (harmony) Bādarāyaṇa establishes that all the Vedāntic texts have for their purport the non-dual *Brahman*. There are many passages where Brahman is expressly mentioned. These passages do not present any difficulty. But there are passages in the Upaniads which do not mean Brahman directly. These passages are explained by Bādarāyaṇa in such a way that it is established that the Vedāntic texts harmoniously teach Brahman as the only reality.

In the second chapter Bādarāyaṇa shows the objection raised against the philosophy of Vedānta and refutes them. In this chapter he has refuted the view of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Bauddha, Jaina, Mīmāṃsā and Pūrāṇīka. In the third chapter Bādarāyaṇa discusses the means (*sādhana*) of liberation. The last chapter is called the fruit (*phala*) where the nature and types of liberation are discussed. Liberation is the fruit of *Brahma-Jñāna* (the knowledge of *Brahman*).

Now, the *s tra*s are brief statements and are not intelligible without a *bh ŷya* (commentary). The *s tra*s of the *Brahmas tra* are also very brief and as such are not easily understandable. These are also liable to different interpretations. That is why different philosophers have written different *Bh ŷyas* on these *s tra*s in order to explain their meanings. But in doing so they have followed their own viewpoint. Hence, we find many commentaries of the *Brahmas tra* which propagate different philosophical views. Here I shall enumerate the names of the *Bh ŷyas* and their writers along with their philosophical views.

| Name of the Bhāṣya | Name of the author | The Philosophical view |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Ś r rakabh ŷya | Śa kar c rya | Advaitavaada |
| (2) Brahmas trabh ŷya | Bh skar c rya | Bhedaabhedavaada |
| (3) Śr bh ŷya | R m nuj c rya | Viśiṣṭādvaitavaada |
| (4) Ved ntap rij ta-saurabha | Nimb rk c rya | Dvaitādvaitavaada |
| (5) Purṇapraj abh ŷya | Madhv c rya | Dvaitadvāda |
| (6) Aṇubh ŷya | Vallabh c rya | Siddhādvaitavaada |
| (7) Govindabh ŷya | Baladeva Vidy bh ṣaṇa | Acintya Bhedaabhedavaada |

There are other commentaries also. But these are important from Ved ntic standpoint.



Stop to consider

Sūtra : *S tra* (Aphorism) is a technical term which was applied for writing a work by Indian scholars. A *s tra* means a short form. The definition of *s tra* is given thus :

अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।

अस्तोभमनवद्यं सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

This means – That is called a *s tra* by the experts of *s tra* which has very few words, which are not doubtful (असन्दिग्धम्) but have essence (सारवत्), which can be applied to different senses (विश्वतोमुखम्), which are not contradictory (अस्तोभम्), and are not censured (अनवद्यम्).

Bhāṣya : The definition of a *bh ŷya* (commentary) is found thus :

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र पदैः सूत्रानुसारिभिः ।

स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

This means – That is called a *bh ŷya* by the experts of *bh ŷya* where the meaning of a *s tra* is described in words following the *s tra*, i.e., in words not different in sense from the *s tra* and also where the own words of the commentator are described.

SAQ :

Why there are so many commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*? (Answer in 30 words)

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4.4 Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya

All systems of Indian philosophy centre round three main concepts : the Absolute or the ultimate Reality, the individual self (*jīva*) and the world (*jagat*). The three *Prasthānas* of Vedānta also deal with these problems in detail. But while explaining the nature and the mutual relations of these three concepts, the commentators differ in their views. As a result of which different theories were advocated by different philosophers. And thus different systems of thought have come into being under the common name of Vedānta. Śaṅkarācārya, the great philosopher has advocated the Advaita Vedānta or non-dualistic Vedānta.

Do you know what is meant by Advaita Vedānta? Advaita means *na dvaita* (न द्वैतम् अद्वैतम्). Dvaita means duality. Hence, *avaitas* means where there is no duality. But duality of what? It refers to the duality of reality. Some philosophers accept the reality of two or more principles. For example the Sāṅkhya philosophy accepts the reality of both Puruṣa and Prakṛti. So it is a dualistic philosophy. Similarly, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas accept many Padārthas as real. So their philosophy is dualism. The philosophy which accepts the reality of only one entity or principle is called non-dualism. Śaṅkara does not accept the reality of any other entity except *Brahman*. Hence, his philosophy is called Advaita Vedānta.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vṛtika* Sureśvara describes thus :

द्विधेतं द्वीतमित्याहुः तद्भावो द्वैतमुच्यते ।

तन्निषेधेन चाद्वैतम् प्रत्यग्वस्त्वभिधीयते ॥

This means—

That which goes in two ways is called द्वैत. Dvaita is the nature of द्वैत. That is called अद्वैत where this nature of द्वैत is negated. The Inner self is said to be without any duality द्वैत.

4.5 Śaṅkarācārya

The system of Advaita Vedānta is in existence from very ancient times. We find the names of Yājñavalkya, Gauḍapāda and others as the advocates of non-

dualism before Sza karaacaarya. But now-a-days, Advaita Vedānta denotes the philosophy propagated by Sza kara. This is because Sza kara is the first Advaitavaadin to have propagated the doctrine of non-dualism in a systematic and exhaustive way by refuting the rival theories.

You will be surprised to know that Sza karaacaarya lived only for 32 years during which he had authored a great number of books in order to establish his system. However, we know very little about the life of Sza kara. Whatever we know, is known from legends and stories which were written after many years of the death of this great master.

It is generally accepted that Sza kara was born in the year 788 A.D. in a small village of Kerala named Kaladi. His father was Szivaguru and his mother's name was Viszīta. He became wellversed in different scriptures at an early age. He took *sannyāsa* (renunciation) at the age of eight only. His preceptor was Govinda who taught him all the *śāstras* upto the age of twelve. After that Govinda ordered Sza kara to go to Vadarikaasrama for meditation. Sza kara went there and spent four long years in writing the commentaries and other books. In all his works Sza kara describes himself as the pupil of Govinda. Govinda, on the other hand, was the pupil of Gauḍapāda.

Sza kara travelled from place to place as a teacher, engaging in debate and discussion with the leaders of other schools of thought. He defeated them in face to face debate. In the course of his travel he visited all the important places of India. He also visited Kāmarūpa where he defeated the Tantriks. In order to establish his philosophy and to maintain the tradition of Vedānta, Sza kara established four *Maṭhas* (monasteries) in four corners of India. The chief among these was Sringeri *Maṭha* at Sringeri in Karnataka. Other *Maṭhas* are : Jyotirmaṭha at Badarik śrama, Govardhana-maṭha at Puri and Sarad maṭha at Dvaraka.

Sza karaacaarya wrote many books. He propagated the philosophy of Advaita through numerous works. He wrote both commentaries and original works. The main commentaries written by Sza kara are : the commentaries on the principal Upani sads, viz. *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kāṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhad aranyaka* Upani sads. He wrote commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra* and *Srīmadbhagavadgītā*. Among his original independent works *Vivekacūḍmaṇi*, *Upadeś sahasrā*, *Aparokṣanubhūti*, *Sarvavedāntasārasa*, *Vidyāsūdhā*, *Dṛgdr̥śyaviveka*, *tmabodha* and *Pācīkaraṇa* are important.

The works of Sza kara, especially the commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* have been commented upon by many thinkers following him. Among them the names of Padmapāda, Vācaspati Miśra, Nandagiri, Govindānanda and Advaitānanda are important.

SAQ

1. What are the works written by Śaṅkara? (Answer in 20 words)

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2. Write a brief note on the life and works of Śaṅkara. (Answer in 60 words)

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.....

4.6 Salient Features of Advaita Vedānta System :

You have already learned about Śaṅkara's life and works. You have also learned that Śaṅkara's philosophy is called Advaita, as it accepts the reality of *Brahman* only. Now, in the following lines I am going to discuss the salient features of Advaita Vedānta philosophy.

The main features of Śaṅkara's philosophy is generally expressed in a single sentence thus :

ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ।

It means : *Brahman* is the only reality, the world is false and the *jīva* is not different from *Brahman*. So here we shall discuss about the nature of *Brahman*, the world and the individual self. We shall also discuss about the relation between these three :

4.6.1 *Brahman*

In Advaita Vedānta, *Brahman* is regarded as the ultimate reality. It is described as *saccidānandarūpa*—i.e., of the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss. *Brahman* is *ekamevadvitīyam*—one without a second. It is *nirguṇa* (qualityless), *nirviśeṣa* (attributeless), *niṣkriyā* (action-less), *nirvikāra* (immutable), *nirāyava* (part-less), *nitya* (eternal) and *ananta* (infinite).

Though *Brahman* is described thus, yet in reality *Brahman* is indescribable. Every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing as associated with some quality or act or genus (*jāti*) or mode of relation. But *Brahman* being devoid of quality, action, *jāti* and relation can not be described by any word. Moreover, our speech is limited. So to describe *Brahman* with our limited speech

is to make it limited. But *Brahman* is unlimited; it is free from the limitations of time, space and causality. Hence, it is imperceptible and is beyond our comprehension and expression – *av m nasagocara*. *Brahman* is also devoid of anything of a like kind (*saj t ya*), or of a different kind (*vij t ya*) and has no internal variety (*svagata*).

Stop to consider :

Brahman is said to be differenceless. In philosophy only three types of difference or *bheda* are accepted, viz, *saj t ya*, *vij t ya* and *svagata*. Difference from similar types of things is called *saj t ya* difference. For example the difference between a mangos tree and a banyan tree. Difference between two dissimilar things is *vij t ya* difference, eg, difference between a tree and a stone. The internal difference of a thing is called *svagata* difference. This is the difference between the part and the whole. Vidyaranya Muni has described this beautifully in his Pañcadaś :

वृक्षस्य स्वगतो भेदः पत्रपुष्पफलादिभिः ।

वृक्षान्तरात् सजातीयो विजातीयः शिलादितः ॥

4.6.2 *Saguṇa Brahman* or *Īśvara*

The Upaniads describe *Brahman* as both *nirguṇa* (qualityless) and *saguṇa* (qualified). According to Śāṅkara, it is the *nirguṇa Brahman* which is the Ultimate Reality. The *saguṇa Brahman* is only an apparent phase of *nirguṇa Brahman*. *Saguṇa Brahman* is the *Īśvara* or God who occupies a lower status and is not the highest reality. *Brahman* appears as *saguṇa* only when it is endowed with *māyā*. Actually the Absolute *Brahman* cannot be related in any way to this world of multiplicity. But being associated with *māyā*, this *Brahman* appears as *Īśvara* and is the cause of origination, sustenance and destruction of the world. This *Īśvara* is *sarvajā*, *sarvaśaktimān* and *sarvavyāpī*.

4.6.3 *Maya*

Māyā is an indescribable cosmic power, because of which *Brahman* appears as *Īśvara*, the *jīva* and the world. *Māyā* is also called *avidyā* or *ajñāna* and is a power of *Īśvara*. It consists of three *guṇas* – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Māyā* is indescribable and has two powers – *varaṇa* (concealment) and *vikṣepa* (projection). It conceals the real nature of *Brahman* and projects the world of multiplicity.

Sāṅkaraācārya often uses the terms *māyā*, *avidyā* and *ajñāna* in the same sense. *Māyā* is described as *avyakta* or *anirvacanīya* (indescribable). Here

anirvacan ya means that which is neither eternally existent nor totally non-existent. As *m y* or *avidy* is neither existent nor non-existent, it is called *anirvacaniya*. If *m y* were existent, it would bring a limit to *Brahman*; if it were non-existent, the appearance of the world could not be accounted for. Further *m y* is neither identical with nor different from *Brahman*. It is not identical with *Brahman*, because *m y* is changeable and non-eternal, while *Brahman* is unchangeable and eternal. *M y* cannot be different from *Brahman* since *Brahman* is the only reality. Thus, *m y* is neither real as *Brahman*, nor unreal as a sky-flower. So it is called *anirvacan ya*.

I have already said that *m y* is also called *aj na* and *avidy*. Now there is a difficulty about the expression *aj na* or *avidy* which is negative in form. It is negation of *j na* (*na j na*) or *vidy* (*na vidy*) i.e., knowledge. But the Advaita Ved ntins regard *aj na* as a positive entity and not as a negative one. In their view *na* here implies antagonistic to knowledge (*j na virodhi*). According to the Advaita Ved ntins, *aj na* cannot be a negative entity, since it is the cause of the world.

SZan4kara describes *aj na* or *m y* as the root-cause of the world appearance and the *j va's* bondage. The variety and multiplicity of the perceptible world can not be explained simply by accepting the pure and changeless *Brahman*. Hence, *maya* is admitted as the ground of multiplicity, in association with which *Brahman* produces the world-appearance. When the qualityless *Brahman* becomes associated with *m y*, it is revealed as the qualified *Brahman* or *Isvara* whose power is *m y*. *M y* is dependent upon *Isvara*, but *Isvara* is never affected by *m y*.

Stop to consider :

Śa kara's philosophy is also called *Maa yaa vaa da*. It is because SZan4kara has tried to explain all the problems confronting his *Nirguṇa Brahmavaa da* with the help of *maya*. The word *maya* means magic. For example when a magician produces a tree before us from out of nothing, we call it *maya*. Similarly the one *Brahman* appears as the world of plurality because of *m y*. It is impossible to explain through logical categories the relation between *Brahman* and the world. This is a mystery which can not be solved by human understanding. *Maa yaa* explains this mystery and points to the finiteness of our knowledge.

4.6.4 The Individual self

It is the fundamental concept of the Advaita Ved ntins that the *J v tm* (the individual self) is identical with *Brahman*— जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः. Hence, the *j va* is actually identical with *Brahman* and as such is of the nature of *sat*, *cit* and

nanda. Like *Barhman* it is in reality *nitya* (eternal), *śuddha* (pure), *buddha* (intelligent or conscious) and *mukta* (free). It can not be limited by time, space etc. and, as such, is *ananta* (unlimited) and *vibhu* (all-pervading). It does not undergo births and deaths. The self has neither origination nor destruction. The self being of the nature of consciousness is always free. Bondage of the self is not real.

However, in the empirical level this real nature of the *jīva* is not revealed. In this level, the *jīva* appears as possessing limited existence, limited consciousness and limited bliss. The *jīva* is limited by the mind-body complex. The *jīva* suffers from pains and sorrows. It cannot be regarded as eternal, since it undergoes birth and deaths. It is also not pure, as it is subject to desire, hatred etc. In the empirical level, the *jīva* appears as the *karta* (doer) and *bhokta* (enjoyer).

The empirical *jīva* is endowed with three bodies, viz., *sthūla-sarīra* (the gross body), *śukla-sarīra* or *liṅga-sarīra* (the subtle-body) and *kāraṇa-sarīra* (the causal body). The gross body of the *jīva* means the gross material body consisting of the skin, flesh, blood, arteries, veins, fat, bones etc.

The five *prāṇas* (vital breaths), the five senses of knowledge, the five senses of action, the mind and the intellect – these seventeen elements constitute the subtle body of the *jīva*.

Avidyā or *ajñāna* constitute the causal body of the *jīva* as it is the cause of both the subtle body and the gross body.

Though in this way the empirical *jīva* appears as different from *Brahman*, yet in reality it is identical with *Brahman* from the transcendental point of view. The empirical *jīva* is only a conditioned state of *Brahman*. Being conditioned (*upahita*) by the mind-body complex *Brahman* appears as the *jīva*. *Avidyā* is the *upādhi* (condition) which causes the *jīva* to identify itself with the mind-body and undergoes all its experiences. All the limitations of the *jīva* are caused by this *upādhi*. The *jīva* appears as undergoing births and deaths only because of this *upādhi*.

Stop to consider :

The identity of the *Jīva* and *Brahman* is declared in the Upaniṣadic statements like *Tattvamasi*, *Aham brahmāsmi* etc. These are called the *mahāvākyas* as they directly declared the *jīva-brahma*-identity. According to the Advaita Vedāntins there are four such *mahāvākyas* belonging to four Vedas. These are :

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| 1. प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म - | ऐतरेयोपनिषत् - | ऋग्वेदः |
| 2. तत्त्वमसि - | छान्दोग्योपनिषत् - | सामवेदः |
| 3. अहं ब्रह्मास्मि - | बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् - | यजुर्वेदः |
| 4. अयमात्मा ब्रह्म - | माण्डुक्योपनिषत् - | अथर्ववेदः |

4.6.5 The World

According to SZA kara, the world is false or *mithy*. Now, in ordinary sense, *mithy* means non-existent, i.e., which has no reality at all. SZA kara is often criticised as regarding the world totally non-existent. It is not possible to negate something which is experienced by us. We all perceive this world as real. Hence, SZA kara's view of the falsity of the world goes against this everyday experiences of us.

But this criticism has no ground, since according to SZA kara, *mithy* does not mean non-existent or *asat*. In Advaita Vedānta, the two terms – *asat* and *mithy* bear quite different meanings. *Asat* means totally non-existent which nobody has ever experienced. For example a sky-flower is *asat* since nobody can perceive it. *Mithy*, on the other hand, means something which is neither eternally existent nor totally non-existent. It means that which is indescribable as both *sat* and *asat*. By *sat* the Advaita Vedāntins mean that which is eternally existent and is never contradicted. In this sense only *Brahman* is *sat*. The world can not be *sat* as it is contradicted when the knowledge of *Brahman* arises. Again the world is not *asat* since it has a practical reality. From the practical point of view the world is quite real. So long as true knowledge of *Brahman* is not attained, the world of experience continues to exist. Hence, the world can not be described either as *sat* or *asat* and as such it is indescribable, it is *mithy*.

Now, the existence of the world depends on *Brahman*. Hence, according to the Advaita Vedāntins, the cause of the world is *Brahman*; it is the only cause. It is *Brahman* that creates, sustains and destroys the world. But there is a problem here. The qualityless, actionless and non-dual *Brahman* by itself cannot be the cause of the world, since it lies beyond the chain of cause and effect. Hence, SZA kara maintains that *Brahman* becomes the cause of the world through the help of *māyā* or *avidyā*, without which it cannot create this world.

Again, it must be mentioned here that cause is of two types – *upādānaka* (material cause) and *nimittaka* (efficient cause). Hence, the question is : what type of cause is *Brahman*? The Advaita Vedāntins reply that *Brahman* is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the world.

An objection is raised against the material causality of *Brahman*. It is seen that the material cause is transformed into the effect. But *Brahman* is unchangeable (*avikāri*) and as such it cannot be said to be transformed into the world. How can then *Brahman* be the material cause of the world? To this the Advaita Vedāntins reply that the material cause is of two types – *pariṇāmin* or that which is really transformed into the effect and *aparīṇāmin* or that which is not really transformed but appears to have transformed into the effect. This second kind of cause is called *vivarta* cause. For example, milk is really transformed into curd, whereas in the rope-snake illusion, the rope does not change into the snake but only appears as the snake. *Brahman* is also not transformed into the world, it only appears as the world.

4.6.6 Bondage and Liberation

According to Śāṅkara, bondage of the *jīva* consists in the wrong identification of the self with mind-body-complex. When this wrong notion is removed, the *jīva* attains liberation. This wrong notion is again caused by *māyā*. Hence, liberation is attained only through the destruction of *māyā*. *Māyā* or *ajñāna* can be destroyed by the knowledge of *Brahman* only. So the knowledge of *Brahman* is regarded as the only means of liberation. Knowledge here again means the immediate intuitive knowledge of *Brahman* as identical with the *jīva*. The *Śruti* prescribes *śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (thinking) and *nididhyāsana* (meditation) for the realisation of *Brahman*. It is said—

“आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः” (i.e., The self is to be seen, is to be heard, is to be thought of and is to be meditated upon.) *ātman* and *Brahman* are synonymous. Hence, Śāṅkara says that *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are the means of *Brahmajñāna*.

As I have already said, in the view of the Advaita Vedāntins, liberation means the realisation of the true nature of individual self which is absolutely identical with *Brahman*. This revelation of the one-ness of the *jīva* with *Brahman* is termed as *brahma-*pr*āpti* or the attainment of *Brahman*. This is of the nature of unsurpassable bliss, since the essence of *Brahman* is absolute bliss. Defined negatively, liberation is the complete cessation of all pains and sorrows.

“आनन्दात्मकब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्च मोक्षः शोकनिवृत्तिश्च”

The Advaita Vedāntins advocate two types of liberation—*jīvanmukti* or liberation during embodiment and *videhamukti* or disembodied liberation. *Jīvanmukti* or liberation during embodiment is that in which the *jīva* acquires the knowledge of *Brahman* and thereby destroys *avidyā*, though he continues to live in this body because of the non-exhaustion of *prarabdha-karmans*. As the *jīva* has attained *Brahma*-knowledge he is liberated (*mukta*) from bondage. But he lives (*jīvan*), because his *prarabdha karmans* are not destroyed. *Videhamukti* or disembodied liberation is attained when the *jīva* merges with *Brahman* after his death.

Stop to Consider :

In Indian tradition two types of *karman* are accepted, viz., *prarabdha-karman* and *ārabdhakarman*. *Prarabdha-karman* is that action which has begun producing its fruits. Because of this *karman* a *jīva* is allotted his present body, his span of life and such other things. Knowledge cannot destroy this action; it is to be exhausted by enjoyment only.

The other kind of action is also called *sañcitakarman*. These have not started producing their fruits. Fruits of these actions only arise at a future time. These types of *karman* are destroyed by the knowledge of *Brahman*.

SAQ

1. What is the real nature of *Brahman*? (Answer in 30 words)

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.....
.....

2. What is *saguṇa Brahman*? (Answer in 30 words)

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.....

3. Discuss about *māyā*. (Try to answer in 50 words)

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.....
.....

4. What is the falsity of the world? (Answer in 30 words)

.....
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.....

5. What is *Jivanmukti*? (Answer in 25 words)

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.....

1.7 Vedāntasāra :

Vedāntasāra is a famous *Prakarāṇa* of Advaita Vedānta system. It is written by Sadānanda Jogendra. *Vedāntasāra* is a summery statement of the doctrines of Advaita Vedānta system as advocated by Śaṅkara. This work is very useful for the beginners of the system as it deals with the Advaita Vedāntic doctrines in a lucid and precise manner. From the standpoint of language and treatment of the topics this work is a wonderful work. After Śaṅkara has advocated his philosophical views, many rival Vedāntins like Rāmānuja, Madhva etc, have criticised his views and refuted them. To safeguard Advaita Vedānta from the attacks of these scholars many great philosophers wrote many treatises – both commentaries

and independent works. Among these the names of Vācaspati Miśra, Padmapāda, Prakāśhānanda, Sureśvara, Sarvajñamuni, Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī etc. are worth mentioning. But their works are not easily understandable by ordinary people or by students. Hence, Śaṅkara wrote this work which may be said to be an introduction to those great works of those stalwarts. That is why this work is generally prescribed for the beginners. However, it should not be thought that *Vedāntasāra* is simply a compilation of the views expressed by previous thinkers. Śaṅkara has also put forward his special views in many cases which are different from his predecessors. Of course he has not different view from Śaṅkara whose philosophical views he sums up. But he has elaborated those points which were not discussed by Śaṅkara clearly and elaborately. It is because of this Śaṅkara claims a very significant position in the galaxy of the thinkers of this system.

Stop to Consider

Prakarāṇa – This is a special type of work which deals with only a particular part of a scripture. The definition is given thus –

शास्त्रैकदेशसम्बद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम् ।

आहुः प्रकरणं नाम ग्रन्थभेदं विपश्चितः ॥ (पराशर उपपुराणम्)

It means –



The wise call that type of book a *prakarāṇa* which is related with a part of a scripture and deals with some particular topic of that *śāstra*.

The great popularity of this treatise is proved by the large number of commentaries written on it. Of these the names of three are most prominent. These are *Subodhin* written by Nṛsiṅha Sarasvatī, *Balabodhin* written by Āpodeva, and *Vidvanmanorajan* written by Rāmānanda. There are also many translations of this book – both in English and in vernacular.

4.8 The Author of *Vedāntasāra* :

The writer of *Vedāntasāra* is Śaṅkara Yogaśāstra. We know very little about the personal life of Śaṅkara. It is said that Śaṅkara lived in the last part of 15th century A.D. or early part of 16th century A.D. Śaṅkara also wrote a *Śaṅkara vijaya* which deals with the life history of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara was a *sannyāsin* who belonged to one of the ten distinguished orders of monks of Śaṅkara's school. Śaṅkara has mentioned that his preceptor was Advaita. Advaita also wrote a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Śaṅkara vijaya*.

SAQ

1. Why is *Vedāntasāra* so popular? (Answer in 20 words)

.....
.....

2. What do you know about *Vedāntasāra* and its author? (50 words)

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.....

4.9 Summing Up :

By the end of this unit you will be able to know the main philosophical views of Advaita Vedānta. We have shown here the development of Advaita Vedānta system from its origin. Vedānta philosophy has its origin in Vedānta, i.e., the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic philosophy has been systematically and logically presented in the *Brahmasūtra* of Bṛhadāraṇyaka. Different philosophical schools have developed on the basis of this work of which the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara is the most prominent. The main philosophical view of Advaita Vedānta can be summed up in a sentence thus : *Brahman* is the only reality, the world is false and the individual self is non-different from *Brahman*. *Brahman* is qualityless and actionless. But *Brahman* becomes qualified being associated with *māyā* or *ajñāna* which is an indescribable power of Īśvara. Though world is regarded as false, it is not non-existent, it has a practical reality. The individual self is not different from *Brahman*, but appears as different because of *avidyā* or *māyā*. When the individual self realises its true nature as identical with *Brahman*, it attains liberation.

We have been careful to guide you through the introductory concepts of Advaita Vedānta in such a way so that it will be comprehensible to you. We have not discussed here in depth all the metaphysical views of this system. Inquiring students can learn more from the excellent works written by many scholars. Our approach has been to guide you through the mass of information available elsewhere.

4.10 References/Suggested Readings :

- (1) Das, Rasvihari, *Introduction to Śaṅkara*, Calcutta, 1968.
- (2) Deussen, Paul, *The System of the Vedānta*, Oriental Publishers, Delhi, 1972.
- (3) Devaraja, N.K. and Hirendranath, N.S., *A Source Book of Śaṅkara*, B.H.U., Varanasi, 1962.

- (4) Mahadevan, T.M.P., *Philosophy of Advaita*, Ganesh of Co. Pvt, Ltd., Madras, 1957
- (5) Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.II, New Delhi, 1977.

Model Questions :

- (1) Write a note on *Prasthaa natraya*.
- (2) Write a note on *Sānākaācaarya*.
- (3) Write a note on *Vedāntasāra* and state the names of the important commentaries of *Vedāntasāra*.
- (4) Show your acquaintance with the main tenets of Advaita Vedānta.

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Unit 5

Vedāntasāra: Maṅgalācaraṇa, Anubandhacatuṣṭaya, Adhyāropa etc.

Contents :

- 5.1 Objectives
- 5.2 Introduction
- 5.3 Benediction
 - 5.3.1 Benedictory verse -II
 - 5.3.2 What is Vedānta
- 5.4 Anubandha
 - 5.4.1 Adhikārin
 - 5.4.2 Viśaya
 - 5.4.3 Sambandha
 - 5.4.4 Prayojana
 - 5.4.5 Necessity of a Guru
- 5.5 Adhyāropa and Apavāda
- 5.6. Ajñāna
 - 5.6.1 Nature of Ajñāna
 - 5.6.2 Types of Ajñāna
 - 5.6.3 Power of Ajñāna
- 5.7 The cause of the World
- 5.8. Creation of the World : Srstikrama
 - 5.8.1 The Nature of the Subtle Body
 - 5.8.2 Pañcī karaṇa
 - 5.8.4 Creation of Gross World
 - 5.8.4 The Gross Bodies
- 5.9 Summing Up
- 5.10 Suggested Readings.
Model Questions

5.1 Introduction

In the previous unit you have already learnt about *Vedāntasāra* and its author. You have learnt that *Vedāntasāra* is generally prescribed for the beginners who want to study Advaita Vedānta philosophy. This book is a summery statement of the doctrines of Advaita Vedānta. The book begins with a benedictory verse

(*maṅgalācarāṇa*) as has been customary to the Indian scholars. In this benedictory verse the author has offered salutation to the Supreme self. Advaita Vedānta has been presented by different authors in various ways so as to suit different levels of understanding among seekers of Truth. This book adopts the orthodox method by first explaining the kind of moral and mental disciplines needed for the pursuit of the highest Truth. It then proceeds to give a description of *ajñāna* which is at the root of all evil, according to Advaita Vedānta. After that the process of creation, which has *ajñāna* as its root cause, is elaborately discussed. The author of *Vedāntasāra* has also given us a good idea of the views of different scholars regarding the nature of the self. Here Sadānanda has tried to show that all these views are based on the Upaniṣads. The next point considered is the method of interpretation of the *mahāvākyas* like *Tattvamasi* etc. The concept of liberation and its means are also discussed by Sadānanda. One of the most important features of this work is that here the Yogic practices consisting of eightfold Yogic paths are inculcated for the purpose of attaining liberation. The language of this work is lucid and simple. Its popularity consists in its simplicity and comprehensiveness of the subject dealt with.

5.2 Objectives

Here in this unit you will be given the detailed account of some of the topics dealt in the *Vedāntasāra*. The Advaita Vedāntic doctrines already discussed in the earlier unit will be discussed here as set by Sadānanda. Thus at the end of this unit you will be able to know about :

- *Maṅgalācarāṇa* of *Vedāntasāra*.
- *Anubandhacatuṣṭaya*
- *Adhyāropa and Apavāda*
- *Ajñāna*— Its Nature and Varieties
- Creation of the world.

5.3 Benediction

Sadānanda offers salutation to the supreme self in the first verse. The first verse is—

अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दमवाङ्मनसगोचरम् ।

आत्मानमखिलाधारमाश्रयेऽभीष्टसिद्धये ॥

I shall first give you the prose order and then the translation of this verse.

अन्वयः— अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दम् अवाङ्मनस- गोचरम् अखिलाधारम् आत्मानम् (अहम्) अभीष्टसिद्धये आश्रये ।

Translation— I take refuge to the Self which is indivisible, is existence—consciousness—bliss, beyond the range of speech and mind and the substratum

of all, for the attainment of my desired thing.

Exposition of the verse :

In this verse the author takes refuge to the supreme Self for attaining his cherished desire. The author describes *Ātman*, i.e., *Brahman* as *akhaṇḍa*, *saccidānanda*, *avā mmanasagocara* and *akhilādhāra*. Now let me explain to you these words first.

अखण्डम्-

It means partless or indivisible. So *Brahman* or *ātman* is partless. According to the commentator Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī, this term means “devoid of anything of a similar kind or of a different kind and without internal variety.”-

“अखण्डमिति सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदशून्यमित्यर्थः ।”

According to Rāmatīrtha, this term means *ananta* or endless - अखण्डशब्दोऽनन्तपदपर्यायः. This term implies that the supreme self is beyond time and space and is not limited by any object.

सच्चिदानन्दम्-

Sat, *cit* and *ānanda* constitute the essential definition of *Brahman*. The meaning of the terms *sat*, *cit* and *ananda* are discussed by S'aṅkarācārya in his commentary on *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. *Sat* or existence or truth means that the nature of which never changes. It is different from *anṛta* or false. The nature of *Brahman* is *sat*. The term *Sat* further indicates that *Brahman* is the cause of the world, because the world being an effect must be produced from some existent entity.

Now, a cause is generally found to be inert like clay etc. Moreover, both conscious and material entities can have existence as is accepted by other philosophers. But *Brahman* cannot be inert or *jaḍa*. Hence, it is defined as consciousness or *cit*. The term *cit* also means that *Brahman* is not conscious, but consciousness itself. If it is said that *Brahman* is conscious, then there will be some other object of consciousness, which would involve dualism. Hence, *Brahman* is conceived of the nature of consciousness itself.

Again, *Brahman* is also of the nature of bliss or joy. But unlike worldly joy, the joy of *Brahman* is unsurpassable. Worldly joy is only a part of that unlimited joy of *Brahman*. It is said in the *Upaniṣad*-

“तस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति ।”

These terms *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are not the adjectives of *Brahman*, they are the essence of *Brahman*.

अवाङ्मनसगोचरम्-

वाक् च मनश्च वाङ्मनसी (द्वन्द्वसमासः), तयोर्गोचरः वाङ्मनसगोचरः (तत्पुरुषसमासः), न वाङ्मनसगोचरः अवाङ्मनसगोचरः (नञ्त्पुरुषः)

It means that *Brahman* is beyond the range of speech or mind. It cannot be described by our speech and cannot be thought of. Both our speech and mind are limited and hence, cannot grasp the unlimited *Brahman*. It is said in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*—

“यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह।”

[From which speech turn back, together with the mind, not reaching it]

There are other passages also in the Upaniṣads where *Brahman* is described as beyond the reach of word and thought.

अखिलाधारम्—

Brahman is the substratum (आधार) of all (अखिल). *Brahman* is the material cause of the world. All effects exist in their material cause. The Upaniṣad says— “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति तद् ब्रह्म” (तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत्)

[That from which all these beings have evolved, by which they exist and to which they return after death is *Brahman*]. Hence, *Brahman* is the cause of origination, sustenance and destruction of the world.

अभीष्टसिद्धये—

According to Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī, अभीष्ट here means निःश्रेयस, i.e., final beatitude or liberation. But Rāmānirtha maintains that this means ‘the removal of non-apprehension and misapprehension of the meaning of the śāstra and of conflicting views as to its meaning’. (अभीष्टं शास्त्रार्थप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथाप्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरसलक्षणम्). This word may also mean the fulfillment of any particular desire (अभीष्ट) of the author.

Stop to consider :

मङ्गलाचरण — all the works in Sanskrit commence with a *maṅgalācarāṇa* (benediction). This is generally done with a benedictory verse where the author salutes his favourite deity. It is believed that by this benediction any obstacle standing in the way of the completion of the work can be removed. In the present work the author Sadānanda offers salutation to the Supreme Self. The author also pays tribute to his *guru* (preceptor).

Essential definition :

The Advaita Vedāntins offer two kinds of definition of *Brahman*, viz., *svarūpalakṣaṇa* and *taṣasthalakṣaṇa*. *Svarūpalakṣaṇa* or essential definition is that in which the object is defined by its nature or essence itself (स्वरूपमेव लक्षणं स्वरूपलक्षणम्). The essential definition of *Brahman* is *sat, cit, ānanda* and *ananta*.

5.3.1 Benedictory Verse- II

After saluting the supreme self Sadānanda offers his tribute to his teacher in the next verse thus :

अर्थतोऽपि अद्वयानन्दानतीतद्वैतभानतः ।

गुरूनाराध्य वेदान्तसारं वक्ष्ये यथामति ॥

अन्वयः अतीतद्वैतभानतः अर्थतः अपि अद्वयानन्दान् गुरून् आराध्य यथामति (अहम्) वेदान्तसारं वक्ष्ये ।

Translation : Having saluted my preceptor, who, on account of his being free from the notion of duality, is in true sense Advayānanda, I shall now expound the essence of the Vedānta, according to my conception of it.

Exposition : As you have seen here, the name of the *guru* of Sadānanda is Advayānanda. The word literally means the embodiment of non-dual bliss. (अद्वय आनन्दो येषां तान् = अद्वयानन्दान्). The *guru* fully justifies his name as he is free from the sense of duality. (द्वैतभानतः).

After saluting his *guru* Sadānanda proceeds to propound *Vedāntasāra*. Nṛsiṃha Sarasvatī explains the title of the book thus—

(वेदान्तानां सारः वेदान्तसारः) वेदान्तानाम् उपनिषद्वाक्यजातानां मध्ये यः सारः यत् सिद्धान्तरहस्यं यस्मिन् ज्ञाते पुनर्ज्ञातव्यं नावशिष्यते स वेदान्तसारः ।

Thus, *Vedāntasāra* means the essence (*sāra*) of the doctrines of the Vedānta which is nothing but the Upaniṣadic passages. If one can attain the knowledge of this Vedānta, no other knowable remains for him.

SAQ :

1. How the author defines Brahman in the first benedictory verse? (Try to answer in 25 words)

.....
.....

2. What desire of the author will be fulfilled from the composition of this verse? (Answer in 20 words)

.....
.....

5.3.2 What is Vedānta?

You have already learnt about the etymological meaning of the term *Vedānta* from unit-I. However, Sadānanda gives a precise definition of Vedānta in his book. He writes—

वेदान्तो नाम उपनिषत्प्रमाणं तदुपकारिणी शारीरकसूत्रादीनि च ।

Vedānta is the evidence furnished by the Upaniṣads, as well as the *Śārīrakasūtra* etc. which help in the correct understanding of their meaning.

Now, in this sentence, the most important term is उपनिषत्प्रमाण as it provides the definition of Vedānta. So you must be very clear about its meaning. This term can be expounded in two ways. So we find in the *Subodhini*—

1. उपनिषदः एव प्रमाणम् उपनिषत्प्रमाणम् ।
2. उपनिषदो यत्र प्रमाणम् इति वा ।

In the first case it means the *pramāṇas* or evidence, i.e., instrument of knowledge in the form of the Upaniṣads.

Secondly the term means wherein the Upaniṣads are *pramāṇas*.

The word *pramāṇa* means the instrument of *pramā* or valid knowledge (प्रमायाः करणम् प्रमाणम्). Hence, Vedānta means the doctrine which is derived from the Upaniṣads or which is based upon the Upaniṣads.

Stop to consider :

Now, in this definition, the key word is Upaniṣad. Do you know what is the meaning of the term *Upaniṣad*? The etymological meaning of this term is *Brahmavidyā* or *atmavidyā* (i.e., the knowledge of *Brahman*). Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary has explained the meaning of the term *Upaniṣad* thus :

सदेधीतोः विशरण-गत्यवसादनार्थस्य उपनिपूर्वस्य क्विप्प्रत्ययान्तस्य रूपमिदम् उपनिषदिति ।

That means the word *Upaniṣad* is derived from the root *sad* with prefixes *upa* and *ni* and the suffix *kvip* (उप-नि-√सद् + क्विप् = उपनिषत्). In this explanation the prefixes *upa* and *ni* denote nearness and certainty respectively. The root *sad* has three meanings— *viśaraṇa* (to loosen), *gamana* (to lead) and *avasādana* (to destroy). Hence, the word *Upaniṣad* means that teaching or knowledge (*vidyā*) which loosens (*viśīryati*) the bondage in the form of transmigration; which certainly leads (*gamayati*) one very near to *Brahman* and which completely destroys (*avasādayati*) ignorance, the cause of bondage. Only the knowledge of *Brahman* can destroy ignorance and lead one to liberation and hence *Upaniṣad* denotes the knowledge of *Brahman*. Though this is the primary meaning of this term, yet secondarily it also means the books or scripture which contain such knowledge.

Another meaning of *sad* is 'to sit down' and hence *Upaniṣad* means sitting down near the *guru* to receive instruction. *Upaniṣad* also means secret knowledge (*rahasya vidyā*).

5.4 Anubandha

Before commencing any *Śāstra* or technical work, the Sanskrit scholars opine that four questions are to be considered— (1) What qualifications are required to render one competent for studying that *śāstra*? (2) What is the subject matter of the *śāstra*? (3) What connection or relation is there between the subject matter and the book itself? (4) What is the purpose of studying the *śāstra*? The answer to these questions constitute the *anubandhas*. The term is explained thus—

अनु स्वज्ञानाद् अनन्तरं वदन्ति शास्त्रे ग्रन्थे वा आसज्जयन्ति प्रवर्तयन्ति ये ते अनुबन्धाः ।

That is those which engage one to study a book or a *śāstra* by their knowledge are called *anubandhas*.

Unless a man knows what a particular book is about and whether he is competent to understand it and what good the knowledge will do him, he cannot be expected to apply himself to the study of the book. Thus *anubandhas* are the pre-requisites of the study of a book. *Anubandhas* are four in number. They are—

1. अधिकारी or the competent person.
2. विषयः or the subject-matter.
3. सम्बन्धः or the relation.
4. प्रयोजनम् or the purpose.

This is clearly stated in the *Vācapāyana* thus :

शास्त्रस्यादौ वक्तव्येषु अधिकारिविषयप्रयोजनसम्बन्धेषु

“ज्ञातार्थं ज्ञातसम्बन्धं श्रोतुं श्रोता प्रवर्तते ।

ग्रन्थादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥”

इत्युक्ते विषयप्रयोजनादीनामारम्भप्रयोजकत्वात् तद्धेतुत्वम् । अस्मिन् पक्षे च अनुवध्यते अनेनेति करणो घञ् ।

Hence, *anubandhas* are causes. The derivative meaning (अनुवध्यते अनेनेति) also makes this clear.

5.4.1 The Adhikārin

Now, let us discuss about the four *anubandhas* of *Vedāntasāra*. Here Sadānanda himself says that as this book is a *prakaraṇa* of *Vedānta*, hence the *anubandhas* of *Vedānta śāstra* will serve the purpose of the book also. So we will discuss here the *anubandhas* of *Vedānta* as a whole. Among the four *anubandhas* the *adhikārin* comes first, for if the qualifications of the person who is competent to study a *śāstra* are not known, then one will not apply oneself to the study of the book. Sadānanda posits the qualifications for the study of *Vedānta* thus—

अधिकारी तु विधिवदधीतवेदवेदाङ्गत्वेन आपाततः अधिगताखिलवेदार्थो अस्मिन् जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा काम्यनिषिद्धवर्जनपुरःसरं नित्यनैमित्तिक प्रायश्चित्तोपासनानुष्ठानेन निर्गतनिखिलकल्मषतया नितान्तनिर्मलस्वान्तः साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नः प्रमाता ।

The *adhikārin* is a *pramātā*. *Pramātā* again means the possessor of right knowledge. Hence, the qualified person is the *pramātā* who, by studying the Vedas and Vedā ṅgas in accordance with the prescribed method (*vidhivat*), either in this life or in the life hereafter, obtained a general idea of the entire Vedas; who has got rid of all sins by performing the *nitya* (obligatory) and *naimittika* (occasional) rites, as well as penance (*prāyas'citta*) and devotional rites (*upāsana*) and also avoiding the *kāmya* (which is done with a desire) and *niṣiddha* (prohibited) actions and thus becomes entirely pure in mind and who has acquired the four means.

In the above definition of the qualified person you have certainly noticed many technical terms. I will now explain these terms one by one.

(a) विधिवदधीतवेदवेदाङ्ग – To be an *adhikārin* for Vedānta one must study the Vedas and Vedā ṅgas. This study must be according to prescribed rule. It is prescribed in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* that 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' (one should study one's own *Veda*). To follow this rule again a student must follow some rules such as *upanayana*, *brahmacharya*, residing in the house of the *guru* etc.

(b) अस्मिन् जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा – It is seen that Vidura and other sages acquired the highest knowledge of Vedānta, though they were not allowed to study the Vedas being sūdras by birth. Then how can their cases be explained if studying of Vedas is a must for an *adhikārin*? To explain this it is said— in this life or in a previous life. That means Vidura and others were born with purity as a result of their studying the Vedas and Vedā ṅgas in a past life.

Stop to consider

Vedāṅgas—Vedāṅgas are books which are auxiliary to the Vedas. Without the help of the Vedāṅgas the study of the Vedas is not possible. Vedāṅgas are six in number— (1) *Sikṣā* (the science of proper articulation and pronunciation), (2) *Kalpa* (Rituals or ceremonies), (3) *Vyākaraṇa* (Grammar), (4) *Nirukta*, (5) *Chandas* (the science of prosody) and (6) *Jyotiṣa* (Astrology).

(c) नित्य-नैमित्तिक-काम्य-निषिद्धानि

These are the types of rites prescribed or prohibited in the scriptures. *Nitya* or obligatory rites are those which cause harm (*pratyavāya*) if not performed. The daily rites such as *sandhyā*, *vandanā* etc. are obligatory rites.

“नित्यानि अकरणे प्रत्यवायसाधनानि सन्ध्यावन्दनादीनि ।”

Naimittika or occasional rites are those which are observed on special occasions. *Jātesti* (birth sacrifice) is an occasional rite, which is performed after a son is born.

“नैमित्तिकानि पुत्रजन्माद्यनुवन्धीनि जातेष्ट्यादीनि ।”

Kāmya or optional rites are those which are performed with a desire to attain some fruit. *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is the example of optional rite which is the means of attaining heaven.

“काम्यानि स्वर्गादीष्टसाधनानि ज्योतिष्टोमादीनि ।”

Niṣiddha or forbidden action are those which bring about undesired results such as going to hell etc. Slaying of a brahmin is a forbidden thing. Here other such sins as drinking of wine etc. are also included as forbidden acts.

“निषिद्धानि नरकाद्यनिष्टसाधनानि ब्राह्मणहननादीनि ।”

Stop to consider

सन्ध्यावन्दना— The morning, noon and evening prayers of the three upper castes. The *Śruti* prescribes— “अहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीत”. The *Manusamhitā* also says that one should observe the sandhyās repeating the *Gāyatri mantra* according to rule. These rites do not produce any fruit but cause harm if not performed.

ज्योतिष्टोमः— This is a cycle of seven sacrifices, viz., Agniṣṭoma, Ukthya, Ṣoḍaśī, Atirātra, Vājapeya and Āptoryāma. Agniṣṭoma is the model of all Soma sacrifices of one day's duration. By performing *Jyotiṣṭoma* a sacrificer attains heaven. So it is said— “ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत”. So this is performed with the definite motive of attaining heaven. As such it is a *kāmya karman*.

जातेष्टि— This is a sacrifice of *iṣṭi* type which is to be performed when a son is born. In this sacrifice offering is to be given to Vaiśvānara. The injunction is found in *Taittirīya Samhitā* thus : “वैश्वानरं द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेत् पुत्रे जाते ।”

(d) प्रायश्चित्तोपासनानि—

Prāyaścitta rites are performed for expiation of sins. *Cāndrāyaṇa* etc. are *prāyaścitta* rites.

प्रायश्चित्तानि पापक्षयसाधनानि चान्द्रायणादीनि ।

Mental activities relating to *Saguṇa Brahman* such as are described in the *Sāṅdilya-vidyā* are *upāsanās* or devotional exercises.

उपासनानि सगुणब्रह्मविषयमानसव्यापाररूपाणि शाण्डिल्यविद्यादीनि ।

(e) साधनचतुष्टयः

Now, the above mentioned actions are to be performed for the purification of the mind. These actions are essential for being an *adhikārin*, but it is not mandatory that these should be performed in this life itself. Even if a person performs these activities in the previous life and thereby happens to attain the purity of mind, he is qualified for studying Vedānta and acquiring Brahma-knowledge. But he must possess *sādhana-catustaya* (four means). So Sadānanda describes these four means in his work. The four means are:

- (i) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः (Discrimination between things eternal and non-eternal)
- (ii) इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः (Indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits of action here and hereafter);
- (iii) शमादिषट्कसम्पत्तिः (Possession of the six –*śama, dama*, etc.); and
- (iv) मुमुक्षुत्वम् (Desire for release)

I shall now explain these *sādhana*s one by one as described by Sadānanda.

(i) First of all *nityanityavastuviveka*. You have already learnt that according to the Advaita Vedāntins, *Brahman* is the only eternal thing; all other things except *Brahman* are non-eternal. The discrimination between these eternal and non-eternal things is the first *sādhana*.

(ii) The result of the above mentioned discrimination is the non-attachment to the enjoyments of the things either in this life or in the life hereafter. All the enjoyments of this world are the products of action. That what is produced by action is perishable. Hence, all the enjoyments of the world are non-eternal, which end in suffering alone. When one becomes fully aware of the perishable nature of the enjoyments of the world, he is no more attached to them.

(iii) The third means of eligibility consists in the possession of six virtues, viz., *śama* (tranquility), *dama* (self-restraint), *aparati* (detachment), *titikṣā* (endurance), *samādhāna* (concentration) and *śraddhā* (faith).

Sadānanda describes thus—

नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकस्तावद्ब्रह्मैव नित्यं वस्तु ततोऽन्यदखिलमनित्यमिति विवेचनम् । ऐहिकानां स्रक् चन्दनवनितादिविषयभोगानां कर्मजन्यतया अनित्यत्ववद् आमुष्मिकाणाम् अपि अमृतादिविषयभोगानाम् अनित्यतया तेभ्यो नितरां विरतिः इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः । शमादयस्तु शमदमोपरतितितिक्षासमाधानश्रद्धाख्याः ।

Now, *śama* means the control of internal organs. It means taking the mind away from all objects other than *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.

“शमस्तावत् श्रवणादिव्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो मनसो निग्रहः ।”

Dama means the control of the external organs by taking them away from all objects except that (i.e. *śravaṇa* etc.)

“दमः बाह्येन्द्रियाणां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयोभ्यो निवर्तनम् ।”

Uparati consists in abstaining of sense-organs and mind which are controlled by *śama* and *dama* from the objects except *śravaṇa* etc. In another sense *uparati* means the abandonment of the prescribed actions according to scriptural injunctions.

“निवार्तितानाम् एतेषां तद्व्ययतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यः उपरमणमुपरतिः अथवा विहितानां कर्मणां विधिना परित्यागः ।”

Titikṣā is the endurance of such opposites as heat and cold, happiness and sorrow etc.

“तितिक्षा शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वसहिष्णुता ।”

samādhāna is the constant concentration of the mind, thus restrained, on *śravaṇa* etc. and on such other objects which are helpful to them.

“निगृहीतस्य मनसः श्रवणादौ तदनुगुणविषये च समाधि समाधनम् ।”

śraddhā is the faith in the truths of Vedānta as taught by the *guru*.

“गुरूपदिष्टवेदाल्तवाक्येषु विश्वासः श्रद्धा ।”

(iv) When a person is equipped with the three above mentioned *sādhanas* or means, he naturally desires for the attainment of liberation. This is *mumukṣutva*, the last means of eligibility. When an aspirant fulfils all these conditions, then only he becomes fit to receive the knowledge of *Brahman* as taught in the Vedānta and as advised by the *guru*. A person thus qualified is to approach a *guru* and study *Vedānta* under his guidance. Such a person is the *adhikārin*. About this *adhikārin* the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says— “शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वाऽत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति” (Having become tranquil, restrained, satisfied, patient and collected he sees the self in self). This passage of the Upaniṣad is the proof of the characteristics of the *adhikārin* mentioned above. Saṅkarācārya also describe this in *Upadeśasāhasrī*—

प्रशान्तचित्ताय जितेन्द्रियाय च
प्रहीणदोषाय यथोक्तकारिणे ।
गुणान्वितायानुगताय सर्वदा
प्रदेयमेतत् सततं मुमुक्षवे ॥

[This is always to be taught to one who is of tranquil mind, who has controlled his senses, who is free from faults, obedient, endowed with virtues, always submissive and who is constantly eager for liberation.]

The above qualifications of an *Adhikārin* signify the fact that the person competent to attain the knowledge of *Brahman* is the one who has not only undergone a complete intellectual training and studied the Vedas properly, but has also accomplished the moral training by his acquisition of the four *sādhanas*. Thus, there are two aspects of this qualification, viz., intellectual and ethical. The former

consists in the study of the Vedas and Vedāṅgas. The latter i.e., the ethical part has reference to the four *sādhanas*.

The seeker after truth is eager to distinguish between the permanent and the impermanent. This is the first qualification. The *viveka* or the distinguishing capacity of the aspirant results in *vairāgya* or detachment from all worldly objects and other-worldly pleasures. This, on its part, gives rise to certain positive means which are enumerated as *samādiṣaṭka*.

Both *sama* and *dama* are the means to acquire control of senses and thought. *Uparati* is the ansterity of acts, a renunciation in spirit. When the mind is with drawn from all external things, a natural tendency of endurance of all sorts of afflictions follows. The constant and sustained practice of mental as well as physical control leads one to *śraddhā* or faith in one's preceptor and in Vedānta. The last means is *samādhāna* or the stalrility of attitude.

SAQ :

1. What are the characteristics of an *Adhikārin*? (Answer in about 200 words)

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2. What is the necessity of action for a *Adhikārin*? (Answer in about 40 words)

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3. What are special means of becoming an *Adhikārin*? (Answer in about 100 words)

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5.4.2 Viṣaya

You have already learnt about the characteristics of a person who is competent to study Vedānta. Now among the four *Anubandhas* the second one is *Viṣayah* or subject-matter.

The subject-matter of Vedānta is the identity of the individual self (*jīva*) and Brahman, which is of the nature of pure consciousness. This identity is the *prameya* or object of knowledge here. This is the purpose of all Vedānta texts.

विषयः जीवब्रह्मैक्यं शुद्धचैतन्यं प्रमेयं तत्र एव वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यात् ।

The identity of the *jīva* and *Brahman* is the main doctrine of Advaita Vedānta. The Advaita Vedāntins maintain that this is the purpose or significance of all the Upaniṣadic passages. Hence, this is regarded as the subject-matter of *Vedānta-sāra* also.

5.4.3 Sambandha

Relation means the connection between the subject-matter and the book. This is the third *Anubandha*.

Sambandha is the relation between the *prameya* which is the identity (of the individual self and *Brahman*) and *pramāṇas* which is the Upaniṣads that establish this identity. This relation is in the form of *bodhya* (thing to be known) and the *bodhaka* (that which explains it).

सम्बन्धस्तु, तदैक्यप्रमेयस्य तत्प्रतिपादकोपनिषत्प्रमाणस्य च बोध्यबोधकभावः ।

5.4.4 Prayojana

The last *Anubandha* is *prayojana*. Actually this is the most important of the pre-conditions of the study of a *śāstra*. For it is generally said that not even a dull-witted person commences any work without knowing its necessity. (प्रयोजनम् अनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ।). If you do not know what purpose will be served by studying a book or a *śāstra*, you will not be interested in studying that. So it is the most essential *anubandha*. Now, *prayojana* of Vedānta, according to Sadānanda, is the removal of the ignorance regarding the *prameya* consisting in the identity of the *jīva* and *Brahman*, as well as the attainment of bliss which is the essence of one's own self.

प्रयोजनं तु तदैक्यप्रमेयगताज्ञाननिवृत्तिः स्वस्वरूपानन्दावाप्तिश्च ।

It is already explained by me that though the *jīva* is identical with *Brahman*, it does not realise this identity because of *ajñāna* or ignorance. When this ignorance is removed, the *jīva* realises this identity. So the purpose of Vedānta is to remove this ignorance. Now, when ignorance is destroyed, the *jīva* becomes *Brahman*, as there is no difference between them. *Brahman* is of the nature of bliss. So the

jīva is also of the nature of bliss. This nature of bliss is realised when ignorance is removed. This realisation is also the fruit of the study of Vedānta. This is testified by the *śruti* also. It is said in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* that “The knower of the self overcomes sorrow”. (तरति शोकम् आत्मवित्।). Again the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says, “He who knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman*”. (ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति।).

Stop to consider :

The Advaita Vedāntins maintain that ignorance or *ajñāna* can be destroyed by knowledge of *Brahman* only. This knowledge is immediate intuitive knowledge. This type of knowledge can be obtained from the Upaniṣads only. Among the different *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda* etc., only *śabdapramāṇa* is possible in case of *Brahman*. *Śabda* is here the Upaniṣads. So after being instructed in the nature of *Brahman* as non-different from the *jīva*, one meditates on it. Only then he achieves the direct realisation of *Brahman*. And this realisation destroys ignorance and the *jīva* perceives its identity with *Brahman*. So it is said ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति।.

5.4.5 Necessity of a Guru

As a man whose head is on fire goes to the water, so also this qualified person being scorched by the fires of the endless rounds of births, deaths etc. takes a present in his hand and approaches a *guru* (spiritual teacher). This *guru* must be well-versed in the Vedas and intent upon *Brahman*. He then becomes his follower and acts according to his advice.

Instruction from a proper teacher is absolutely necessary for the knowledge of *Brahman*. Śāṅkara has said in his commentary of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* thus, “शास्त्रज्ञोऽपि स्वातन्त्र्येण ब्रह्मज्ञानान्वेषणं न कुर्यात्।”. That means a person though learned in the scriptures, should not search for the knowledge of *Brahman* independently. He should approach a suitable *guru*. The *guru* also instructs him with great kindness. So it is said in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, “तद्विज्ञानार्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छेत् समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्” [In order to know that he should go with fuel in his hand to a teacher who is learned in the Vedas and lives entirely in *Brahman*.]

SAQ :

1. What do you know about the subject matter of Vedānta? (Answer in about 20 words)

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2. What is the necessity of Vedānta śāstra? (Answer in about 15 words)

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.....

3. Who is a *guru*? Why a *guru* is needed? (Answer in about 20 words)

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5.5 Adhyāropa and Apavāda

In the previous section you have seen that a spiritual aspirant should approach a *guru* who will instruct him accordingly. Now, what is the method which the *guru* generally follows in giving his instructions? Sadānanda says that the *guru* instructs the pupil by the method of *adhyāropa* (superimposition) and *apavāda* (withdrawal of superimposition). So let me tell you first what is meant by *adhyāropa*.

Adhyāropa is also called *adhyāsa*. It is the superimposition of the unreal on the real, just like the superimposition of snake on a rope which is not a snake. Now real (*vastu*) is *Brahman* which is existence, consciousness and bliss and is without a second. Unreal is the whole mass of unintelligent things beginning with ignorance.

“असर्पभूतायां रज्जौ सर्परोपवद् वस्तुनि अवस्त्वरोपः अध्यारोपः । वस्तु सच्चिदानन्दम् अद्वयं ब्रह्म, अज्ञानादिसकलजडसमूहोऽवस्तु ।”

Apavāda is the opposite of *Adhyāpara*. As a snake which is falsely perceived in a rope is ultimately found out to be nothing but the rope, similarly the world of unreal things beginning with ignorance, superimposed upon the Reality, is realised, at the end, to be nothing but *Brahman*. This is called *apavāda* or withdrawal of superimposition.

“अपवादो नाम रज्जुविवर्तस्य सर्पस्य रज्जुमात्रत्ववद् वस्तुविवर्तस्य अवस्तुज्ञानादेः प्रपस्य वस्तुमात्रत्वम् ।”

Stop to consider :

Brahman is, according to the Advaita Vedāntins, pure and indivisible absolute (*Akhaṇḍa*). This *Brahman* cannot be the real cause of the world. But then there is no other entity except *Brahman* which can be the cause of the world. So the *Advaitavadins* say that the world is originated from *Brahman*. But when they speak of the origin of the world, they do not believe its origin to be true. So the question is : what is meant here by origination? The Advaita Vedāntins call this *adhyāropa*. It means the apprehension of one thing as another or attributing the properties of one thing to another. Just as the snake appears in the rope which is not the cause of the snake, so also the world appears in *Brahman*. This is *adhyāropa* or *adhyāsa*.

5.6 Ajñāna

The concept of *ajñāna* is a pivotal concept in Śaṅkara's philosophy. In the previous section it has been stated that *ajñāna* etc. are the unreality which are wrongly superimposed on the real Brahman. So the questions naturally comes : what is this *ajñāna*? What is its nature? What are its varieties? In this section we will discuss this concept of *ajñāna* as propounded by Sadānanda.

5.6.1 Nature of Ajñāna

Sadānanda defines *ajñāna* thus :

अज्ञानं सदसद्भयामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं ज्ञानविरोधि भावरूपं यत्किञ्चिदिति वदन्ति । अहमज्ञ इत्याद्यनुभवाद् “देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगुढाम्” इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च ।

I shall now explain this definition to you showing the necessity of all the words in the definition. Here five characteristics of *ajñāna* are given.

These are : (1) *Anirvacanīya*, (2) *Triguṇātma*, (3) *Jñānavirodhi*, (4) *Bhāvarūpa* and (5) *Yatkiñcit*.

(1) *Ajñāna* or nescience is *anirvacanīya* i.e., indescribable. It is indescribable because it can not be described either as *sat* or *asat*. *Ajñāna* can not be regarded as *sat* or real like *Brahman*, since it is contradicted later by right knowledge. If *ajñāna* is regarded as real then it will never be contradicted at any point of time. Then there will be dualism, because there will be two entities— *Brahman* and *ajñāna*. Again *ajñāna* cannot be said to be *asat* or unreal like a sky flower, since it produces effects and is an object and is an object of our direct experience. If *ajñāna* is said to be unreal then it will fall in the same category as a sky-flower, the son of a barren woman and such other absolute non-entities. No causation can be attributed to such things. But *ajñāna* is regarded as the cause of the world. Again *ajñāna* can not be both real and unreal, since reality and unreality being mutually contradictory can not remain in the same thing at the same time. For example cowness and horseness are contradictory to each other and so these can not be the attributes of the same thing. Hence, *ajñāna* is said to be indescribable as *sat* and *asat*.

Stop to consider :

For a clear understanding of the above characteristic of *anirvacanīya*, you must know what the Advaita Vedāntins mean by the terms *sat* and *asat*. The Advaita Vedāntins define the term *sat* in a way quite different from that of other philosophers.

The Bauddhas define *sattva* as *arthakriyākāritva* i.e., the capacity to produce some effect. That means, an entity is called *sat* if it can produce some effect.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, *sat* means that which possesses the *sāmānya*

(genesis) *satta*.

But according to the Advaita Vedāntins, *sat* means that which is not contradicted at any point of time— past, present and future.— “त्रिकालावाध्यत्वं सत्त्वम्” Accordingly only *Brahman* can be *sat*.

Asat or unreal is that which is never experienced or perceived as existent. Nobody ever perceives a sky-flower or hare’s horn or son of a barren woman. So these are *asat*— यस्य कदापि प्रतीतिर्न भवति ।

Now, there are things which can be said neither *sat* nor *asat*. Such things are regarded by the Advaita Vedāntins as *anirvacnīya* or indeterminable. The objects of erroneous cognitions like rope-snake etc. are not *sat* since they are contradicted afterwards by true knowledge of rope etc. They are also not totally non-existent, as they are perceived in front of us. *Sat* and *asat* being contradictory can not remain in the same thing at the same time. Hence, the Advaita Vedāntins maintain that these are *anirvacnīya* or indescribable.

(2) Now, as *ajñāna* is said to be indescribable as *sat* and *asat*, so it may be thought that it is non-existent. To avoid this *ajñāna* is described as *triguṇātma*, i.e., composed of three *guṇas*. The *guṇas* are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These three *guṇas* are found to exist in all the products of *ajñāna*. These *guṇas* are mentioned in the following passage of the Upaniṣad— “अजामेकां लोहितक्लकृष्णाम् बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।” (Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad). These three *guṇas* are elaborately discussed in Sāṅkhya system where they are said to be the constituents of Prakṛti. *Sattva guṇa* is illuminating, *rajas* indicates activity and *tamas* indicates dullness. *Ajñāna* or *māyā* is also called Prakṛti and these three *guṇas* have been attributed to *ajñāna* also. Though these are attributes of *ajñāna*, yet they constitute its essential part.

(3) Some philosophers try to explain the word *ajñāna* as absence of knowledge. *Ajñāna* is derived as *na jñānam ajñānam*. The prefix *na* in *ajñāna* means non-existence or absence (*abhāva*). But the Advaita Vedāntins do not agree with this view. In their view, *ajñāna* is a positive entity and not a negative one. So *ajñāna* is defined as *bhavārūpa*. According to them, *ajñāna* cannot be a negative entity, since it is the material cause of the world. The material cause cannot be a negative one.

(4) Just now it is said that *ajñāna* is positive, but this will be against the derivative meaning of the word. For *ajñāna* (*na jñāna*) means *jñānābhāva* (negation of knowledge) as *na* always denotes negation (*abhāva*). To this the Advaita Vedāntins say that the prefix *na* has other meanings also such as similarity, contradiction etc. *Ajñāna* means antagonistic to knowledge (*jñānavirodhi*). This also means that *ajñāna* is destroyed by knowledge. Somebody may say that *ajñāna* being beginningless and positive can never be destroyed and as such liberation will be impossible. To refute this it is defined as *jñānavirodhi*.

Stop to Consider :

There are several meanings of *na* (नञ्). These meanings are given in the following verse—

तत्सादृश्यमभावश्च तदन्यत्वं तदल्पता ।

अप्रशस्त्यं विरोधश्च नञर्थः षट् प्रकीर्त्तिताः ॥

Hence, *na* may mean similarity (*sādrśya*), negation (*abhāva*), difference (*anyatva*), minuteness (*alpatā*), not praiseworthy (*aprāśastya*) and contradiction (*virodha*). These are the six meanings of *nañ*. Examples are—

- (1) न ब्राह्मणः अब्राह्मणः (ब्राह्मणसदृशः)
- (2) न पापम् अपापम् (पापाभावः)
- (3) न घटः अघटः (घटभिन्नं द्रव्यम्)
- (4) अनुदरा (अल्पोदरी)
- (5) अकार्यम् (अप्रशस्तं कार्यम्)

(5) *Ajñāna* is also defined as something (*yatkñ cit*). Though *ajñāna* is said to be positive, this positivity should not be taken in the strict sense of the term. The word has been used here simply to mean that *ajñāna* is something other than non-existence. Moreover, though *ajñāna* is described as positive and possessing three *guṇas*, it is not possible to describe it as 'it is like this'. Hence it is only said to be 'something'.

In this way *ajñāna* has been defined by Sadānanda. But the question is : what is the *pramāṇa* for the existence of *ajñāna*? Sadānanda says that there are both perception and verbal testimony for the existence of *ajñāna*. The immediate experiences like "I am ignorant" etc. establish the existence of *ajñāna*. Similarly the *Śruti* passage, "The power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own qualities." देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैः निगुदाम् (Śvetas'vatara Upaniṣad) is the proof of its existence.

Stop to consider :

Extracts from the commentaries :

सुवोधिनी- किमिदमज्ञानं सद्रूपमसद्रूपं वा ? नाद्यः शशविषाणतुल्यत्वेन तुच्छत्वात्; नापि द्वितीयः, असतः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः, इत्यादिहेतुभिः सत्त्वेन असत्त्वेन सर्वथा ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् तदभावप्रसङ्गम् आशङ्क्या- त्रिगुणात्मकमिति । "अजामेकाम्" इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणात्मकत्व- प्रतिपादनाद् इत्यर्थः । ननु एवम् अज्ञस्य अज्ञानस्य श्रुतिप्रसिद्धस्य व्योमादिरूपेण विततस्य सत्यवद् भासमानत्वेन संसारानिवृत्तिः इत्याशङ्क्याह-ज्ञानविरोधीति । एतादृशम् अपि अज्ञानम् आत्मसाक्षात्कारेण निवर्त्तते इत्यर्थः । तदुक्तं भगवता- "दैवी छेषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया । मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥" (गीता) इति । ज्ञानाभाव एवाज्ञानमिति तार्किकमतं निराकरोति, भावरूपमिति ।

त्रिगुणात्मकभावरूपत्वेऽपि इदमित्थम् एवेति पिण्डीकृत्य प्रदर्शयितुं न शक्यते इत्याह- यत्किञ्चिदिति । किमपि अधटितघटनपरीयः इत्यर्थः ।

विद्वन्मनोरञ्जनी - ज्ञानविरोधि अज्ञानम् इत्युक्ते ज्ञानप्रागभावे प्रसङ्गं व्युदस्यति- भावरूपमिति । सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्यमित्यपं लक्षणम् । अज्ञानस्य सत्त्वे चिदात्मवद्वाधाभावप्रसङ्गात् । असत्त्वे च वन्ध्यासुतादिवदपरोक्षप्रतिभासानुपपत्तेः । मिथ्याज्ञानम् आत्मगुणोऽज्ञानम् इति पक्षं निरस्यति- त्रिगुणात्मकमिति । गुणा लोहितशुक्लकृष्णा अज्ञानकार्येषु तेजोबन्धेषु अवान्तरप्रकृतिषु प्रसिद्धाः “यदग्ने रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तद्रूपं यच्छुक्लं तदपां यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्य” इति श्रुतेः । तथा च कार्यगतत्रिरूपेण कारणम् अपि अज्ञानम् अव्याकृतात्मकं त्रिरूपेण त्रिगुणात्मकमिति यावत् ।

SAQ :

1. Why is *ajñāna* called *anirvacaniya*? (Answer in about 30 words)

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2. What is meant by *bhāvarūpatva* of *ajñāna*? (Answer in about 20 words)

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3. Can we call *ajñāna* a negative entity? If not, why? How the meaning of *ajñāna* can be arrived? (Answer in about 30 words)

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5.6.2 Types of *Ajñāna*

The Advaita Vedāntins generally accept *ajñāna* as one, though there are some Advaitins who accept many *ajñānas*. However, Sadānanda accepts *ajñāna* as one and many depending upon the aspects from which it is viewed. Hence, he divides *ajñāna* as *samaṣṭi* and *vyasṭi*.

Samaṣṭi Ajñāna:

This *ajñāna* is said to be one or many according to the mode of observing it either collectively or individually. The idea will be clear with examples. When a collection of trees is considered collectively or as an aggregate, we speak of them as one thing, namely, a forest. Similarly, when considering a collection of waters as a whole, we call them a lake. In the same way, when we look at the aggregate of the ignorances residing in individual souls and appearing as many, we call them as one.

Taking this oneness of *ajñāna* the Upaniṣad says— “अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम्” (The one, unborn, red-white-black etc.)

This aggregate of ignorance (*samaṣṭi*) is the associate or adjunct (*upādhi*) of *Īśvara*. As it is associated with the perfect or the most excellent *Īśvara*, so it has a preponderance of pure *sattva*. Consciousness associated with it is endowed with the qualities like omniscience, omnipotence and all controlling power. It is *avyakta* (undifferentiated) and is called the *antaryāmi* (inner guide), the cause of the world and designated as *Īśvara*, because it is the illuminator of the aggregate of *ajñāna*.

This aggregate of *ajñāna* being the cause of all things is said to be the causal body of *Īśvara*. It is also called *ānandamayakośa* as it is full of bliss and envelops all things like a sheath (*kośa*). It is further called *susupti* or dreamless sleep because everything is dissolved in it. For this reason it is also regarded as the state of dissolution of the gross and subtle worlds.

In this way this text describes the various designations of *ajñāna*. It is called the causal body, as from it all the world consisting of gross and subtle bodies are originated. It covers the real nature of *Brahman* like a sheath which covers the sword. Hence it is called blissful sheath, bliss coming from *Brahman*. The whole Universe consisting of *ākāśa* etc. is produced from *ajñāna* and is dissolved in it. That is why it is called *susupti*.

Stop to consider :

Īśvara— The word *Īśvara* which popularly means God has a special concept in Advaita Vedānta. The Advaitavadins do not believe *Īśvara* to be the Ultimate Reality. *Īśvara* is as unreal as the phenomenal world. *Brahman* associated with ignorance is known as *Īśvara*. The difference between *Īśvara* and an individual self is that though the former is associated with *maya*, he is not bound by its fetters, whereas the latter is bound by it. It can be said that the first product of *ajñāna* when associated with *Brahman* is *Īśvara*.

Vyaṣṭi Ajñāna

As a forest when viewed from the standpoint of the units that compose it, may be said to be many trees and as a lake when viewed from the same point of view may be said to be quantities of water, so also ignorance when viewed from separate units is said to be many. The *Śruti* also supports this. It is said in the *Rgveda*— “इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते” (Indra appears as of many forms through *māyās*).

Thus, *ajñāna* is of two types— *samaṣṭi* (aggregate) and *vyaṣṭi* (individual). Actually it is regarded as aggregate and individual according as it is viewed as a whole or as different parts.

Just as in case of *samaṣṭi*, *vyāṣṭi ajñāna* is regarded as the associate of the inferior *jīva* and hence, it is characterised by impure *sattva*. Consciousness associated with this has limited knowledge and is devoid of the power of lordship. It is called *Prājñā* as it is the illuminator of one *ajñāna*.

The individual *ajñāna* is the causal body of the individual self, because it is the cause of *ahamkāra* (egoism) etc. It is also called the *ānandamayakośa* (blissful sheath), because it is full of bliss and covers like a sheath. It is also called *susupti* because everything is dissolved in it. However, it should be remembered that *samaṣṭi ajñāna* and *vyāṣṭi ajñāna* are ultimately not different.

Stop to consider :

Prājñā— It is the name of the individual self while in a state of dreamless sleep or slumber. In this state the self remains in a state of unity with *Brahman*, but only temporarily and is covered by *ajñāna*.

5.6.3 Powers of *Ajñāna*

The Advaita Vedāntins hold that *ajñāna* has two powers, viz., *āvaraṇa* (concealment) and *vikṣepa* (projection). By the power of concealment, *ajñāna* conceals the real nature of the self.

Here you may ask : how can the limited, non-eternal and inert *ajñāna* conceal the self which is unlimited, eternal and of the nature of consciousness?

The Advaita Vedāntins here reply that just as a small patch of cloud having obscured the sight of the seer seems to conceal the sun, so also the limited *ajñāna* having obscured the intelligence of the cogniser seems to conceal the self.

The idea here is that *ajñāna* can not really conceal the self just like the patch of cloud which cannot cover the sun extending over many miles. The cloud only comes in between the observer and the sun and thus covers up the vision of the observer in such a way that the observer cannot see the sun at all. Similar is the case with the self and *ajñāna*. *Ajñāna* only seems to obscure the self. Actually it obscures the intelligence of the cogniser and as such the real nature of the self is not revealed to him. Even when a man thinks himself bound, he is in reality the ever-free consciousness. He only does not know his real nature which is due to *ajñāna*. It is said in the *Hastāmalaka* thus :

“धनच्छन्नदृष्टिर्धनच्छन्नमर्कं यथा मन्यते निष्प्रभं चातिमूढः ।

तथा बद्धवद्भाति यो मूढदृष्टेः स नित्योपलब्धिरूपोऽहमात्मा ॥”

[As the sun appears covered by a cloud and to lose its light to a very ignorant person whose vision is obscured by the cloud, so also that self which seems to be bound to him who is unenlightened. I am that self essentially eternal consciousness.]

The second power of *ajñāna* is called *vikṣepas'akti* or the power of projection. By this power *ajñāna* projects the unreal on the real. It is by this projective power that *ajñāna* creates the world appearance on *Brahman*.

For example a rope appears as a snake. Now, there is no snake in the rope, yet how this snake appears there? Actually, ignorance regarding the rope conceals the rope and gives rise to the snake by its own power. This power of *ajñāna* is the power of projection. Similarly *ajñāna* by its power creates in the self which is covered by it the appearance of *ākāśa* etc. This is what is called power of projection. It is said in the *Vākyaśudhā*— “विक्षेपशक्तिर्लिङ्गादि ब्रह्माण्डान्तं जगत् सृजेत् ।” [The power of projection creates the world beginning with subtle bodies and ending with the cosmos.]

Stop to consider

Ajñāna endowed with the twin powers of concealment and projection is the cause which transforms, as it were, the pure, immutable, unattached and indivisible self into the *jīva* and the world. As ignorance regarding the rope gives rise to the illusion of the snake, similarly ignorance regarding the self brings before our mind the appearance of the phenomenal Universe. The self when covered by *ajñāna* appears to be the doer and enjoyer of pleasure and pain undergo the experiences of the *samsāra*.

5.7 The Cause of the World

According to the Advaita Vedāntins, *Brahman* is the cause of the world. But what type of cause is *Brahman*? Is *Brahman* material cause or efficient cause? That means, whether *Brahman* has created the world like the potter making the pot or whether *Brahman* has transformed itself into the universe like the transformation of earth into the pot. The Advaita Vedāntins hold that *Brahman* is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. However, for becoming the cause *Brahman* has to take the help of *ajñāna* or *māyā*. Only when it is associated with *ajñāna* *Brahman* can be regarded as the cause. So Sadānanda says— When consciousness associated with *ajñāna* possessed of two powers is considered from its own standpoint, it is the efficient cause. Again when it is considered from the standpoint of its *upādhi* or associate it is the material cause of the universe.

The point here is that consciousness takes the *upādhi* (associate) of *ajñāna* for being the cause. When it is looked upon from the consciousness- aspect, *ajñāna* being secondary it is the efficient cause, the creator. On the other hand, when *upādhi*- aspect (i.e. *ajñāna*) is predominant, it is material cause. That is to say *ajñāna* is the direct material cause of the world and *Brahman* being the locus of that *ajñāna* is said also to be the material cause of the world.

An example will make this idea clear. You have seen the spider weaving its web.

Here the threads of the web are produced from the body of the spider and the spider itself weaves it. The spider here is the efficient cause, as without the life-principle of the spider, its body only cannot weave the web. Again without the material body, the life-principle of the spider is not capable of weaving the web. Therefore the spider is both the material cause and the efficient cause of its web. Just as the spider weaves its web without common thread and other materials, similarly *Brahman* creates this world through its own power of *ajñāna*.

SAQ :

1. What are the types of *ajñāna*? (Answer in about 50 words)

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2. What is the difference between *Īśvara* and *Prajña*? (Answer in about 50 words)

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3. What are the power of *ajñāna*? (Answer in about 40 words)

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4. What type of cause of the world is *Brahman*? (Answer in about 30 words)

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5.8 Creation of the World : *Sṛṣṭikrama* :

In the former section it is said that *Brahman* together with *ajñāna* is the cause of the world. Here we shall discuss how this world has been evolved from *Brahman*. *Sadānanda Yogīndra* has given a vivid picture of this creation process in his work.

From consciousness (i.e. *Brahman*), associated with the projecting power of *ajñāna*, which has a preponderance of *tomoguṇa*, *ākāśa* (ether) is produced.

From *ākāśa* is produced *vāyu* (air), from *vāyu*, *agni* (fire), from *agni*, *ap* (water) and from *ap* *prthivi* (earth) is produced. In this way these five—ether, air, fire, water and earth—are produced from consciousness associated with *ajñ āna*. It is said in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, “एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः” (From this self ether was produced): Here *ātman* means *Brahman* or consciousness.

It is said here that *ajñ āna*, which is the *upādhi* of consciousness, has the preponderance of *tamoguna*. This is inferred from observing the preponderance of inertia (*jādyā*) in ether etc. That is as there is excess of inertia in ether etc. so their cause must have also excess of inertia which is due to *tamoguna*. It is said by the Naiyāyikas that the qualities of cause produce the qualities of the effect (कारणगुणा हि कार्यगुणान् आरभन्ते).

At the time of creation the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* arise in ether etc. in the proportion in which they exist in their cause. Actually all these three qualities are found in the effects, i.e., ether etc. But though they contain the portions of *sattva* and *rajas*, they have a preponderance of *tamas*. Again in comparison to the other elements, *ākāśa* contains the greatest amount of *sattva* and *prthivi*, the greatest amount of *tamas*.

These five are called subtle elements (*sukṣma bhūta*) and *tanmātra* (rudimentary elements). These are also called *apañcī kṛta* (non-quintuplicated) elements. These elements are said to be subtle because they have no gross form and cannot be perceived by our senses. These are unmixed with one another and possess only their own characteristic attributes. Thus in this state *ākāśa* is endowed with the quality of sound only. That is why they are called *tanmātra*. *Pañcī kṛāna* is a process of combining the five elements which will be discussed later. The elements in this state are not combined with one another.

From these five subtle elements subtle bodies and gross elements are produced.

5.8.1 The Nature of the Subtle Body :

In Advaita Vedānta three types of bodies of an individual self are accepted. These are *kāraṇa śarīra* (causal body), *sūkṣmaśarīra* (subtle body) and *sthūlaśarīra* (gross body). The causal body is *ajñ āna*, which is already mentioned here. Let us discuss the second type of body, i.e., subtle body.

The subtle body is also called *liṅgaśarīra* (distinguishing body). It has seventeen component parts. The seventeen parts of the subtle body are five organs of cognition, five organs of action, five vital airs, mind and intellect. It is said in the *Vedāntasāra* “सूक्ष्मशरीराणि सप्तदशावयवानि लिङ्गशरीराणि । अवयवाः तु ज्ञानेन्द्रियपकं बुद्धिमनसी कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं वायुपञ्चकं चेति ।”

The five organs of cognition are the ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose. These are produced separately in consecutive order from the *sattva*-portion of ether. That is the ears are produced from the *sattva*-portion of ether, the skin from that of

air, the eyes from that of fire, the tongue from water and the nose from earth.

Intellect (*buddhi*) is the modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) which is characterised by certitude. Mind (*manas*) is also the modification of the internal organ characterised by resolution and irresolution. *Citta* and *ahaṁkāra* are included in these two. The Advaita Vedāntins generally accept four aspects of the internal organ, viz. mind, intellect, *citta* (thinking) and *ahaṁkāra* (egoism). Here only two are said to be the components of the subtle body. Hence, Sadānanda clarifies that other two aspects of the internal organ are not excluded, they are also included in these two.

Mind and intellect are produced from the combination of the *sattva* portion of ether etc. These seven, i.e., the five organs of cognition and mind as well as intellect are inferred to be produced from the *sattva* portion as they are luminous.

The intellect together with the organs of senses constitute the *vijñānamayakośa* (cognitional sheath) of the self. This *vijñānamayakośa* is called the empirical *jīva* as it thinks itself agent and enjoyer, happy and miserable etc. This is the self which transmigrates from this world to the other worlds.

The mind together with the organs of senses constitute the *manomayakośa* (mental sheath).

The organs of action are *vāk* (the organ of speech), *pāṇi* (hands), *pāda* (feet), *pāyu* (anus) and *upastha* (generative organ). These are produced separately, in consecutive order, from the *rajas*-portion of ether etc. That means *vāk* is produced from the *rajas* portion of ether, hands from air, feet from fire, anus from water and the *upastha* from earth.

The five vital airs are—*prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. *Prāṇa* or respiration has an upward motion and abides at the tip of the nose. *Apāna* or inspiration has a downward motion and abides in the anus etc. *Vyāna* or flatuousness moves in all directions and pervades the whole body. *Udāna* or expiration which resides in the throat, is the ascending air which helps the passing out from the body. *Samāna* or digestion assimilates (i.e. digests) food and drink and has its seat in the middle of the body.

Some persons like the followers of Kāpila etc. say that there are five other airs known as *nāga*, *kūrma*, *kṛkala*, *devadatta* and *dhanāñjaya*. *Nāga* is that which causes vomiting. *Kūrma* is that which causes the opening of the eyelids, *kṛkala* causes hunger, *devadatta* causes yawning and *dhanāñjaya* nourishes the body. But the Vedāntins include these in *prāṇa* etc. and as such it is said here that there are five vital airs.

These five vital airs are produced from the combination of *rajas*-portion of ether etc. The vital airs together with the organs of action constitute the *prāṇamayakośa* (vital sheath). The active nature of this sheath shows that it is produced from *rajas* portion.

These three sheaths constitute the subtle body. This subtle body is also looked

upon as *samaṣṭi* (collective) and *vyāṣṭi* (individual). The sum total of all the subtle bodies is called the collective and is looked upon as one. When viewed individually these become the objects of many cognitions and are called individual subtle bodies.

As in the case of *ajñāna*, all the subtle bodies in the universe may be looked upon collectively or individually, like a forest and the trees that form it, or like a lake and the quantities of water that make it up. In the former case it is an aggregate or totality, and in latter it denotes the different individuals.

Consciousness associated with this totality of subtle bodies is called *Sūtrātmā*, *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *Prāṇa*. It is called *Sūtrātmā* because it passes as a thread through all subtle bodies and because it is associated with the three sheaths possessing the faculties of knowing, desire and activity.

Consciousness associated with each individual subtle body is known as *Tajjasa* (brilliant) because it has the luminous internal organ as its associate.

Stop to consider :

1. Three states of the Jīva :

The empirical *jīva* has three states of experience— (1) *jāgrat* (waking), (2) *svapna* (dream) and (3) *suṣupti* (deep or dreamless sleep).

The working state of the *jīva* is that state when knowledge is produced by sense-organs coming in contact with the objects.

The state of dream is that state in which objects of waking state are reproduced by the mind. When a person falls asleep and dreams, his sense-organs remain inactive, but he perceives different objects in dream even in the absence of such objects. This is because the experiences of the waking state remain stored up in the mind in the form of impressions and become revived in dream.

The state of deep sleep or slumber is that in which one neither perceives the external world through sense-organs, nor experiences the dream objects. This state is called the state of *avidyā-vṛtti*. In this state the *jīva* becomes one with the Ultimate Reality.

5.8.3 Pañcīkaraṇa :

The gross elements are quintuplicated. What is this *Pañcīkaraṇa* or quintuplication? This is the combining of the five subtle elements. The subtle elements are *tanmātrās* or unmixed. They are now mixed together to form gross elements. Otherwise they cannot produce the phenomenal objects of the universe. Hence, they combine with one another in a certain ratio. Mixing or combination may be done taking the same proportion of all the elements. But that will not serve the purpose, because in that case we will get only one combination of

different elements. In *pañcīkaraṇa* these are combined in different proportions. The process is described below—

Each of the five elements, viz. ether etc. is divided into two equal parts. Thus we get ten parts. Of these ten parts, each of the first five is again sub-divided into four equal parts. Then leaving the second half of each element, one of these quarters from each of the other four elements is added to the other half. This process of compounding is described in the *Pañcadas'ī* thus:

द्विधा विधाय चैकैकं चतुर्धा प्रथमं पुनः ।

स्वस्वेतरद्वितीयांशैर्योजनात् पञ्च पञ्च ते ॥

[After dividing each into two parts and the first halves again into four parts, by uniting the latter to the second half of each, each contains the five.]

It must not be supposed that there is no authority for this. For the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* mentions about the combination of three things (*trivṛtkaraṇa*). From this combination of five is implied. Now after thus combining, though all the five elements possess the five alike, they are differently named as ether etc. owing to the preponderance of that particular element in them. That means each is named after the element it contains in the largest proportion. The *Brahmasūtra* also says—*वैशेषातु तद्वादस्तद्वादः* (Their appellation is on account of the preponderance). This can be represented in tabular form thus

$$\text{Ether} - \frac{1}{2} \text{Ether} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Air} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Fire} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Water} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Earth}$$

$$\text{Air} - \frac{1}{8} \text{Ether} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Air} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Fire} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Water} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Earth}$$

$$\text{Fire} - \frac{1}{8} \text{Ether} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Air} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Fire} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Water} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Earth}$$

$$\text{Water} - \frac{1}{8} \text{Ether} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Air} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Fire} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Water} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Earth}$$

$$\text{Earth} - \frac{1}{8} \text{Ether} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Air} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Fire} + \frac{1}{8} \text{Water} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Earth}$$

Then in ether sound is manifested; in air, sound and touch; in fire, sound, touch and colour; in water, sound, touch, colour and taste; in earth, sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are manifested.

5.8.4 Creation of Gross World

From these quintuplicated elements are produced the gross world consisting of seven upper worlds, seven nether worlds and *brahmāṇḍa*. The seven upper worlds are *Bhū*, *Bhūva*, *Sva*, *Maha*, *Jana*, *Tapas*, and *Satya* existing one above the other. The seven nether worlds are *Atala*, *Vitala*, *Sutala*, *Rasātala*, *Talātala*, *Mahātala* and *Pātāla* existing one below the other. Also the four kinds of gross bodies and food and drink suitable for them are also produced from these quintuplicated elements.

5.8.5 The Gross Bodies

We have already discussed about the causal body and subtle body of the *jīva*. Now I shall tell you what is a gross body or *sthūlaśīra*.

The gross body of the *jīva* means the gross material body consisting of the skin, flesh, blood, arteries and veins, fat, marrow and bones. The *jīva* enjoys all worldly objects with this gross body. The gross body may be of four types, viz. *jarāyujā* (viviparous), *aṇḍajā* (oviparous), *svedajā* (born of moisture) and *udbhijā* (born of sprout). The viviparous are those produced from the womb. The bodies of men and animals are of this kind. The oviparous are those born from eggs. The bodies of birds and reptiles are of this kind. Those which are born of moisture are the third type. The bodies of lice, mosquitoes etc. are of this type. Those which shoot up from the ground are *udbhijā* like grass and trees.

In this case also the fourfold gross bodies may be spoken of collectively or individually according as they are viewed as one like a forest and a lake or many like the trees and the quantities of water.

Consciousness associated with this aggregate of gross bodies is called *Vaiśvānara* and *Virāt*. It is called *Vaiśvānara* on account of its identification with the whole humanity. It is called *Virāt* because it manifests in various forms. (सर्वेनसभिमानित्वात् विविधं राजमानत्वाच्चा ।). This aggregate of bodies is his gross body. It is called the *annamayakośa* (alimentary sheath), on account of its being a modification of food. It is called gross body since it is the medium of enjoyment of gross objects. It is also called waking-state.

Consciousness associated with the individual gross body is designated as *Viśva*, because it enters the gross bodies without giving up its identification with the subtle body. This individual gross body is also called the *annamayakośa* of the *jīva* and is said to be the waking state.

Stop to consider :

The Five Sheaths :

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* the five sheaths or *kośa* of the *jīva* is described. These are *annamayakośa*, *prāṇamayakośa*, *manomayakośa*, *vijñānamayakośa* and *ānandamayakośa*. Just as the sheath covers the sword, so also these *kosas* are the coverings of the real self. Man in his gross physical body is a product of food. The most elementary aspect of man is bound up with the activities of his food-sustained body. Hence, the outer most sheath which wraps him up and which to a superficial observer is his reality is styled as *annamayakośa*, the sheath of food.

In the search of real self of man one cannot stop with the gross material body. The fact of life which distinguishes the animate from the inanimate bodies leads to the deeper view that man is made of vital breaths or *prāṇas*. The self made of vital breath is styled as the sheath of *prāṇa*, *prāṇamayakośa*. It is the self of the material body and fills it as air fills a bag.

The next deeper view is the sheath of mind, *manomayakośa*. Mind denotes a higher stage of evolution than that of mere life. Mind can contemplate and comprehend the world of matter and of life. Hence the sheath of mind is superior to the sheath of breaths. It is the inner self of *prāṇamayakośa*.

More determinate than mind is consciousness born of understanding or *vijñāna*. Mind normally functions in the level of *saṁkalpa* and *vikalpa* (imagination and doubt). The evolution of consciousness due to discriminative operation of the powers of buddhi is represented by the *vijñānamayakośa*. It is made up of the elements of sure knowledge.

Both *manomaya* and *vijñānamaya* sheaths pertain to the *antahkaraṇa* (internal organ). Deeper and more comprehensive than sheath of consciousness is the sheath of joy, *ānandamayakośa*. It is the core of human personality. The body, life, mind and consciousness are sustained by the sheath of joy, hidden in man. It is the inmost self. This *ānandamaya* is the subtlest of effects and is closest to *Brahman*, which is of the nature of joy or bliss.

SAQ :

1. What is *Pañcī karaṇa* ? (Answer in about 50 words)

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2. What is the nature of subtle body? (Answer in about 50 words)

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3. What are *Sūtratmā* and *Taijasā*? (Answer in about 25 words)

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4. What are the types of gross body? (Answer in about 20 words)

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.....

5.9 Summing Up

In this unit I have dealt with some of the topics discussed in the *Vedāntāsāra*. You have now gathered some idea about the four *anubandhas* necessary for commencing the study of any *śāstra*. You have also learned about the spiritual qualifications need for a person to become competent to study Vedānta. The concept of *ajñāna* is the pivotal concept in Advaita Vedānta system. Sadānanda has given a detailed account of this very important concept. His view about the types and number of *ajñāna* is somewhat different from other Advaitins. All these things are discussed here on the basis of *Vedāntāsāra*. The world has a practical reality in Advaita Vedānta system. Hence, theory of the origination of the world is found in different works. *Vedāntāsāra*'s description is comprehensive and a detailed one.

In this unit only three concepts are discussed. Others will be discussed in the next one. I have not given here the full Sanskrit texts. It is my suggestion that the students should go through the original text carefully.

5.10 Suggested Readings :


1. Jacob, Colonel G.A., *A Manual of Hindu Pantheism The Vedāntāsāra*, Orient Publishers and Bookseller, Varanasi, 1972.
2. Jacob, Colonel G.A., *Vedāntāsāra* of Sadānanda, Choukhamba Amarbbharati Prakashan, Varanasi, 1975.

3. Nikhilananda, Swami, *Vedāntāsāra* of Sadānanda Yogīndra, Delhi, 2006
4. Pal, Bipadbhanjan, *Vedāntāsāra*, Kolkata, 1982.

Model Question :

1. Explain the definition of *ajñāna*. What are the powers of *ajñāna*? What are its varieties?
2. Discuss the process of creation of the world.
3. Write the first benedictory verse of *Vedāntāsāra* and explain it.
4. Write a note on the characteristics of *Adhikārin*.
5. What is an *anubandha*? Discuss its varieties fully.
6. Distinguish between *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*.

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Unit-6

Vedântasâra: Jîvâtman , Mahâvâkyas, Liberation etc.

- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 Objectives
- 6.3 The Jîva and Adhyaropa
 - 6.3.1 The View of Ordinary Deluded Man
 - 6.3.2 The View of the Caarvaakas
 - 6.3.3 The View of the Bauddhas :
 - 6.3.4 The View of the Mîmaamsakas
 - 6.3.5 The View of the SZuuyavaadi Bauddhas :
 - 6.3.6 The View of the Advaita Vedaantins
- 6.4 Apavaada
 - 6.4.1 Difference between Pariṇaama and Vivarta
- 6.5 The Meaning of the Mahaavaakyas
 - 6.5.1 Determining the Meaning of Tattvamasi
 - 6.5.2 Bhaagalakṣaṇais Tattvamasi :
- 6.6 The Meaning of “I am Brahman” :
 - 6.6.1 Brahman is not Phalavyāpya : ā
- 6.7 Means of Self-Realisation :
 - 6.7.1 Meaning of SZravaṇa :
 - 6.7.2 Meaning of Manana and Nididhyāna :
 - 6.7.3 Samādhi : Its Nature and Varieties :
 - 6.7.4 The Eightfold Steps :
 - 6.7.5 Obstacles to Samādhi and Their Removal
- 6.8 Jîvanmukta
 - 6.8.1 The Characteristics of a Jîvanmukta
- 6.9 Videhamukti
- 6.10 Summing up
- 6.11 Selected Readings

6.1 Introduction

In the previous unit you have already studied some of the topics discussed in the *Vedaantasâra*. In the discussion of the *anubandhas* you have been told that knowledge of the self leads one to liberation. But the problem is what is the real nature of the self. Everybody has the knowledge of his own self, but nobody attains liberation. This is because nobody has the knowledge of the

real nature of the self. Even the philosophers differ in their views regarding the nature of the self. These different views about the nature of the self has been discussed by Sadānanda. The speciality of Sadānanda is that he has found support for all these different views in the Upaniṣads which he refers accordingly. After refuting these different views Sadānanda has established the Advaita Vedāntic view of the self. According to Advaita Vedānta, the individual self is non-different from *Brahman* and hence, it is of the nature of *Brahman*. There are some sentences in the Upaniṣads which directly establish this identity of the individual self and *Brahman*, the Universal self. These are called *mahāvākyas*. The Advaita Vedāntins show that these *mahāvākyas* give *akhaṇḍārtha* by implication. The process of determination of the meaning of a *mahāvākya* has been discussed elaborately by Sadānanda. I have already said that the knowledge of self leads to liberation. There are some steps to be followed for this self-realisation. One of these steps is *Samādhi* or *yoga* which is discussed by Sadānanda in a way similar to Patañjali's aṣṭāṅgayoga. Sadānanda has given a very lucid description of the *Jīvanmukta* which is an important contribution of Advaita Vedānta to the field of Indian philosophy. The *Gīta* describes about *Sthitaprajā* who is none other than the *Jīvanmukta* of the Advaita Vedāntins.

In the present unit we will discuss all these topics together with the other related ones.



6.2 Objectives

In this unit you will be given to learn the remaining topics of Vedāntasāra. At the end of this unit you will be able to know about

- Different views about the Nature of the Individual self.
- Meaning of *Mahāvākyas*
- Means of Self-realisation
- *Jīvanmukti* and *Videhamukti*

6.3 The Jīva and Adhyaropa

In the previous unit you have learned about *adhyaropa* and *apavāda*. I have already explained to you how *ajñāna* and its products are superimposed on *Brahman*. It is said that superimposition of the unreal upon the real is *adhyaropa*. The attribution of *ajñāna* etc. which are unreal on *Brahman*, the real is general superimposition. Now we will consider how people superimpose on the innermost self (*Pratyagātmaa*) such ideas as “I am this”, “I am this”, etc. When one identifies oneself with such extraneous objects as son, property etc. which are other than one's own self, that is particular superimposition. Just as son etc. are different from the self, so also body, sense-organs, mind, intellect etc. are not the self, they

are not-self. The superimposition of this not-self on the self is particular superimposition. Now this particular superimposition is also of different types.

6.3.1 The View of Ordinary Deluded Man

An ordinary deluded person says that his son is his own self. Because in the Śruti texts, it is said, “Verily the self is born as the son” (आत्मा वै जायते पुत्रः). Moreover, it is seen that one has the same love for one’s son as for one’s own self and experiences prosperity or ruin according as one’s son fares well or ill. Hence, the son is one’s own self.

The idea here is that the son is very dear to a person. He feels happiness or sorrow whenever his son becomes happy or sorry. On account of this and on account of the scriptural passage given above ordinary persons think that the son is the self.

6.3.2 The View of the Caarvaakas

Caarvaakas are the materialists, who accept perception as the only means of knowledge. They do not accept anything as existent which is not perceived. Hence, they do not accept any self beyond this body or sense-organs. They do not believe in the Vedas or in any supernatural elements. They do not believe in God and in the existence of any other world after death. Here Sadānanda has mentioned several views regarding the nature of the self as upheld by different sections of the Caarvaakas. He has also cited some *śruti* passages in support of these views. Sadaananda mentions that these views are forwarded by the Caarvaakas on the strength of these *Śruti* passages. However, the Caarvaakas themselves do not believe in these *Śruti* passages. It is only the contention of Sadānanda who refers to these passages as authority.

I shall here describe these views as given by Sadānanda.

One school of Caarvaakas holds that this physical body is the self. Because there is the *Śruti* passage, “स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः” (i.e., This man is constituted of the essence of food) Also because it is seen that a man rushes out from a burning house leaving behind even his son. The experience of men also establishes that the body is the self. For everybody experiences as “I am fat” or “I am thin” etc. Now, fatness, thinness etc. pertain to the body, hence the body is the self.

Another section of the Caarvaakas say that the sense-organs are the self. Because there is the *Śruti*, “ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्य ऊचुः” (The sense-organs went to their father Prajapati and said), and because in the absence of the organs of sense, the functions of the body cease and because of the experience, “I am blind of one eye,” “I am deaf” etc.

It is implied here that this section of the Caarvaakas refuse the contention of the former school that the body is the self.

Another section of the Caarvaakas again says that *Prāṇa* or the vital air is the self. Their view also has the support of the *Śruti* and experience. There is the Upaniṣadic passage as, “There is another, an inner self, made of the vital airs” (अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः) Moreover, when there is the absence of vital airs (i.e., at the time of death), the sense-organs cease to act. Again there are the experiences as “I am hungry”, “I am thirsty” etc. All these point to the fact that the sense-organs cannot be the self. Hence, this section of the Caarvaakas holds that the vital air is the self. Hunger, thirst etc. are regarded as the characteristics of the vital airs as without food and drink vital airs go out of the body.

Another section of the Caarvaakas again holds that mind is the self. Their view can be supported by the *Śruti* text, “There is another, an inner self, made of the mind” (अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः). Also because when the mind goes into deep sleep, the vital airs cease to be and because of the experience, “I resolve”, “I doubt” etc. this section of the Caarvaakas holds that the mind is the self, not the vital airs.

All these above mentioned views are forwarded by Sadānanda as the views of the Caarvaakas.

6.3.3 The View of the Bauddhas

Against the view of the Caarvaakas the Bauddhas say that the intellect is the self, on account of the *Śruti* text, “There is another, an inner self, made up of cognition” (अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः); and because in the absence of an agent, an instrument is powerless and because of the experience, “I am the agent”, “I am the enjoyer” etc.

Here the idea is that the mind and the other organs mentioned earlier are only instruments of knowledge and experiencing pleasure and pain etc. Therefore, there must be an agent, separate from the instruments which controls them. Some Buddhists hold that *vijāna* is the agent and the self. The view of these Buddhists is referred to here.

6.3.4 The View of the Mīmāṃsakas

There are two sections of the Mīmāṃsakas, viz. the Praabhaakaras and the Bhaṭṭas. The Praabhaakaras are the followers of Prabhaakara Miśra and the Bhaṭṭas are the followers of Kumaarila Bhaṭṭa.

The Praabhaakara Mīmāṃsakas and also the Naiyaayikas hold that ignorance is the self, on account of such *Śruti* passages, “There is another, an inner self, made up of bliss” (अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः) and because in deep sleep the intellect etc. merge in ignorance; and because of the experience, “I am ignorant”, “I am devoid of knowledge” etc.

The Bhaṭṭas, on the other hand say that intelligence associated with ignorance is the self, on account of the Śruti text, “Self is a mass of knowledge and comprised of bliss” (प्रज्ञान एवानन्दमय); and because during deep sleep there are both consciousness and unconsciousness; and because of the experience, “I do not know myself”, etc.

Stop to Consider :

The Mīmāṃsā Philosophy : The Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy was propounded by Jaimini. The basic work of this school is *Mīmāṃsā sūtra* on which Śābarasvāmī wrote a *bhāṣya*. This commentary of Śābarasvāmī has been further explained by Prabhākara Miśra and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who differ from each other on certain points. Latter two different school were formed within the fold of Mīmāṃsā school named Prabhākara school and Bhaṭṭa school. There are many differences of view among these schools. Here, only their views about the nature of the self are mentioned. According to the Prabhākaras, the self is the substratum (*śraya*) of knowledge, but not of the nature of knowledge. It is the knower. Prabhākara holds that the self is essentially *jaḍa* (unconscious) and consciousness is only a quality of the self. This is pointed out as *ajñāna* by Sadānanda.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, on the other hand, differ from Praabhaakara and holds that the self is not wholly unconscious; it is conscious and unconscious. As substance it is unconscious and as modes it is conscious.

The Naiyaayikas like the Praabhaakaras also hold that the self is unconscious in its essential nature. Consciousness or knowledge (*buddhi*) is only a quality of the self.

6.3.5 The View of the Sūnyavādi Buddhās

A section of the Buddhists called Sūnyavādins holds that the self is identical with the void; on account of the Śruti texts, “In the beginning, there was only non-existence” (असदेवेदमग्र अत्) etc., and because during deep sleep there is an absence of everything, and because of the experience of a man who has just awakened from deep sleep, when he says, “During deep sleep I was non-existent.”

Stop to Consider :

The Buddhists :

Buddhism developed in India in the sixth century B.C. with the advent of Gautama Buddha. Gautama Buddha denied the authority of the Vedas and preached his religion which is based on the Four Noble Truths and Noble Eightfold Path. It was more a religion than a philosophy. According to Gautama

Buddha, there is nothing permanent, everything is transitory (*anitya*). He even denied the existence of a permanent self.

Buddhism is divided into many philosophical schools and has a vast literature. The main philosophical schools of Buddhism are the Sautraantikas, the Vaibhaasikas, the Yogaacaaras and the Maadhyamikas. The Yogaacaaras are also called Vij aanaavaadins as they accept only *vij na* as real, all other objects of the world are unreal for them. The view of this sect of the Buddhists is referred to here. The Maadhyamikas are called SZ nyavaadies as they maintain that everything is sz nya or void. In their view, the self is also not intelligent or a substance. Sadaananda here tries to describe their view as the self is non-existent.

6.3.6 The View of the Advaita Vedaantins

According to Sadaananda, all the above mentioned views are fallacious. For the subsequent views contradict the previous ones and as such contradict these views which are based on scriptural passages, arguments and personal experiences. Moreover, from the opposite statements of other strong Vedic texts also these views can not be supported. The Vedic texts describe the self as not gross, without eyes, without the vital airs, without the mind, not an agent, but consciousness, pure intelligence and existence etc. Secondly ‘the son’ etc. declared by these thinkers as self are all material and are illumined by Pure Consciousness and as such are non-eternal like a pot. Thirdly because of the realisation of the wise as “I am Brahman” all these items from the son to the void cannot be the self.

There are many passages in the Śruti which declare the self as different from body etc. and eternal. Thus, it is said –

अस्थूलमनण्वहस्वमदीर्घम् (It is neither gross, nor subtle, neither short nor long).
[बृहदारण्यक उप]

अचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम् (It has no eyes, no ears, no hands and no feet). [मुण्डक उप]

अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः (Without the vital force and without the mind). [मुण्डक उप]

अनन्तश्चात्मा विश्वरूपो ह्यकर्ता (The self is infinite, all-formed and non-agent) [श्वेताश्व
तर उप]

तत् सत्यं स आत्मा (It is truth. It is the self). [छान्दोग्य उप]

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् (In the beginning, O gentle one, it was existence only)
[छान्दोग्य उप]

Therefore, the self is the inner most consciousness which is the illuminator of all. It is by nature eternal, pure, intelligent, free and real नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावम् प्रत्यक्चैतन्यम्. This is the view of the Advaita Veda ntins.

6.4 Apavaada

The difference between *adhyaaropa* and *apavaada* has already been mentioned. There it is said that *apavaada* is the opposite of *adhyaaropa*. That means by *adhyaaropa* the unreal *ajāna* etc. are superimposed on real *Brahman*. By *apavaada* this superimposition is withdrawn. That means the unreal which is an unreal effect (*vivarta*) of the real is realised to be nothing but *Brahman*. This is just like the illusory appearance of rope-snake.

You see when the rope appears as a snake, it does not actually change into the snake. *Apavaada* destroys this illusion and brings out the truth. Similarly *Brahman*, through illusion, appears as the phenomenal world. The breaking up of this illusion and the consequent discovery of *Brahman*, which is the underlying reality, is called *apavaada*.

6.4.1 Difference between *Pariṇāma* and *Vivarta*

Just now it is mentioned that the world is an unreal effect of *Brahman*. Now, the question is : what is this unreal effect? Actually, about the relation between the cause and effect, different theories are held in different philosophical schools. Among these *Pariṇāma* is upheld by the *Sākhya* philosophers. The *Advaita Vedāntins* uphold the theory of *vivarta*. Let us see what is the difference between these two theories.

When a thing really attains a new state which is different from the earlier one, it is called *pariṇāma* or transformation – सतत्त्वतोऽन्यथा प्रथा विकार इत्युदीरितः. *Vikāra* means *pariṇāma*. That means *pariṇāma* is the real modification of a thing. For example milk is transformed into curd. This is real change.

When a thing without abandoning its existing state appears to be something different, it is called *vivarta* or apparent change [– अतत्त्वतोऽन्यथा प्रथा विवर्त इत्युदीरितः] When a rope appears as a snake, it does not really transform into the snake, it simply appears as the snake.

The *Advaita Vedāntins* maintain that *Brahman* becomes the cause of the world not through *pariṇāma* or transformation but through *vivarta* or appearance.

Stop to Consider :

The *Advaita Vedāntins* say that *Brahman* cannot really transform into the world. If *Brahman* is said to transform into the world abandoning its nature, then *Brahman* will have to be regarded as endowed with parts and as subject to change. This position will go against the *Vedas* which declare *Brahman* as partless and immutable. Hence, it is to be accepted that *Brahman* becomes the world without abandoning its real nature. That means *Brahman* simply appears as the world.

SAQ:

(1) What is the view of the C Ārvakas regarding the nature of the self? (Answer in about 75 words)

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.....
.....

(2) What is the nature of the self according to the Buddhists? (Answer in about 60 words)

.....
.....
.....

(3) Who are the Pr bhakaras and the Bh ūttas? (Answer in about 25 words)

.....
.....
.....

(4) What is the view of the Advaita Ved āntins about the nature of the self? (Answer in about 50 words)

.....
.....
.....

6.5 The Meaning of the Mahaavaakyas

In the *Ch āndogya Upaniṣad*, the one-ness of the *j īva* and *Brahman* has repeatedly been declared in the sentence ‘*tattvamasi*’ (That thou art). This is called *mah āvākya* (great sentence) by the Advaita Ved āntins. There are other *mah āvākyas* also which I have already mentioned in Unit I. Here we shall discuss the process of determining the meaning of ‘*tattvamasi*’.

In determining the meaning of this sentence, the Advaita Ved āntins apply the theories of *adhy āropa* and *apav āda*— आभ्याम् अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां तत्त्वंपदार्थशोधनमपि सिद्धं भवति.

By the knowledge of the proposition *tattvamasi* all dualities superimposed on *Brahman* is negated and the non-difference of the *j īva* and *Brahman* is established. In this proposition there are three words— *tat* (that), *tvam* (thou) and *asi* (art). Now in order to determine the meaning of this proposition, the

meanings of these terms should be understood first, because without knowing the meanings of words constituting a sentence, the sentence-meaning cannot be understood.

Sad nanda Yog ndra determines the meanings of *tat* and *tvam* in the following way : The meaning of *tat* includes the three elements of collective *aj na* etc., consciousness associated with it and endowed with omniscience (*sarvaj atva*) etc. as also pure consciousness unassociated with any attributes. These three elements appear as one because of superimposition caused by ignorance, just like a piece of hot iron ball in which fire and iron are cognised as non-different.

The unassociated consciousness which is the substratum of the limiting adjuncts is the implied meaning of *tat*.

The primary meaning of *tvam* is also derived in the same manner. It includes the three elements of individual *aj na*, consciousness associated with it and endowed limited knowledge etc. and consciousness not associated with any attributes appearing as one and inseparable like a hot iron ball. The unassociated transcendent consciousness of the nature of bliss which is the substratum of the limiting adjuncts is the implied meaning of the word *tvam*.

6.5.1 Determining the Meaning of Tattvamasi

The sentence *tattvamasi* conveys *akhand rtha* (non-relational or identity) by virtue of three relations of its terms, i.e., *tat* and *tvam*. These three relations are :

- (1) पदयोः सामानाधिकरण्यम्;
- (2) पदार्थयोः विशेषणविशेष्यभावः;
- (3) लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः प्रत्यगात्मलक्षणयोः

It is said also—

“सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनाम् ॥”

(1) सामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धः or the relation between two words having the same substratum is found when two words having different meanings are co-ordinated through the same case ending to express some particular meaning. For example, in the sentence *so 'yam devadattaḥ* (This is that Devadatta), the words *sah* (that) and *ayam* (this) ending in the same case (*pratham vibhakti*) signify that the Devadatta of past and the Devadatta of the present refer to one and the same person called Devadatta. (*Sah* or that usually refers to something of the past, while *ayam* or this to something present). Similarly in the sentence, “That thou art” (*tattvamasi*), the words *tat* and *tvam* ending in the same case and denoting consciousness characterised by *parokṣatva* (remoteness) etc. and consciousness characterised by *aparokṣatva* (immediacy or nearness) etc. respectively refer to one and the same consciousness.

(2) विशेषणविशेष्यभावः or the relation of predicate (adjective) and subject : That which distinguishes something from others is called विशेषण (adjective) and that which is distinguished is called विशेष्य (subject). In the sentence *so 'yam devadattaḥ*, the meaning of the word *sah devadattaḥ* is Devadatta existing in the past and the meaning of *ayam devadattaḥ* is Devadatta existing in the present. They are contrary ideas but still they are mutually related as adjective and subject (i.e. quality and qualifier) through the exclusion of mutual differences. Similarly, in the sentence, *tattvamasi*, *tat* or consciousness characterised by remoteness etc. and *tvam* or consciousness characterised by immediacy etc. qualify each other through the exclusion of mutual differences.

(3) लक्ष्यलक्षणभावसम्बन्धः or the relation of indicator and indicated is the third relation. In the sentence *so 'yam devadattaḥ* the terms *sah* and *ayam* or the meaning of them, i.e., Devadatta of the past and Devadatta of the present are the *lakṣaṇas* or indicators and the person Devadatta as distinct from the contradictory characteristics of the past and the present is the *lakṣya* or indicated here. That means these two apparently contradictory sentences *sah devadattaḥ* and *ayam devadattaḥ* indicate the same person Devadatta by eliminating the contradictory characteristics of the past and the present.

Similarly, in the sentence *tattvamasi*, the words *tat* and *tvam* or the meanings of the words, i.e., consciousness characterised by remoteness etc. and immediacy etc. respectively, are the *lakṣaṇas* and the non-conflicting part, i.e., consciousness is the *lakṣya*. By eliminating the conflicting characteristics of remoteness and immediacy etc., the sentence *tattvamasi* indicates the indivisible consciousness. This process is called *bh gaty galakṣaṇ* .

Exposition : To explain the above process I must tell you that in determining the meaning of a sentence first of all the meanings of all the words (also called terms) are to be determined. Then the grammatical relations must be established. Now, in the sentence *so 'yam devadattaḥ*, three terms are found *sah*, *ayam* and *devadattaḥ*. Here the term *devadattaḥ* is related with both *sah* and *ayam*. The term *sah* (that) generally denotes something remote or of the past. *Ayam* (this) denotes something near and present. Hence, *sah devadattaḥ* means Devadatta characterised by remoteness etc. and *ayam devadattaḥ* means Devadatta characterised by nearness etc. Now all these terms are in the same case ending, i.e., *pratham vibhakti*. This is called *s m n dhikaranya*. When there is such type of relation, then all these terms denote the same thing being related as qualified and qualifier or being identical. According to the Advaita Vedāntins, this sentence does not convey any relational meaning, but an indivisible non-relational meaning (*akhaṇḍ rtha*). The sentence *tattvamasi* is also like this.

Stop to Consider :

Two types of Meanings of a Sentence :

Usually the meaning of a sentence may be of two types– (i) *Sa sṛṣṭa* or relational and (ii) *akhaṇḍa* or non-relational.

(i) That meaning of a sentence is called relational which is conveyed by the words of a sentence through syntactical relation. The sentences *n lam utpalam* (The lotus is blue), *g m naya* (Bring the cow) etc. convey the relational meaning. In *n lam utpalam*, the words *nilam* (blue) and *utpalam* (lotus) are mutually related as the quality and qualified. In the sentence *g m naya* also the two words are related as *karma* and *kriya*.

(ii) There is another type of sentences which do not convey the relational meaning. That meaning of a sentence is called *akhaṇḍ rtha* which gives rise to a knowledge which is not conveyed by the syntactical relation of the non-synonymous words of the sentence.

For example the sentences like प्रकृष्टप्रकाशचन्द्रः (The moon is brilliant light), सोऽयं देवदत्तः (This is that Devadatta) etc. convey the non-relational meaning. In the first sentence what is intended is the knowledge of the moon; no syntactical relation of the moon with the other words is intended here. Similar is the case with the other sentence also.



6.5.2 Bhaagalakṣaṇaa is Tattvamasi

Just now we have mentioned that relational meaning is not possible in *tattvamasi*. But why? Sad nanda has explained it clearly.

In the sentence *ni lam utpalam* the meaning of the word *n lam* is blue colour and the meaning of the word *utpalam* is the flower called lotus. They respectively exclude other colours such as white etc. and other substances such as cloth etc. Thus these two words can stand in the relation of qualifier and qualified. There is no valid reason for not accepting the fact that they are mutually connected as subject and predicate or are identical, each being qualified by the other.

But in this sentence *tattvamasi* the relational meaning does not suit. Because there is the evidence of our senses against the acceptance of a connection as subject and predicate (i.e., qualified and qualifier) between consciousness characterised by remoteness and consciousness characterised by nearness, the connection being constituted by the exclusion of their mutual differences. Moreover, if we regard them as identical, each being qualified by the other, that will also be against our perception and therefore is inconsistent.

Hence, here *akhaṇḍ rtha* is to be accepted which is conveyed by *bh galakṣaṇ* only.

Stop to Consider

लक्षणा – When the primary or expressed meaning (*vacy rtha*) of a word does not fit in the context in which it is applied or goes against the intention of the speaker, some other meaning connected with the primary meaning of that word is adopted. This process of adopting some other meaning connected with the primary meaning of a word is called *lakṣaṇ* or implication. There are three types of implication, viz., *jahallakṣaṇ*, *ajahallakṣaṇ* and *jahadajahallakṣaṇ*.

(i) **जहल्लक्षणा** is that implication in which the primary meaning of a particular word is completely discarded, though the secondary meaning is somehow related to the primary meaning. For example in the sentence गङ्गायां घोषः (The cowherd village is on the Ganges), the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgā*, i.e., the river is discarded in favour of the indirect meaning which is the bank of the river *gaṅgā*.

(ii) **अजहल्लक्षणा** is that implication in which the primary sense is not wholly discarded, though some other sense related to that primary meaning is indicated. For example, in the sentence शोणः धावति (The red colour is running), the primary meaning of the word *śoṇah*, i.e., red-colour cannot be linked with the verb running. But yet the primary sense of the red colour is not forsaken and the term is taken to imply a red horse.

(iii) **जहदजहल्लक्षणा** is that implication in which a part of the primary sense of a word is given up and another part is retained. For example, in the sentence सोऽयं देवदत्तः (This is that Devadatta), the primary sense of *ayam*, i.e., Devadatta qualified by the present time etc. and the primary sense of *sah*, i.e., Devadatta qualified by the past being opposed to each other, cannot be connected as establishing identity between the two. Hence, those parts of the primary meaning which is opposed to each other are given up and the person Devadatta is accepted. This is called *bh galakṣaṇ* or *bh gaty galakṣaṇ*.

In the sentence *tattvamasi* it is not possible to accept *jahallakṣaṇ* as in the sentence *gaṅgā y m ghosaḥ prativasati* (The cowherd village is on the Ganges). In that sentence as it is not possible to construe the words ‘Ganges’ and ‘cowherd-village’ literally in the sense of container and contained respectively, that meaning of the sentence is entirely given up. It then refers by implication to the bank of the Ganges.

But in *tattvamasi* which convey the identity of consciousness characterised by immediacy and remoteness, there is contradiction in one part only. Therefore it is not proper to abandon the other part also and indicate something else by implication. Hence, here *jahallakṣaṇ* is not admissible.

Further it cannot be regarded as an instance of *ajahallakṣaṇ* as in the case of the sentence *śoṇo dh vati* (The red colour is running). The literal meaning of

that sentence, viz., the running of red colour is incongruous. But it is possible to remove this incongruity without abandoning the meaning of red by interpreting it to imply a horse of that colour. Therefore, in this case *ajahallakṣaṇ* is admissible.

But in *tattvamasi*, the literal meaning, viz., the identity of consciousness characterised by remoteness and immediacy is incongruous. If without abandoning thing meaning, any other idea connected with it be implied, still the contradiction will not be reconciled. Therefore, in this case *ajahallakṣaṇ* is inadmissible.

Hence, *jahadajahallakṣaṇ* is to be accepted in this sentence as in *so 'yam devadattaḥ*. In this sentence, the contradictory portions of the primary sense of the terms *saḥ* and *ayam* are abandoned and only the non-contradictory portion, i.e., the person Devadatta is accepted. Similarly in the sentence *tattvamasi*, the portions of the primary senses which are contradictory to each other, i.e., consciousness characterised by remoteness etc. in the case of *tat* and by immediacy etc. in the case of *tvam* are abandoned and the non-contradictory part of each of the two, i.e., the indivisible consciousness is indicated.

SAQ :

(1) How the meaning of the sentence *tattvamasi* is determined? (Answer in about 20 words)

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.....

(2) What is an *akhaṇḍartha*? (Answer in about 15 words)

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.....
.....

(3) What are the relations by which the meaning of *tattvamasi* can be determined? (Answer in about 50 words)

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.....
.....

(4) What is लक्षणा? What are its varieties? (Answer in about 50 words)

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.....
.....

(5) What type of *lakṣaṇaa* is accepted in *tattvamasi*? (Answer in about 40 words)

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6.6 The Meaning of “I am Brahman”

When the teacher in this way clarifies the meaning of the words ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ by the removal of superimpositions and makes the qualified student grasp the import of the sentence “That thou art” which is absolute unity, there arises in the mind of the student a state of Absolute Oneness in which he feels that “I am Brahman, the unchanging, pure, intelligent, free, undecaying, supreme joy, eternal and non-dual.” This mental state of Absolute oneness is called अखण्डाकारा चित्तवृत्ति. This *cittavṛtti* (modification of the internal organ) being illuminated by the reflection of Pure Consciousness takes the supreme *Brahman* that is non-different from individual self as its object and destroys the ignorance pertaining to *Brahman*. Then just as a cloth is destroyed when the threads composing it are burnt, so all the effects of ignorance are destroyed when their cause, i.e., the ignorance itself is destroyed. Even the mental state of Absolute Oneness, which forms part of those effects is also destroyed. ā

As the light of a lamp cannot illuminate the light of the sun but is overpowered by it, so also consciousness reflected in that mode (*vṛtti*) of the mind is not capable of illuminating the Supreme *Brahman* which is non-different from the individual self and is overpowered by it. And on the destruction of this state of Absolute Oneness with which that consciousness is associated, there remains only the Supreme *Brahman*, just as, on the removal of a mirror, the face reflected in it lapses into the face itself.

6.6.1 Brahman is not Phalavy pya

Now, a question may arise as to how *Brahman* is revealed? The Śruti says that “By the mind alone it is to be perceived.” (मनसैवानुद्द्रष्टव्यम्). This means that the unknown Brahman is brought into contact with only the mental state. But it is not revealed by the underlying consciousness. Brahman is self-luminous and hence, it does not require the help of another consciousness to reveal it. This is suggested by the Vedic passage “That which cannot be thought of by the mind” (यन्मनसा न मनुते) Hence, it is said—

फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम् ।

ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशाय वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता ॥

That means the authors of the scriptures have refuted the idea that the individual consciousness can manifest the Supreme *Brahman*. But they admit that for the removal of ignorance resting on *Brahman*, its pervasion by the mental mode is required.

6.7 Means of Self-Realisation

Just now we have seen that when a spiritual aspirant understands the meaning of *tattvamasi*, a mental state of Absolute Oneness in the form of “I am Brahman” arises in his mind. However, this realisation does not occur just after the hearing of *tattvamasi*. Till the realisation of the consciousness which is one’s own self, it is necessary to practise *śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (reflection), *nididhy śaṇa* (contemplation) and *sam dhi* (meditation). Hence, *śravaṇa*, *manana* etc. are said to be the means of self-realisation. Thus, through *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nididhy śana* and *sam dhi* one can attain the immediate intuitive knowledge of *Brahman* as identical with one’s own self. Thus it is said—

“श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः ।

मत्वा च सततं ध्येय एते दर्शनहेतवः ॥”

The Śruti also says— आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः (The self is to be seen, is to be heard, is to be reflected upon and is to be contemplated on.)



6.7.1 Meaning of Śravaṇa

Now, the question is : what is the meaning of *śravaṇa* etc? Sad ānanda defines *śravaṇa* thus : श्रवणं नाम षड्विधलिङ्गैः अशेषवेदान्तानाम् अद्वितीयवस्तुनि तात्पर्यावधारणम् । Hearing is the ascertainment of the purport of all the Ved āntic passages through the sixfold means (Li ṅga) that the entire Ved ānta philosophy establishes the one *Brahman* without a second.

The *lingas* are : (i) उपक्रम and उपसंहार (the beginning and the ending), (ii) अभ्यास (repetition). (iii) अपूर्वता (novelty), (iv) फल (result), (v) अर्थवाद (praise) and (vi) उपपत्ति (demonstration). Hence, it is said—

उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वताफलम् ।

अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥

Thus, in ascertaining the purport of any passage the means are, the beginning and the ending, repetition, novelty, result, praise and demonstration.

(i) उपक्रम and उपसंहार— It means the presentation of the subject matter of a section (or of a chapter) at its beginning and at the end— प्रकरण प्रतिपाद्यस्य अर्थस्य तदाद्यन्तयोरुपपादनम् उपक्रमोपसंहारौ. For example, in the 6th chapter of the

Chāndogya Upaniṣad Brahman is introduced in the beginning with the words “One only without a second (एकमेवाद्वितीयम्) etc. and again at the end with the words “All this is of the essence of that” (एतदात्म्यम् इदं सर्वम्) etc.

(ii) अभ्यास –The repeated declaration in a chapter of the subject matter is called repetition.

प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य वस्तुनः तन्मध्ये पौनःपुन्येन प्रतिपादनमभ्यासः । For example in the aforementioned chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Brahman*, the one without a second is repeated nine times in the words “That thou art” (तत्त्वमसि)

(iii) अपूर्वता –The novelty of any idea is called *apūrvatā* . In other words it means that the subject-matter of a section is not known from any other source of knowledge.

प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य अद्वितीयवस्तुनः प्रमाणान्तराविषयीकरणमपूर्वता ।

For example, the subject-matter of the said chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, i.e., *Brahman*, the one without a second can not be known through any other means except the Śruti.

(iv) फल –*Phala* means the fruit or necessity of the subject-matter i.e., the knowledge of the self or its practice as mentioned at different places.

फलं तु प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य आत्मज्ञानस्य तदनुष्ठानस्य वा तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणं प्रयोजनम् ।

For example in that very section of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the words, “The man who has got a teacher knows *Brahman*. He has to wait only till he is delivered from the body, then he becomes united with *Brahman*.” (आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद । तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ सम्पत्स्ये ।) Here the attainment of the secondless Reality is set forth as the necessity of the knowledge of *Brahman*.

(v) अर्थवाद – *Arthavāda* is the praising of the subject-matter of the section at different places. प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य तत्र तत्र प्रशंसनमर्थवादः

For example in the aforementioned chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it is said, “Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unthought, thought, the unknown, known?” (उत तमादेशम् अप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्). Here the secondless Reality is praised in these words.

(vi) उपपत्ति –This is an argument in support of the subject-matter of a section or chapter stated in different places.

प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यार्थसाधने तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणा युक्तिरुपपत्तिः ।

For example in that same chapter of the same *Upaniṣad*, the words, “O gentle one, as by means of one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known— every modification being but a mode of speech, a name and only clay being the reality.” (यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।) furnish the argument that modifications are merely a mode of speech, to

establish *Brahman*, as one without a second.

Thus with the help of these six liṅgas or means, the significance of a particular passage of the *Śruti* can be ascertained. It is with the help of these means that the purport of the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* can be said to be lying in *Brahman*, the one without a second. And by applying these liṅgas in the case of all the Upaniṣads, it can be shown that the real purport of the Upaniṣads lies in *Brahman* only. *Śravaṇa* thus means the ascertainment of the significance of the Upaniṣadic passages in *Brahman*.

6.7.3 Meaning of Manana and Nididhyāna

Manana is the unceasing reflection on *Brahman*, the one without a second, which has been heard of, by arguments in conformity with the teaching of the Vedānta.

मननं तु श्रुतस्याद्वितीयवस्तुनो वेदान्तानुगुणयुक्तिभिः अनवरतम् अनुचिन्तनम् ।

Nididhyāna is a stream of ideas consistent with the secondless Reality, to the exclusion of the notion of body and such other things which are inconsistent with it.

विजातीयदेहादिप्रत्ययरहिताद्वितीयवस्तु- सजातीयप्रत्ययप्रवाहो निदिध्यासनम् ।

6.7.4 Samādhi : Its Nature and Varieties

Among the different means of self-realisation, samādhi is the fourth and the last one. Sadānanda has not defined *samādhi*. However, the commentators have defined *samādhi* in the line of Patañjali's *Yogasāstra*. Patañjali defines Yoga as the cessation of the modifications of *citta* (योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः). This cessation is through meditation or concentration which is also called Yoga. (योगः समाधिः). Samādhi is also the final step in Eightfold Path prescribed in Yoga system. Let us now see what is the nature of *samādhi* in Advaita Vedānta.

According to Rāmānandha, meditation is the absorption of the mind in the object of knowledge (चित्तस्य ज्ञेयात्मना निश्चलावस्थानम्). This *samādhi* is of two types, viz., *savikalpaka* (with the recognition of subject and object) and *nirvikalpaka* (without such recognition). These two types of *Samādhi* in *Vedāntasāstra* correspond to the *sa prajñāta* and *asa prajñāta samādhi* accepted in Yoga system.

Savikalpaka samādhi is that in which the mental state taking the form of Brahman, the one without a second, rests on it. But the distinction of the knower and the knowledge etc. is not merged in it. Thus in this state the distinction of the knower and knowledge etc. persists, though the aspirant perceives the falsity of this distinction. In that state the knowledge of the Absolute manifests itself in spite of the consciousness of the duality. This can be likened to that state when there is the perception of clay along with the perception of the elephant etc. made of clay.

तत्र सविकल्पको नाम ज्ञानृज्ञानादिविकल्पलयानपेक्षया अद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारितायाः
चित्तवृत्तेरवस्थानम् । तदा मृन्मयगजादिभानेऽपि मृद्भानवद् द्वैतभानेऽपि अद्वैतं वस्तु भासते ।
तदुक्तं

दृशिस्वरूपं गगनोपमं परं
सकृद्विभातं त्वजमेकमक्षरम् ।
अलेपकं सर्वगतं यदद्वयं
तदेव चाहं सततं विमुक्तमोम् ॥ (उपदेशसाहस्री)

I am that ever-free *Brahman*, of the nature of consciousness, like the ether (formless), supreme, eternally luminous, birthless, the one, immutable, undefiled all-pervading and without a second.

Nirvikalpa Sam dhi is that in which the mental state, which has assumed the form of *Brahman*, the one without a second, rests in it, the distinction of the knower, knowledge etc. being obliterated in this case, so as to become completely identified with it. Then, just as when salt has been dissolved in water, it is no longer perceived separately; nothing appears but the water, so by the disappearance of the modifications of the mind after it has assumed the form of the secondless Reality, nothing appears but the self.

निर्विकल्पकस्तु ज्ञातृज्ञानादिविकल्पलयापेक्षया अद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारितायाः चित्तवृत्तेः
अतितराम् एकीभावेनावस्थानम् । तदा तु जलाकारकारितलवणानवभासेन जलमात्रत्वभासवद्
अद्वितीयवस्त्वाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्त्यनवभासेन अद्वितीयवस्तुमात्रमवभासते ।

6.7.5 The Eightfold Steps

Patajali in his *Yogasutra* has given us the eightfold method for attaining the ultimate aim, i.e., *sam dhi*. Sad nanda has taken these eightfold steps which lead to *nirvikalpaka sam dhi* from the *Yogasutra*. The definition of the eight-are also the same in *Vedantasra*.

The means ancillary to *nirvikalpaka sam dhi* are—*yama* (abstention), *niyama* (observance), *sana* (posture), *pranayama* (regulation of the breath), *pratyahara* (withdrawal of the senses), *dharana* (concentration), *dhyana* (contemplation) and *sam dhi* (meditation).

अस्याङ्गानि यमनियमासन प्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयः ।

Yama : *Yama* consists of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity and non-acceptance of gifts. That means we should practise non-violence, truthfulness etc. and abstain from inflicting of injury to others from falsehood, theft, incontinence and avarice. तत्र अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः ।

Non-violence again means abstinence from harming others by thought, word or deed. Truthfulness is maintaining identity between thought, word or deed.

Chastity is abstinence from sex relation even in thought.

Gifts consists of things likely to stand in the way of meditation. Hence non-acceptance of such things is prescribed.

Niyama : Observance consists of cleanliness, contentment, austerity, study of the scriptures and concentration on God. शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः । Hear *śauca* or cleanliness means purification of body and mind. Being satisfied with what comes of itself is called *santoṣa* or contentment. *Sv dhy ya* also includes repetition of the sacred syllable *om*.

Āsana : Posture means the placing of the hands feet etc. in particular positions, such as *padm sana*, *svastik sana* etc. करचरणादिसंस्थानविशोषलक्षणानि पद्मस्वस्तिकादीन्यासनानि ।

Prañāyāma : Regulation of breath refers to exhalation (*recaka*), inhalation (*p raka*) and retention (*kumbhaka*) of breath which are the means of restraining the vital breath. रेचकपूरककुम्भकलक्षणाः प्राणनिग्रहोपायाः प्राणायामाः ।

Pratyahāra : Withdrawal of the senses is the withdrawing of the sense-organs from their respective objects. इन्द्रियाणा स्वस्वविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याहरणं प्रत्याहारः ।

Dhāraṇa : Concentration means the fixing of the mind on *Brahman*, the one without a second. अद्वितीयवस्तुनि अन्तरिन्द्रियधारणं धारणा ।

In Patajali's system *dh raṇ* is the fixing of the mind in a particular spot. It is steadfastness of mind. But according to the Advaita Vedāntins, mind must be fixed on *Brahman* only. Thus it is said—

यत्र यत्र मनो याति ब्रह्मणस्तत्र दर्शनात् ।

मनसो धारणं चैव धारणा सा परा मता ॥

That is in whatever place the mind goes, one should see *Brahman* there, this is supreme *dh raṇ* as the mind is fixed thus.

Dhyāna : Contemplation is the flowing forth of the internal organ upon *Brahman*, the one without a second, at intervals. तत्राद्वितीयवस्तुनि विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्य अन्तरिन्द्रियवृत्तिप्रवाहो ध्यानम् ।

Dhy na is said to be intermittent. i.e., *vicchidya*. That means it is not continuous. Because of deficiency in concentration *dhy na* is not unbroken like the flow of oil. This shows the difference between *dhy na* and *sam dhi*.

Samādhi : The last means is *sam dhi*, which is actually the *savikalpaka sam dhi*, because *savikalpaka* is the means, while the *nirvikalpaka sam dhi* is the end. This has already been defined.

6.7.6 Obstacles to Samādhi and Their Removal

The *nirvikalpaka sam dhi* has four obstacles, viz. *laya* (mental inactivity), *vikṣepa* (distraction), *kaṣ ya* (passion), and *ras sv da* (enjoyment).

Laya is the lapse of the mental state into sleep because of the failure to rest on the Absolute. It is the result of laziness or fatigue.

Vikṣepa is the resting of the mental state on things other than the Absolute, because of the failure to rest on it.

Kaṣ ya is the failure of the mental state to rest on the Absolute, owing to the numbness brought on by lust or other desire, even when there is no mental inactivity or distraction.

Ras sv da is the tasting by the mental state of bliss of *savikalpaka sam dhi* owing to the failure to rest on the Absolute. Or it may mean continuing to enjoy the bliss of *savikalpaka sam dhi* while about to commence the *nirvikalpaka sam dhi*. Thus sad nanda says—

लयस्तावद् अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन चित्तवृत्तेर्निद्रा । अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन चित्तवृन्तेरन्यावलम्बनं
विक्षेपः । लयविक्षेपाभावेऽपि चित्तवृत्तेः रागादिवासनया स्तब्धीभावादखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनं कषायः ।
अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेनापि चित्तवृत्तेः सविकल्पकानन्दास्वादनं रसास्वादः । समाध्यारम्भसमये
सविकल्पकानन्दास्वादनं वा ।

When the mind, free from these four stacles, rests motionless like the flame of a lamp sheltered from the wind, as one with Absolute Consciousness, it is called *nirvikalpaka sam dhi*. So it is said in *Gauḍap dak rik* —

लये सम्बोधयेच्चित्तं विक्षिप्तं शमयेत्पुनः ।

सकषायं विजानीयाच्छमप्राप्तं न चालयेत् ॥

नास्वादयेद्रसं तत्र निःसङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत् ।

It means, when the mind has fallen into a state of inactivity, one should arouse it; when it is distracted, one should bring it back to calmness; when it becomes affected by passion, one should be aware of it; when it is controlled, one should not distract it any more. One should not linger on the bliss that comes from *savikalpaka sam dhi*, but should be unattached through discrimination.

The Gita also says— यथा दीपो निवातस्थो नेङ्गते सोपमा स्मृता । [As a lamp sheltered from the wind does not flicker, so is a Yogi's controlled mind.]

SAQ :

1. What is *savikalpaka sam dhi*? (Answer in about 20 words)

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.....

2. What are the signs for determining the purport of a passage? (Answer in about 60 words)

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.....
.....
3. What is sam dhi? What are its different types? (Answer in about 25 words)

.....
.....
4. What are the a gas of nirvikalpaka sam dhi? (Answer in about 60 words)

6.8.1 Jīvanmukta

The Advaita Ved ntins advocate two types of liberation-*jivanmukti* (liberation during embodiment) and *videhamukti* (disembodied liberation). I have given some idea of this in Unit I itself. Now I shall discuss the concept of *J vanmukta* as narrated in the *Ved ntas ra*.

A jī vanmukta or a person liberated-in-life is one who attains the immediate intuitive realisation of Absolute *Brahman* which is identical with his own self by means of the knowledge of *Brahman* and thereby destroys *aj na* and its effects like accumulated *karman* etc, doubts, errors etc. and is free from all bondage. He resides in *Brahman (brahmaniṣṭha)*. This person, though liberated, has to continue to live in this body, as his *pr rabdha karmans* remain unexhausted. *Pr rabdha karmans* of a person has to be destroyed not by knowledge but by enjoyments only. This is the state of a *j vanmukta*. In this state, though the spiritual aspirant lives an embodied life, he is not bound but liberated.

जीवन्मुक्तो नाम स्वस्वरूपाखण्डब्रह्मज्ञानेन तदज्ञानबाधनद्वारा स्वस्वरूपाखण्डब्रह्मणि साक्षात्कृते अज्ञानतत्कार्यसञ्चितकर्मसंशयविपर्ययादीनमपि बाधितत्वाद् अखिलबन्धरहितो ब्रह्मनिष्ठः ।

According to the Advaita Ved ntins, liberation is not inconsistent with embodiment. That means, it is not necessary that the body of the liberated person should 'fall' at the time of the attainment of *Brahma*-knowledge or *nirvikalpaka sam dhi*. For the body of the *j vanmukta* is bound to persist till the exhaustion of the *pr rabdha karmans*. *Prarabdha karmans* are destroyed by enjoyment only. So long as these *karmans* of the liberated person are not destroyed, his body continues, as his body itself is the fruit of *pr rabdha karman*.

That is, the spiritual aspirant whose ignorance has been destroyed by the realisation of *Brahman* in the *nirvikalpaka sam dhi* becomes liberated at once from the body if there is no strong momentum of past actions left. But if

there is, then that must be exhausted by enjoyment only by continuing to live in the present body itself. Such a person is called a *jī vanmukta*. Though associated with the body, he is untouched by ignorance or its effects. His ultimate liberation (*videhamukti*) comes with the destruction of the body.

Stop to Consider :

Pr rabdha karman— This is the accumulated action which has started bearing fruits. This type of action has brought about the present life and this continues to influence the life till its end. *Pr rabdha karmans* are not destroyed by knowledge or anything else. This must run out its course.

There are again some other actions which are called *apr rabdha*. These may be *sa cita* or accumulated and *sa cīy maa naa* or yet to come. All these actions are burnt by the fire of *Brahma*-knowledge. This means that a *jī vanmukta* is not required to enjoy the fruits of actions which have not yet started producing fruits. No new action also attaches to him.

About the *jī vanmukta* the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says—

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥

The knot of his heart is broken asunder, all his doubts are solved, and his past actions are neutralised when that which is supreme and not supreme is realised.

6.8.2 The Characteristics of A J vanmukta

Such a liberated person, on arising from meditation, though sees that by his body which is the receptacle of flesh, blood, urine, filth etc., and by his sense-organs which are the seat of blindness, slowness, unskilfulness etc., and by his internal organ which is subject to hunger, thirst, sorrow, infatuation etc. works are done according to the momentum of past impressions. He experiences the fruit of those actions which have already begun to bear fruit and which are not opposed to knowledge. He regards them not as real, because they have been already cancelled. As a man who is conscious that a magical performance is being given, even though he sees it, does not consider it as real.

The Śruti also says—

सुषुप्तवज्जाग्रति यो न पश्यति
द्वयं च पश्यन्नपि चाद्वयत्वतः ।
तथा च कुर्वन्नपि निष्क्रियश्च यः
स आत्मविन्नान्य इतीह निश्चयः ॥

He who when awake and even looking upon duality, yet like one in deep sleep,

does not see it as such, because he sees only the Absolute oneness; who though engaged in actions is free from actions; he and he alone is without doubt, the knower of the self.

Just as he continues his habit of eating, walking about etc., which existed before the attainment of true knowledge so too he follows good desires alone, or he is indifferent to both good and bad alike. It has been said, “If he who knows the secondless Reality may act as he likes, what difference is there between the knower of truth and dogs in respect of eating impure food?”. Except the fact of knowing *Brahman*, there is no difference; the one knows the self, and the other does not.

In that state, humility and other attributes which are means of acquiring right knowledge and such virtues as non-violence etc. persist to him like so many ornaments.

6.9 Videhamukti

After the exhaustion of the *prarabdha karman*, his vital force is absorbed in the Supreme *Brahman*, who is all pervading bliss and then his ignorance with its effects and their impressions is also destroyed. Then he is identified with the Absolute *Brahman*, the Supreme isolation, the embodiment of bliss, which is free from all appearance of duality. This is the ultimate liberation. The *Śruti* also says, “न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति” (His sense organs do not ascend.), “अत्रैव समवनीयते” (They are absorbed in him), “विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते” (Already liberated, he is freed).

SAQ :

1. What is jivanmukti? (Answer in about 15 words)

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.....

2. Who is a jivanmukta? (Answer in about 35 words)

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.....

3. What are the characteristics of a jivanmukta? (Answer in about 30 words)

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.....
.....

6.10 Summing up

At the end of this unit which is the last unit you have gathered a good idea of all the important topics of Advaita Vedānta. Different theories about the nature of the self have been discussed in the way presented by Sadānanda. You have certainly noticed that Sadānanda has maintained that all these views are based on some passages of the Upaniṣads, even though, in reality the Cārvākas and other *nāstika* philosophers do not accept the authority of the Vedas. This is, in fact, a speciality of Sadānanda. The determination of the meaning of *tattvamasi* is a very important topic in Advaita Vedānta system as the realisation of the meaning of the *mahāvākya* leads to liberation. This important topic has been elaborately discussed first by Sarvajñamuni. Sadānanda has followed him and his presentation is more elaborate. Discussion on *samadhi* and its eightfold means is Sadānanda's special contribution. Though Yoga as a means of liberation is admitted in Advaita Vedānta, nowhere in the extant works such elaborate descriptions are found.

In this last unit you have read about all these topics. As in former unit, here also I have not given the full Sanskrit texts. Only some selected texts are given here. However, you should go through the original texts also.

6.11 Selected Readings

All the books given in Unit I and II are also necessary for study. In addition the following books can be consulted.

1. Das, S.K., *A Systematic Study of the Vedānta*, Calcutta, 1931
2. Dasgupta, S.N., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I., Motilal Banarsidass, 1977
3. Radhakrishnan, S., *The Brahmastra. The Philosophy of Spiritual Life*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1971.
4. Sarasvati, Swami Satchidanandendra, *Salient Features of Śāṅkarā's Advaita*, Mysore, 1967.
5. Vidyaratna, Kokilesvara Sastri, *An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy*, Delhi, 1979.
6. Warrior, A.G.K., *God in Advaita*, Simla, 1977.

Model Questions :

1. Show your acquaintance with the different theories about the nature of self. What is the view of the Advaitavādins in this respect?
2. What are the steps for determining the meaning of *tattvamasi*?
3. What type of *lakṣana* is accepted in *tattvamasi*? Discuss elaborately.

4. What are the means of self-realisation?
5. Discuss elaborately the meaning of ravaṇa.
6. What is samādhi? What are its divisions? What are the means of samādhi?
7. What is the nature of a jīvanmukta? Why jīvanmukti is accepted?
8. Distinguish between pariṇāma and vivarta.

—xxx—

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